Monday, March 16, 2026
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Ghost Bites (Absa | Attacq | Burstone | CA Sales | Hyprop | Trellidor | Weaver)

Absa had a strong year in 2025 and expects even more in 2026 (JSE: ABG)

The positioning in Africa is paying off

Absa generated solid growth for investors in 2025, with HEPS up by 12.2% and the dividend per share up by a similar 12.0%. The overall value of the bank moved in the right direction, with the net asset value per share increasing by 8%. Return on Equity (ROE), the core driver of a bank’s valuation, increased from 14.8% to 15.0%.

If we dig deeper into the numbers, we find that Corporate and Investment Banking (CIB) grew earnings by 14% and achieved ROE of 21.1%. I expect to see a strong ROE here, as this business unit enjoys the best opportunities for advisory work. This boosts ROE by generating the “R” without needing to use much of the “E” in its business model. Sure enough, non-interest income grew by 16%.

In Personal and Private Banking, earnings grew by 7%. Active transactional customers grew by 3%, and Absa’s efforts to cross-sell products in the customer base appear to be paying off. ROE was 17.6% in this business unit.

Business Banking is where things headed in the wrong direction. Earnings fell by 8%, although ROE was the highest in the group at 21.5%. Revenue was up by just 2% in that business unit.

Finally, the Africa regions did ridiculously well. The macroeconomic improvements on the continent filtered through into Absa’s business, with earnings up by a whopping 51%. But ROE is only 17.1%, so they need to get that much higher – especially given the underlying risks.

I must point out that the Africa business unit doesn’t include the CIB activities in Africa. Those fall under the CIB business unit, with Africa generating R5.5 billion vs. R7.5 billion in South Africa within CIB. In other words, Absa has much more exposure to Africa than you might think – especially if you only gave the segmental breakdown a cursory glance, instead of digging into the detail.

Special mention must go to the net trading line within non-interest income, up by 30% year-on-year. The star of the show was the FICC business (Fixed Income, Currencies and Commodities), up by a delicious 51% vs. the prior period. There’s a reason why the people with multiple screens and Bloomberg terminals get paid the big bucks. Again, this sits inside CIB.

The group credit loss ratio of 88 basis points is nicely in the middle of the 75 – 100 basis points target range. This is encouraging for the general credit picture.

In terms of the 2026 outlook, they expect mid-single digit revenue growth, with the credit loss ratio expected to improve towards the bottom half of the target range. With operating expenses expected to grow by low- to mid-single digits, positive JAWS is the flavour of the year.

This is exactly what investors want to see, with JAWS measuring the difference between the growth rate in income and expenses. If JAWS is positive, it means that operating income margin is going the right way.

Finally, they expect ROE of around 16%, which would be a significant improvement vs. 2025.

The bank may be red, but the story is very green right now!

Which of these banks would you choose to invest in at the moment, if you could only choose one?


Attacq ticks the box of beating inflation – and by quite some margin (JSE: ATT)

More than 9% growth in the dividend is excellent

Investors in property companies are generally happy to see growth in the mid-single digits. They want to beat inflation as a minimum hurdle, with a few hundred basis points on top for good measure.

To see a local fund grow the dividend by 9.1% is impressive – and that’s exactly what Attacq has done in the six months to December 2025.

Attacq’s net operating income grew by 5.2%. That’s a good start to any income statement.

There was a slight decrease in the gearing (debt) ratio from 25.9% to 25.1%. Thanks to a decrease in overall interest rates, this means that net lower finance costs helped offset cost growth at the centre, allowing the increase in net operating income in the property portfolio to flow through to shareholders.

The retail properties enjoyed positive rental reversions of 3.6%. Logistics had negative reversions of 6.1%, but this portfolio tends to be lumpy with only a few leases churning in any given period. As for the office portfolio (or “collaboration hubs” as Attacq likes to call them), reversions were negative 5.9%.

Across the three portfolios, lease escalations ranged from 6.3% to 7.2%. This is a reminder that property companies face different inflationary pressures to the CPI basket that the SARB works off.

It’s also worth highlighting that Waterfall City contributed 30.9 cents per share of distributable income, while the Rest of South Africa was 29.5 cents. Investors often forget that Attacq has a portfolio that stretches well beyond the Waterfall area.

And in case you’re wondering, trading density growth at the key Mall of Africa property grew by 4.2%. The best performer in the portfolio on this metric was Lynnwood Bridge, up by 6% and boasting the highest trading density in the group by a substantial margin.


Burstone’s platform strategy makes further progress (JSE: BTN)

They’ve announced a new joint venture in Europe

Burstone Group has announced the launch of a joint venture in Germany and the Netherlands with Hines European Real Estate Partners III. The portfolio will be seeded with light industrial assets.

This is precisely the strategy that Burstone has been talking about for ages now. Essentially, they want to act as property investor and asset manager, generating fees along the way that boost performance. That’s the theory, at least.

The Hines fund and Burstone will contribute a combined R3.2 billion in equity to this joint venture. Burstone is on the hook for only 20% of the equity (funded through existing credit lines), yet they will act as the investment and asset manager for the entire joint venture.

Why does this make sense for Hines? Well, these enormous offshore funds have neither the time, nor the inclination, to actively manage their portfolios to the same extent that Burstone is able to. Burstone has more than enough skin in the game here to create alignment with Hines, so it seems like a decent deal for all involved.

There’s no shortage of financial leverage in this structure. The joint venture itself will be funded at a loan-to-value of 60%. As noted above, Burstone’s equity contribution is being funded by existing group facilities on the Burstone balance sheet.

This shows you that in a developed market environment with structurally lower rates, there’s more debt in property deals than you would typically see in South Africa.


CA Sales is doing much better than I expected (JSE: CAA)

With plenty of concerns around Botswana in the market, this company has bucked the trend

I’ve been holding my breath for an earnings update by CA Sales Holdings. Although the company has done a great job of diversifying its earnings in Africa, Botswana is still the market that it calls home.

And as we know from the issues facing De Beers in the mined diamond space, as well as the recent update from retailer Choppies (JSE: CHP), the macroeconomic pressures are piling up in that market.

Despite these concerns, CA Sales released a trading statement for the right reasons. They expect HEPS to grow by between 15% and 20% for the year ended December 2025. Sure, acquisitions will play a role here, but this is still an impressive performance.

I look forward to the release of full results on 26 March.


Hyprop will increase its payout ratio (JSE: HYP)

Shareholders will have to be patient for the juicier full-year dividend, though

Hyprop has amended the dividend policy for FY26, with an increase in the payout ratio from 80% to 82.5%. The shape over the year is interesting, as they pay 95% of distributable income from the South African portfolio as an interim dividend, with the final dividend then taking into account the group results.

With the group believing that they are on track to achieve the upper end of the guided growth of 10% to 12% in distributable income per share for the year ended June 2026, this is an encouraging outlook for the dividend.

The interim numbers for the six months to December are far less exciting, though. Distributable income may have increased by 12.9%, but distributable income per share was only up by 5.4% thanks to additional shares in issue. The interim dividend grew by just 4.9%.

There are encouraging underlying metrics, like trading density up by 7.5% in the South African portfolio and positive rent reversions of 7.6%. In Eastern Europe, trading density increased by 3.6%, while positive rent reversions were 2.7%.

The footfall stats are interesting. This metric increased by 1.9% in South Africa, but fell by 3.0% in Eastern Europe.

I noted that the vacancy level at Table Bay Mall is 2.3%, significantly above Canal Walk (1.4%) and especially Somerset Mall and CapeGate, both just 0.1%. Even though Table Bay Mall is almost as big as CapeGate, footfall was just 2.9 million for the period vs. 5.3 million at CapeGate. I still think they overpaid for Table Bay Mall, despite all the growth happening out there.

The vacancy levels in the properties in Gauteng are significantly higher. Clearwater is sitting at a worrying 6.9%!

The group loan-to-value ratio has improved from 33.6% to 31.0%. They have R7.9 billion in ZAR-denominated debt and R5.9 billion in EUR-denominated debt.


Trellidor’s HEPS did a magical disappearing act (JSE: TRL)

They are still profitable – but only just

Trellidor has released results for the six months to December 2025. HEPS fell by a revolting 98.1%, coming in at just 0.6 cents for the period.

The problems started right at the top of the income statement, with revenue from continuing operations down by 21.3%. If you use total operations, it fell by 47.1%. The disposal of Taylor and NMC are relevant here.

The main reason for the drop in revenue from R204.8 million to R161.1 million is that there was a lumpy contract in the UK of R38 million that didn’t repeat in this period. That accounts for most, but not all, of the drop.

If there’s a silver lining, it’s that net debt was almost halved. Still, with net debt of R46.7 million vs. interim EBIT of just R3.5 million, Trellidor looks to be in a precarious position.

The houses protected by the products are much safer than the balance sheet at the moment. It’s little wonder that the share price is down 40% in the past 12 months.


A casual 40% increase in HEPS at Weaver Fintech (JSE: WVR)

I’m a very happy shareholder

The J-curve is such a pretty thing. When a technology company hits that upward slope and starts generating profits at a high incremental margin, it’s a good time to be a shareholder. It’s even better if you got in before the market actually realised just how good things were going to be.

Weaver’s share price is up 123% over 12 months. I bought my shares after the company appeared on Unlock the Stock last year (when they were still called Homechoice International). That’s all the evidence you need that my platforms are also my research processes.

Why is it doing so well? Buy Now, Pay Later (BNPL) adoption has really taken off in South Africa. Weaver has a variety of financial products, but BNPL seems to have been the catalyst for the upswing in growth.

With revenue growth of 23% and return on equity of 14.7%, Weaver is putting out exceptional numbers. HEPS is up 40% and the full-year dividend grew by 42%, so the cash quality of earnings is excellent.

With 4.3 million customers vs. 3.1 million a year ago, Weaver is growing at a remarkable pace. And like all great technology ecosystems, they have plenty of product opportunities in the pipeline.

Curious to learn more? Register to attend Unlock the Stock on Thursday this week at midday. As I said, this platform was core to my due diligence process on Weaver last year! You can attend for free, but you must register here.


Nibbles:

  • Director dealings:
    • The CEO of AngloGold Ashanti (JSE: ANG) received share awards worth R58.7 million and sold the entire lot.
    • Through participation in the Ethos Capital (JSE: EPE) pro-rata repurchase, three directors of the company sold shares worth around R36 million.
    • The CEO of KAL Group (JSE: KAL) bought shares in the company worth R995k.
    • NEPI Rockcastle (JSE: NRP) announced that an associate of Andre van der Veer bought CFDs with a value of almost R900k.
    • A non-executive director of Anglo American (JSE: AGL) bought shares worth around R370k.
    • The CEO of Astral Foods (JSE: ARL) bought shares worth R131k.
  • KAL Group (JSE: KAL) announced that the Eswatini Competition Commission has approved the sale of Agriplus. The deal has therefore met all conditions and will now also be implemented in the Kingdom of Eswatini.
  • Lighthouse Properties (JSE: LTE) has posted a circular to shareholders regarding the scrip dividend option. This gives shareholders the ability to receive shares in lieu of cash. The benefit to the company is that it retains cash on the balance sheet. The downsides are that it is dilutionary for shareholders who don’t take the scrip alternative, and it increases the number of shares in issue – thus puts pressure on growth in distribution per share.

Ghost Bites (AVI | Choppies | Harmony Gold | Mpact | Pan African Resources | Santam | Southern Sun | Merafe | Sun International)

Double-digit HEPS growth at AVI (JSE: AVI)

The group has once again showcased its efficient operations

AVI has an enviable reputation for turning modest revenue growth into strong profit growth. And sure enough, in the six months ended December 2025, revenue growth of only 4.9% was sufficient for HEPS to jump by 11.7%. That’s really impressive!

Gross profit margin improved from 42.9% to 43.5%, with gross profit increasing by 6.3%. AVI managed to achieve this outcome through price increases and a much stronger performance in I&J. This is the highest interim gross margin we’ve seen since the onset of the pandemic.

Here’s another highlight: selling and administrative expenses grew by just 0.1%. No, that isn’t a typo. This doesn’t happen by accident, with AVI having implemented excellent cost-saving measures in the group.

This means that operating profit margin increased from 23.2% to 24.7%, a casual 150 basis points uplift!

With operating profit up 11.6%, flat net financing costs helped drive even better headline earnings growth of 12.3%. Due to the number of shares in issue, the per-share increase was 11.7%.

That’s pretty hard to fault in terms of extracting value from the businesses that they have.

Digging further into the detail, regular readers will know that the Food & Beverage segment at AVI is much better than the Fashion segment.

This trend has continued, with Food & Beverage improving revenue by 6% and operating profit by 13.6%. The star of the show was I&J, which saw profits triple in a period where hake was a star performer. This is despite the abalone businesses making lossses due to weak demand in Asia, a trend we’ve seen across the sector.

If you want to learn more about fishing, you can do so from one of AVI’s key competitors. The CEO and CFO of Sea Harvest (JSE: SHG) shared deep insights (pun shamelessly intended) into products like hake, and how important this is to South Africa. Check it out here.

Now, back to AVI. There’s one more point I want to make on the Food & Beverage side. In Entyce Beverages, I found it interesting that premium coffee is doing well, while instant coffee is struggling. Once your caffeine is premium, I’m fairly convinced that you’ll give up food before you give up that coffee. Perhaps I’m just speaking for myself here.

If we now look at the Fashion segment to round out that segmental conversation, we find a perfectly flat revenue performance. This is because Personal Care dropped by 7.2%, while Footwear & Apparel was up 3.4% – enough to offset the drop in Personal Care. The Footwear & Apparel performance is actually better than it sounds, as the closure of Green Cross reduced revenue by R37.9 million on a business unit base of R1.08 billion.

Operating profit was up 3.4% in Personal Care and 6.1% in Footwear & Apparel, so the Fashion segment’s operating profit increased 5.4%. The profit performance is good here, but this segment has been a drag on the group for a long time now.

Looking ahead, it’s difficult to forecast performance based on the sheer number of variables here. Management has earned their reputation for being adaptable, so investors tend to trust AVI to make good capital allocation and business decisions in response to conditions.


The macroeconomics in Botswana have hurt Choppies (JSE: CHP)

The collapse of mined diamonds has downstream effects

For as long as I can remember, Botswana has been one of the most stable African countries. The currency was dependable and you didn’t hear much in the way of political issues. The underpin was that “diamonds are forever” and hence so was the economy in Botswana, with De Beers doing a great job of propelling the country forward.

But now diamonds are a disaster, which means that the economy in Botswana is faltering.

A devalued Botswana pula, reduced government spending in an austerity environment and other issues have severely impacted Choppies in its home country. As the icing on the cake, operations elsewhere in Africa were impacted in other factors, like in Zambia, where food deflation was an impactful reality in the six months to December 2025.

This is why a trading statement has flagged a hideous drop in HEPS from continuing operations of between 53% and 63%. If you use total operations, the drop is between 45% and 55%. Either way, it’s ugly.

The only highlight is the cash performance. Cash generated from operations increased by between 2% and 12%, while free cash flow more than doubled!

The retail group is busy with a number of initiatives around systems and cost discipline. The cash flows are certainly encouraging. But as any South African retailer will tell you in years gone by, a poor macro story makes it almost impossible for a retailer to do well.


Harmony Gold investors will lament these numbers (JSE: HAR)

Derivatives and other factors took the shine off the results

The gold price may be the rising tide that lifts all boats, but that doesn’t mean that all the boats end up in the same place. You’ll see an update on Pan African Resources (JSE: PAN) further down in Ghost Bites, with that share price up nearly 300% in the past year. Conversely, Harmony Gold is up only 44%.

Now, nobody should ever feel sad about having 44% more value than they had 12 months ago, but it’s hard not to look at the other shiny toys in the sector and wonder what might have been.

A trading statement for the six months to December 2025 shows you why the share price performance has been subdued. HEPS is only up by between 11% and 17%, a tame result in the context of a 36% increase in the average gold price over the period.

Aside from cost pressures like electricity and labour, as well as higher royalty taxes, it looks like Harmony’s numbers were impacted by derivative losses on silver contracts. There were also negative fair value movements on copper and silver streaming arrangements.

To add to this, they had acquisition costs related to MAC Copper, as well as finance costs related to the bridge facility for that acquisition.

If copper turns out to be the right play, then Harmony shareholders will have suffered some short-term pain for long-term gain. But if copper is overcooked, then Harmony would’ve been far better off just sticking to their golden knitting.

How do you feel about the Harmony diversification story?


Mpact had a tough year in 2025 (JSE: MPT)

Record citrus volumes were one of the few growth drivers

Mpact doesn’t have any fruit trees, but they do supply the packaging that gets our fruit safely to offshore markets. This is just one element of Mpact’s business, with the group playing in the circular economy by recycling and producing paper and plastic products.

Inevitably, each period at the company has good news and bad news. Revenue has been consistently growing over the past couple of years, but EBIT has unfortunately headed in the wrong direction. EBIT margin was a healthy 9.4% in 2023, but in 2025 it came in at just 6.5%.

With net debt increasing from R2.37 billion in 2024 to R2.51 billion in 2025, it doesn’t help investors to see EBIT (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes) going backwards.

HEPS fell by 5.3% in the period to 307 cents, with the total dividend per share being just 60 cents. Not only are earnings under pressure, but the payout ratio is low.

If you look at the underlying segments, you’ll find divergence in performance. The Paper business achieved revenue growth of 7.4%, yet EBIT dropped from R932 million to R804 million. The Plastics business suffered a revenue decrease of 7.5%, yet favourable product mix means that EBIT more than doubled from R89 million to R179 million!

Industrial companies are no joke, particularly in emerging markets where currency and raw material costs can flap around so much.

The good news is that the capex cycle at the company is largely complete, which means they can now focus on execution and cash generation. Shareholders will certainly look forward to that.


Pan African Resources isn’t shy about making acquisitions (JSE: PAN)

For better or worse, they aren’t just sitting back in this cycle

Pan African Resources is literally printing cash at the moment. With the gold price doing so well and additional mining volumes having come on stream, the group has done a great job of building a strong balance sheet.

This is giving them the confidence to carry on with major deals. Shareholders don’t always like seeing this, particularly when gold prices are strong and acquisitions aren’t priced cheaply. Gold has historically been less cyclical than other commodities though, so waiting for a downturn in the price before pulling the trigger on deals may be a very long wait indeed.

Pan African Resources isn’t going to wait. They are looking to acquire 100% in Emmerson in Australia, a deal which would give them complete ownership of the Tennant Creek joint venture (Pan African currently has 75% and Emmerson has the other 25%). The good news here is that Pan African Resources is deepening exposure to an existing asset, rather than taking a swing at something new.

The structure of the deal is a share-for-share transaction, with Emmerson shareholders receiving 0.1493 new Pan African shares for each share in Emmerson. This values Emmerson at A$311 million, or around R3.6 billion. With a market cap of nearly R79 billion, Pan African is taking a risk here, but certainly isn’t betting the farm.

Emmerson shareholders will lock in a premium of 42.7% to the 30-day volume-weighted average price (VWAP) through this deal. That’s a great price for them, while hopefully leaving enough value on the table to make this worthwhile for Pan African.

One of the other encouraging elements of this deal is that Pan African Resources plans to list on the Australian Securities Exchange, allowing Emmerson shareholders to trade the shares on their home market. Together with the existing listings on the JSE and the London Stock Exchange, this gives Pan African excellent visibility in key mining markets.


Forex movements blunted Santam’s results, but the underlying business is cooking (JSE: SNT)

Long-term investors will probably be happy with the strategy

One of the key elements of the Santam model is what they refer to as the “ecosystem/platform play” in the results presentation. This means locking in distribution partnerships, with MTN and MultiChoice as good examples of their partners.

Once you reach a certain size, I think it’s easier to grow through technology and back-end partnerships than by trying to fight for more direct market share.

They are also working on an international expansion strategy through areas like SanlamAllianz and the project with Llloyd’s in London. These are markets in which Santam has immense growth runway.

With net earned premiums up by 14.7% in the year ended December 2025, the growth strategy appears to be working. Pricing also seems strong, with the underwriting margin improving considerably from 7.6% to 11.3%. The long-term target range is 5% to 10%, so they are running above that range at the moment.

Alas, there’s a nasty catch in the numbers here. Although the net insurance result jumped by 61% thanks to the excelleent growth in premiums and margins, the same certainly cannot be said for investment returns on capital. There was a R1 billion forex translation difference that managed to offset roughly half of the uplift in the net insurance result. This is why the “conventional insurance” business was up 16% overall.

The Alternative Risk Transfer (ART) business grew profit before tax by 21%, a strong result.

Once you add in everything else, you end up with net income growth of 10%. That’s still decent obviously, but nowhere near as good as the core insurance metrics would suggest.

Return on capital of 29.2% is way above the 24% target. This is a good reminder that the insurance model generates vastly superior returns to traditional banking businesses, hence why banks push as hard as possible into insurance.

The final dividend was 10.7% higher, so shareholders are seeing the benefit of higher earnings. With HEPS having increased by only 8%, this represents an uplift in the payout ratio.


Southern Sun’s deal for the iconic Sandton properties has fallen over (JSE: SSU)

A deal isn’t a deal until the cash actually flows

For as long as I produce this publication that you know and love, I’ll keep reminding you about the risks of deals falling over. In other words: you’ll be hearing about these risks for a very long time indeed!

There’s always a risk of a deal falling over after it has been announced. The reasons vary, but the end result is the same: disappointment for those who got excited.

Investors were enthralled by Southern Sun’s plan to acquire a 50% undivided share in properties in the Sandton Sun, Sandton Towers, Garden Court Sandton City and the Sandton Convention Centre. Alas, Pareto Limited elected to exercise its pre-emptive right to buy that share, so Southern Sun has been shut out.

Bummer.


Despite all its troubles, Merafe is still paying a final dividend (JSE: MRF)

Merafe is a cash conduit for major shareholders

As things currently stand, Merafe is dependent on appealing to a few bleeding hearts at NERSA and Eskom. They need subsidised electricity to continue operating their smelters. Eskom likes making profits these days, so those subsidies are harder to come by.

Of course, there’s a genuine cost/benefit analysis for the country here. Merafe is an important source of direct and indirect employment. It’s likely that a working ferrochrome industry is more important for South Africa than maximising the profit on the electricity being sold to the company.

Still, it’s not a great look when Merafe is asking for help, all while declaring a final dividend of R200 million. I appreciate that the full year dividend is much lower in 2025 than in 2024, but this decision tells you that the company needs to pay dividends to its shareholders under all but the most dire circumstances.

This is part of why people invest in the company, by the way – the likelihood of receiving dividends (when the smelters are working) is very high.

The results for the year ended December 2025 don’t really tell you how bad things actually got. Sure, revenue was down 31% and HEPS fell 72%, but this doesn’t reflect the almost complete lack of earnings at the end of the period. The exit velocity from the period was horrific, with suspended operations and the threat of a retrenchment process in the absence of an energy solution.

Currently, Merafe seems to have negotiated interim tariff solutions that will allow the smelters to operate. I suspect that this is going to be a process of one interim solution after the next, which means that investors will pay a very low multiple for the shares and demand payment of high dividends.

So, not much has changed then in terms of the investment thesis!


Sun International increased its earnings (JSE: SUI)

This is an encouraging trading statement

Sun International has released a trading statement dealing with the year ended December 2025. It’s encouraging, with adjusted HEPS up by between 4.3% and 7.7%. That may not sound terribly exciting, but you need to remember how much pressure the casino and gaming sector has been under.

Without adjustments, HEPS increased by between 35.3% and 39.9%. This is what triggered the trading statement. There are a number of reconciling factors here, with management’s view on adjusted HEPS probably being the best indication of performance.

Importantly, debt (excluding IFRS 16 leases) decreased from R5.2 billion to R5.0 billion. Net debt to EBITDA is at 1.5x, still slightly on the high side for my liking, but not a huge worry.

The company is hosting a capital markets day on 16 March. That’s certainly going to be an interesting slide pack!


Nibbles:

  • Director dealings:
    • A prescribed officer of Discovery (JSE: DSY) sold shares worth R6.1 million, and a non-executive director sold R1.3 million worth of shares.
    • A non-executive director of Greencoat Renewables (JSE: GRP) bought shares worth over R3.1 million.
    • The company secretary of NEPI Rockcastle (JSE: NRP) sold shares worth R2.55 million.
    • A director of Goldrush Holdings (JSE: GRSP) bought shares (and CFDs) in the company worth R6.2k.
  • RMB Holdings (JSE: RMH) announced that AttBid has been picking up more shares in the market. This takes the aggregate holding of the concert parties to 40.06%.
  • Labat Africa (JSE: LAB) announced the appointment of Terry Johnson as CFO of the company with effect from 6 March 2026. He’s been the Group Financial Manager since March 2016, so this is an internal appointment. That explains the immediate start date.
  • Ethos Capital Partners (JSE: EPE) has completed its pro-rate share repurchase. This means that the company has returned R854 million in cash to the shareholders.
  • Mahube Infrastructure (JSE: MHB) has now postponed the circular related to the firm intention announcement by Sustent Holdings. They don’t explain the reason for this postponement, which is concerning when they haven’t even indicated an expected date for it to be posted. They are engaging with the TRP on this matter.
  • Here’s something that you certainly won’t see very often. Crookes Brothers (JSE: CKS) announced the sad news that the CFO and a non-executive director both passed away in the same week, on 7th March and 5th March respectively. That’s a very hard week for everyone involved there.

Ghost Bites (African Rainbow Minerals | CA Sales | Grindrod)

PGMs more than offset the iron ore troubles at African Rainbow Minerals (JSE: ARI)

This is the benefit of (at least some) diversification

African Rainbow Minerals released results for the six months to December. Although group headline earnings were up 10%, this seemingly strong performance doesn’t really tell the story of what has been going on in the business.

At segmental level, the wild deviation quickly becomes apparent. ARM Ferrous (the iron ore and manganese operations) saw a drop of 34% in headline earnings to R1.24 billion, while ARM Platinum swung wildly from a loss of R689 million to R704 million. ARM Coal tanked from profit of R182 million to a loss of R271 million.

Trying to forecast anything in this business is like betting on the direction that an unsupervised litter of puppies will run in!

Iron ore production volumes were down year-on-year, mainly because the Beeshoek Mine was placed on care and maintenance. Lower volumes mean higher unit production costs (the joys of operating leverage), made worse by above-inflation increases in costs in the operations. Iron ore headline earnings fell by 24%.

That’s still much better than the manganese division, which saw a hideous drop of 84% in headline earnings thanks to a decrease in prices and export sales volumes.

If you can believe it, despite the increase in PGM prices, the Bokoni Mine still generated a substantial loss. There’s a large mineral reserve at that mine, with plans being developed to achieve profitable production. The Nkomati mine is part of ARM Platinum and saw losses more than double, as ARM now owns 100% of that mine instead of just 50%. Chrome concentrate shipments from Nkomati began in January, so that should begin to offset care and maintenance costs.

In ARM Coal, export sales volumes were up 2% and domestic volumes fell 11%. But with a significant decline in coal costs (and a stronger rand), the modest uptick in export volumes were nowhere near enough to offset the pressures.

Just to add to the diversification here, it’s worth mentioning that the company has an investment in Harmony (JSE: HAR) and in Surge Copper in Canada. These are non-controlling stakes though.

If you manage to look through all the noise, you’ll find a business that generated a decent amount of cash and repaid debt in this period thanks to PGMs. Although there are certainly some headaches, this gave management confidence to increase the interim dividend from R4.50 to R5.00.


Another bolt-on acquisition for CA Sales (JSE: CAA)

And they are getting a controlling stake right off the bat

CA&S Group is a great example of the power of bolt-on acquisitions alongside organic growth. I always compare this to building a Lego house, with bolt-ons being small acquisitions that fit with the existing infrastructure and strategy. The other type of deal is to acquire something completely new, like building a Lego model unrelated to the house.

It’s much less difficult and risky to add a brick than it is to embark on a new build, so bolt-ons tend to be seen in a positive light in the market.

The latest example is the acquisition of a 71.19% stake in the holding company of Sunpac, a distribution and route-to-market company operating in South Africa. Sunpac has been around since the 1960s, so there’s a strong track record here. They also bring specific expertise in private label strategies, a growing area of focus for South African retailers.

There are put and call options in place over the remaining 17.7%. This is important, as you don’t want a situation where the minority shareholders are stuck in this thing forever.

The price for the initial controlling stake is R208.6 million. The options will be priced based on profits for the year ending March 2027, capped at R86 million.

Perhaps most of all, this represents further diversification for CA&S while deepening exposure to the most stable market in Africa. The share price is down 5.6% in the past year, much of which I suspect is related to market jitters around the economy in Botswana.

What is your view on small acquisitions vs. large deals?


Grindrod achieved a strong performance in FY25 (JSE: GND)

The Port and Terminals operations were a highlight

Grindrod has released results for the year ended December 2025. With core headline earnings from continuing operations up 17%, the group is doing well. This was achieved despite a revenue increase of just 1%!

The much more interesting underlying growth story is that the Maputo port delivered record volumes (up 6.3%), with the Matola and MPDC-operated terminals achieving records as well. The Port and Terminals segment achieved a 20% increase in revenue and a 44% increase in trading profit.

This was offset to a large extent on the revenue line by the performance in the Logistics segment. They attribute this to reduced rail deployment, lower graphite and container volumes, and general softness in the agency and clearing and forwarded businesses. This segment suffered a decline in revenue of around 10% and a drop in trading profit of 17.6%.

The profit performance is thus a mix effect, as the decline in Logistics wasn’t enough to offset the strong uptick in Port and Terminals on the trading profit line. Combined with strong cash generation and disposals of non-core assets, this has helped Grindrod pay significant dividends to shareholders.

A further special dividend of 43 cents per share is anticipated in April 2026.


Nibbles:

  • Director dealings:
    • A prescribed officer pf WBHO (JSE: WBO) sold shares worth R10.65 million.
    • Lesaka Technologies (JSE: LSK) announced that Ali Mazanderani (the Executive Chairman) bought shares worth $150k (around R2.5 million).
  • Reinet’s (JSE: RNI) sale of Pension Insurance Corporation is expected to be complete on or around 27 March 2026. The deal was first announced in mid-2025, so these things do take a while to get across the line. Major regulatory approvals for the disposal to a subsidiary of Athora Holding have now been obtained. This means that Reinet expects to receive a rather gigantic payment of £2.9 billion on the day of completion.
  • Orion Minerals (JSE: ORN) released results for the six months to December 2025. This only gets a mention in the Nibbles because Orion is still in the development phase, so the important news is around funding and cash balances rather than production performance. First production is only expected to happen in the first quarter of 2027. Cash on hand as at December was $5.74 million. Importantly, the prepayment facility with Glencore (JSE: GLN) was signed after the end of this reporting period, locking in two tranches of funding worth a total of $250 million.
  • Here comes another ASP Isotopes (JSE: ISO) announcement to grease the wheels of SENS. Quantum Leap Energy (as you’ve surely already guessed) has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with a large US energy company that operates power stations. With zero mention of financial effects anywhere in the announcement, we’ve reached the point where ASP Isotopes is using SENS as a PR platform rather than a financial news system. The market tends to pay less attention after a while when the updates are relentless. It’s that old joke: if everything is awesome, then nothing is awesome.
  • Cilo Cybin (JSE: CCC) announced that the CFO of the group, Reshoketswe Maggy Ledwaba, has resigned with effect from 31 March 2026. There will be a transition period until 30 April 2026, although a successor hasn’t yet been named.
  • The JSE has publicly censured Mantengu (JSE: MTU) based on the contents of court records submitted to the JSE. In text messages from Mike Miller to a former director, the JSE’s opinion is that it was clear that a cautionary announcement should’ve been released for the Blue Ridge Platinum transaction in mid-2023. Instead, the formal terms for the deal were only announced in October 2024. That’s more than a year after the date on which the JSE feels that information could no longer have been kept confidential. The JSE has therefore publicly censured Mantengu itself (only the company – not any specific directors). There’s no monetary fine attached to this censure, as that is reserved only for the most blatant disregard for the Listings Requirements (usually including fraud).

Bad taste is still taste

A film widely labelled as “the worst ever made” has spent two decades selling out midnight screenings. This raises an awkward possibility: maybe the line between “bad” and “good” is less stable than we like to think.

In most industries, success is relatively easy to measure. If a restaurant is full, the food is probably good. If a book sells millions of copies, it must be a good read. You would think that films surely work the same way: a big opening weekend signals victory. A box office flop signals failure.

Cinema history, however, occasionally produces an outlier that doesn’t fit this formula.

The Room, a 2003 independent romantic drama written, directed, produced and financed by the mysterious Tommy Wiseau, is widely described as one of the worst films ever made (earning itself the nickname “The Citizen Kane of bad movies”). Critics have dismissed it as incompetent. Reviewers have compared watching it to experiencing a minor head injury. Yet the film continues to sell out midnight screenings around the world, more than twenty years after its release.

This raises a question that becomes harder to answer the longer you sit with it: if a movie fails at the box office but develops a cult following, did it really fail at all? Is there really such a thing as a bad film – and if so, does that mean those who love The Room have bad taste?

A mystery man with a lot of money

To understand how The Room came to exist, one must first understand its writer, director, producer and leading man, Tommy Wiseau – and that is no easy feat. This is a man whose biography has remained shrouded in mystery despite decades of public curiosity about his distinctive look, his indecipherable accent, his fluctuating backstory and his seemingly bottomless reserve of funds.

Wiseau has spent years offering fragments of personal history like puzzle pieces from entirely different boxes. In various interviews he has claimed, at different times, to have lived in France “a long time ago”, to have grown up in New Orleans, and to have an entire extended family in Chalmette, Louisiana. In a 2010 interview he suggested a birth year around 1968 or 1969. Greg Sestero – Wiseau’s friend, co-star in The Room, and eventual chronicler in the memoir The Disaster Artist – later wrote that immigration documents he had seen suggested that Wiseau was born significantly earlier, somewhere in the mid-to-late 1950s, in an Eastern Bloc country. Wiseau himself has never confirmed any claims about his age or country of origin, although in 2017 he publicly acknowledged for the first time that he grew up “in Europe”. Beyond that, the trail becomes hazy again.

According to Sestero’s writing (which was informed by the stories Wiseau told him), Tommy Wiseau started the American chapter of his life in the San Francisco Bay Area, where he worked a series of ordinary jobs like restaurant busboy, street vendor and hospital janitor. During this period he also launched a small clothing business called Street Fashions USA, selling discounted and irregularly dyed blue jeans at Fisherman’s Wharf. The venture apparently did reasonably well, employing several workers and attracting steady tourist traffic.

At some point – precisely when or how remains unclear, obviously – Wiseau’s financial situation improved dramatically. He allegedly began purchasing and renting retail spaces in San Francisco and later in Los Angeles, eventually earning enough money to become independently wealthy. The details of these investments have never been fully explained, but the outcome was obvious to those around him: by the late 1990s, Wiseau had the kind of money that allowed him to pursue unusual creative ambitions without worrying too much about the financial consequences.

Which is how the world eventually ended up with The Room.

Money to burn

For most aspiring filmmakers, producing a feature film requires years of fundraising, pitching and compromise. Wiseau solved the problem in a more direct way: he financed the entire project himself. When the idea for The Room took hold in the early 2000s (initially as a stage play that no-one would print, then briefly as a novel that no-one would publish, and finally as a film), there was no studio oversight, no nervous investor(s) and very little reason for him to listen when collaborators suggested restraint.

If he wanted to build elaborate sets instead of filming on location, he did. If he wanted to shoot scenes repeatedly until they felt right, he did that too. He financed the project entirely himself and ultimately spent roughly $6 million (more than $10 million in today’s money) producing and marketing the film. Where this money came from has never been fully clarified (unsurprisingly). What is clear is that the budget was spent with enthusiasm.

Wiseau purchased expensive film equipment instead of renting it. He built elaborate sets of rooftops and alleyways for scenes that could easily have been filmed on location. Entire sections of the cast and crew were replaced multiple times during production. Dialogue sequences that should have taken minutes to film sometimes required hours or even days, largely because Wiseau (who also starred in the leading role) frequently forgot his lines or his position in the frame.

By the time filming wrapped, more than one hundred people had worked on the project, and Wiseau himself had accumulated a remarkable list of credits: actor, writer, producer, director and executive producer.

It was, by all accounts, an impressive effort. But would it result in an impressive film?

The box office speaks

The answer to that question depends entirely on your definition of “impressive”, dear reader. Because while most viewers agree that the film is terrible, they also agree that it definitely leaves an impression. 

I could write a whole separate article about the contents of the film and the many, many ways that it flies in the face of conventional filmmaking, but for the purposes of this piece I’ll stick to my premise and direct you to a single scene from the film instead – that should give you a good idea of what we’re dealing with: 

Not good. 

When The Room finally arrived in theatres, audiences were… confused. Many walked out before the film hit the 20 minute mark. The film was screened for two weeks in a handful of California cinemas and earned $1,900 before disappearing from theatres. At one cinema, the ticket window reportedly displayed two helpful notices next to the poster for The Room: “NO REFUNDS” and a real review describing the movie as “like getting stabbed in the head”.

Paramount Pictures rejected the film within twenty-four hours of Wiseau submitting it for distribution. With few marketing options available, Wiseau promoted the movie himself through a single billboard in Hollywood, featuring nothing more than the name of the movie and a striking black-and-white close-up of his own face, captured with one eye mid-blink. The image – locally known as “Evil Man” – was so confusing that many viewers thought The Room was a horror film. The billboard cost about $5,000 a month, and Wiseau kept it up, unchanged, for over five years.

By all conventional Hollywood standards, the film was a box office bomb. And yet, something unusual happened once a particular audience discovered it.

The makings of a disasterpiece

One early audience member, filmmaker Michael Rousselet, attended a screening near the end of the film’s original theatrical run and found himself laughing – not at the jokes (because those are awful), but at the film’s strange and unintentional humour. 

The dialogue was repetitive. Characters entered scenes and vanished without explanation. Emotional moments arrived at baffling times. Johnny, the film’s central character, begins many conversations with the same cheerful greeting: “Oh, hi.” Conversations often end abruptly with someone declaring, “Don’t worry about it,” which rarely resolves whatever problem was just discussed.

Instead of treating the screening as a serious drama, Rousselet began watching it as though it were a live comedy. He invited friends to attend the next showing and encouraged them to shout commentary at the screen. Soon they were returning repeatedly, bringing more people each time.

Before long, new traditions had formed. Audience members began throwing plastic spoons at the screen, a reference to an inexplicable framed photograph of a spoon visible in Johnny’s apartment. Footballs were tossed between rows of seats during rooftop scenes. Fans quoted stilted lines of dialogue in unison and shouted insults at the characters.

What had begun as a failed romantic drama had accidentally become interactive theatre. After the film was pulled from cinemas, Wiseau began receiving emails from viewers who had attended those chaotic final screenings. Many of them told him they loved the film. Encouraged by the response, he booked a single midnight screening in Los Angeles in 2004. It sold out.

Another screening followed the next month. That one sold out too. Soon the film was playing monthly screenings that continued for years, attracting devoted audiences who treated each showing as a communal participation event. The phenomenon spread across the country and midnight screenings appeared in other cities. Fans dressed as characters, recited dialogue and introduced newcomers to the strange rituals surrounding the film.

In Ottawa, Canada, one theatre screened The Room every month for 80 consecutive months. And screenings are still happening today, in countries all over the world. Financially speaking, the project was a disaster. Even today, after multiple rereleases and years of cult screenings, The Room has earned just over $5.2 million worldwide. That figure still falls short of its original production budget of $6 million, but it raises the question: if a movie loses money but remains culturally relevant for decades, does that still count as failure? 

Who decides what “good” means?

At some point the conversation moves beyond The Room itself and into a broader question about art. 

Who decides whether a movie (or a book, or a song, or a painting) is good?

Critics evaluate craftsmanship. Awards bodies reward technical excellence. Film studios focus on profitability. Each group has its own set of criteria, and these criteria often overlap, but not always. Audiences bring something else entirely: emotional experience.

A technically flawless film that nobody wants to watch again may impress critics but fade quickly from cultural memory. Meanwhile, a technically flawed film that audiences enjoy returning to can take on a life of its own.

In that sense, The Room exposes a small weakness in the usual hierarchy of taste: a niche where something is so bad that it goes full circle and becomes good again. After all, it’s difficult to dismiss a movie as a flop when people are still happily gathering in theatres to watch it two decades later.

About the author: Dominique Olivier

Dominique Olivier is the founder of human.writer, where she uses her love of storytelling and ideation to help brands solve problems.

She is a weekly columnist in Ghost Mail and collaborates with The Finance Ghost on Ghost Mail Weekender, a Sunday publication designed to help you be more interesting. She now also writes a regular column for Daily Maverick.

Dominique can be reached on LinkedIn here.

Ghost Stories #95: Reeling in returns: Sea Harvest’s best-ever performance

Listen to the show using this podcast player:

The ocean is a mystical place that has captured our imagination as a species for as long as anyone can remember. And although there are many fish in the sea, unlocking that resource in a sustainable and profitable way really isn’t that simple.

Sea Harvest has signed off on an incredible year that demonstrates the depth of the strategy – quite literally. The way they think about the various seafood products is fascinating, as explained by CEO Felix Ratheb on this podcast.

With operating margin more than doubling in 2025 and headline earnings coming in 4.2x higher than the prior year, this income statement has plenty of operating leverage. This adds to the intrigue around the business model and how the group is managed, with those insights delivered by CFO Muhammad Brey in this discussion.

Get ready to learn from Felix and Muhammad on this excellent podcast. The passion for the ocean comes through just as clearly as the numbers.

This podcast deals with topics like:

  • The importance of hake to Sea Harvest’s business
  • Diversification beyond hake – and beyond South Africa’s waters as well
  • Why the Ladismith Cheese disposal makes strategic sense
  • Key features of the business model that lead to such high operating leverage
  • The approach taken to managing financial risks like fuel costs and forex movements
  • Sustainable fishing and how Sea Harvest interacts with the precious resources in our oceans
  • The financial outlook for the group, recognising the cyclicality in the model

Sea Harvest believes strongly in the value of Ghost Mail in the South African investment ecosystem. They have sponsored this podcast for readers, but I was allowed to ask whatever I wanted to ask. Please do your own research and do not treat this podcast as an endorsement of Sea Harvest as an investment.

Full transcript:

The Finance Ghost: Welcome to this episode of the Ghost Stories podcast. Thank you for being with me in a very busy earnings week. It’s really the start of earnings season, actually, on the JSE here in March 2026.

That gives me a fantastic opportunity to speak to local companies, to their management teams, to understand more about their strategies. Companies that have realised the value of the Ghost Mail audience and are keen to support the platform. 

Sea Harvest is one such company, and it’s so good to be able to do this podcast. Full house here, I really get to speak to top management – Felix Ratheb, who is the CEO of the group, and Muhammad Brey, who is the CFO.

Very grateful for your time today, gentlemen. I’m very aware that earnings release day is hectic, to say the least, so thank you for being here. Felix, Muhammad, welcome to the show.

Felix Ratheb: Thank you. Great to be on your show, Ghost.

The Finance Ghost: Congratulations! Let me just start there. Really good numbers. Your share price is up 54% in the past 12 months. That must be a nice thing to see when you go on Google Finance or wherever it is that you check.

You’ve just released results for the year ended December 2025. Operating margin almost doubled, up from 8% to 15% – delightful. 

Headline earnings, up 320%. People don’t understand when numbers get to that level, like, “What is this thing?” We understand 10% or 20%, but you see 320% and your brain switches off because you don’t know what that means. 

It means it is 4.2x higher than it was the previous year. That’s a serious number. So, both of you, congratulations. I really look forward to digging into these numbers. 

Felix, I’m going to start with you because, of course, Sea Harvest, like all companies, is really just a roll-up of a whole lot of things. You’ve got a whole lot of different businesses, and I think it’s important for listeners who may not necessarily be familiar with what you do to actually understand what is inside this thing that has added up to this fantastic performance. 

So I think the first place to start is if you could just give us – I’d call it the lay of the land, but in your case, it’s the lay of the sea – major segments, where you operate, and what people will find inside Sea Harvest?

Felix Ratheb: Thanks. I think the best way to start is to go back to the very beginning, and that was in 1964 when we were founded on the West Coast in Saldanha Bay.

At the time, the largest hake fishing company (because hake is very abundant in our cold Benguela Current) was I&J, and a company called Sea Harvest was founded in 1964. That’s over 60 years ago, and we’ve seen the growth of the company since then. 

Of course, during that period, we did have sanctions. The company had grown by acquiring the third biggest business within hake called Atlantic Trawling. 

When I took over in 2013, it was about the same size as I&J. So, you had two big private hake businesses that were global businesses, and that were really fantastic global businesses.

Our journey started really from there, in terms of investing in our business. Each fishing trawler is a freezer trawler, where you’ve got a factory on board, that would cost you in the region of R250 million just for one. So you can imagine, building a fleet is very capital-intensive. 

We invested in our assets and built a very solid, globally competitive fishing company. We compete around the world. We don’t necessarily compete globally against the likes of I&J and Oceana; we actually compete against other nations. 

We would compete against the New Zealanders (who produce hoki), against the Americans (who produce pollock), and mainly the Norwegians and Icelanders (who have cod), so that was the start of the journey. 

We acquired the third-biggest company in our space, called Viking Fishing. That catapulted Sea Harvest far; being 50% bigger than the next hake fishing company in South Africa, and the largest hake fishing company in the Southern Hemisphere.

From that perspective, that’s the core of our business. That’s why I’ve spent a bit of time just explaining that. 

We employ around 3,200 people within the Sea Harvest business. We have more than 40 vessels operating around the coastline all the way from Namibia to Port Elizabeth. We’ve got four factories that we operate – we have a facility in Saldanha Bay, in Cape Town, and we have a facility in Mossel Bay with fishing operations. 

Our operations are vertically integrated – we catch, we process and we sell the fish globally under our brand and internationally under the species Cape Hake. That’s the core of our business and where the bulk of our capex sits, our investment and our people.

Adjacent to that, we’ve tried to diversify out of being only in hake. We acquired a business that was founded in 1905. It’s 120 years old this year, which is the Saldanha business in St. Helena Bay. 

Saldanha really produces three types of products. One is your canned pilchards. Everybody would know Lucky Star – well, the number two brand in that category is Saldanha.

That’s a canned product, lower LSMs (Living Standards Measure) – hake sits with the upper LSMs, so that’s a cheaper protein. That’s 50% of that business. 

And 50% of the business is catching another species called anchovy (herring or red-eye), which we call ‘industrial fish’. That predominantly goes into the production of fish meal and fish oil. 

Now one will ask, “What is fish meal and fish oil?” It’s basically used as a core ingredient when producing feed for the aquaculture industry. You’ll appreciate that wild-caught resources are pretty much capped at, let’s call it, 7 million tonnes. Most of the growth has come from aquaculture. 

An example would be salmon. Salmon has probably been the most successful farmed fish product that you will find. 

Most of the products that one would feed the salmon would be our own protein, which would be our anchovy and our fish oil, which is very high in omega-3, etcetera. So, that’s the second part of our business and a sizable part of our business based in St. Helena Bay. 

The third part of our business – and I’m going to stay with fishing – is in Australia. 

We managed to consolidate that sector over a period of time. We’ve put three businesses in one, and it’s a vertically integrated prawn/bycatch-of-prawn business (crabs and scallops, etcetera). That’s our business in Australia. 

We operate out of Exmouth and Shark Bay (it’s about 2,000 km northwest of Perth), and our head office is in Perth. So, that’s our third fishing operation, which is in Australia.

We have embarked on growth within aquaculture. And the reason is that, with wild resources, supply’s constrained. It’s constrained with quotas; it’s constrained with sustainability issues, so aquaculture is the growing segment.

We looked at South Africa and what we could invest in. To be frank, we had bought oyster businesses, we had bought muscle businesses, we had farmed salmon trout, and we divested from all those businesses. 

Our view was that the only category here in South Africa that could compete globally was abalone. Now, abalone is predominantly appreciated by the Chinese consumer and Chinese communities, no matter where they are in the world. 

It was a very, very lucrative industry with very high operating margins. Quite frankly, when we entered this industry, we just could not produce enough for China. I mean, it’s a billion people who absolutely love abalone.

It’s going through its own issues right now, and we can talk about that later, but we own four farms in South Africa. We’re going to have two now. 

We’re probably 40% of the production out of South Africa. All the product will go to Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and China because that’s where they appreciate it. And it’s an area of the business that can still grow.

The final segment in our business (which we are now divesting from) is Cape Harvest Foods. That was the dairy part of our business.

When we were going through the fishing rights allocation process in 2019/2020, it was a very uncertain period for the business – and for our country, I believe, over that period. 

Our view was that we needed to diversify away from fishing from the perspective of, “What happens if we don’t come out unscathed from the fishing rights allocation process?” So we invested in dairy. 

Why dairy? I think I was asked once by Bruce Whitfield, “What do dairy and fish have in common?” And the only thing I could think of is that they both pair very well with wine. 

Other than that, it actually exhibits quite a few fundamentals that are similar, one being the fact that it’s also constrained by supply. You don’t see growth in milk supply of double digits. If it grows 1% to 3%, it’s a lot, and this is a global phenomenon.

At the same time, people want to eat healthier. When I was brought up, you had to eat margarine – “it’s safe”. Now, nobody eats margarine. We know that it’s not healthy. So everybody’s moved to natural butter. 

Cheese is one of the fastest-growing categories globally, and also the powders that you make (for the chocolate industry, the soup industry, the baking industry, etcetera). That appealed to us because it had very similar fundamentals. 

We invested in that business, and I think we did incredibly well out of that business. We put in a new powder factory – two powder factories! – a butter factory and a cheese factory, but to cut a long story short, we got to a point where we were either going to back the strategy and put a lot more capital towards it or divest. 

And basically, because we were only in cheese, butter and powders, we don’t do the value-added dairy – in other words, your UHT milk, your yoghurts and those types of products; your energy drinks.

So, our view was we were going to give it a full go, or we’d rather divest and allocate that capital in our core fishing business and stick to fishing. 

From a board, business and management perspective, our view was that we know fishing very well. Our debt had got pretty high over the period with all our acquisitions over the last nine years, and our view was that it’s better deployed to pay back and halve our debt. 

We’ve subsequently entered into a sale agreement with Woodlands Dairy, a fantastic company in the Eastern Cape. They will be acquiring the business and taking it forward. 

So those are the various pillars of our business. They’re very different, you’re right. Where we are going is to try to have a diversified seafood offering with hake being the anchor tenant, but also with pelagics offering something very different. 

Sea Harvest is an iconic brand. We’re the number-one frozen fish brand in South Africa. In the last three years, we’ve been the market leader. 

From a brand equity perspective, we rank number one right now in terms of frozen fish. But at the same time, we are competitors to Lucky Star when you look at the lower LSM. So, we’ve got fantastic brands and a great portfolio of assets. 

It’s a very capital-intensive industry with very high barriers to entry. Quota is only given to you every 15 years. To replace a fleet, you probably need R3 billion or R4 billion. Factories that were built many, many years ago – replacement value R2 billion to R3 billion. 

So, you’re talking about a very capital-intensive industry. But from our perspective, those assets have been fully paid. It’s very cash generative – all fishing companies, not only us, are very cash generative.

Nice free cash flow conversion to EBITDA, probably north of 60%, which allows the business (although slightly cyclical from a catch rate perspective, and we can discuss that later) to be able to be more consistent in terms of a dividend flow and to provide a decent dividend yield to investors. 

That is the business in a nutshell.

The Finance Ghost: Very nice. Thank you so much, Felix. A couple of things from that.

Number one, I can tell you that butter is my ride or die. I agree with you about margarine. If doctors ever tell me I can’t have butter, then that’s it. I’m going to become a ghost in more ways than just a purple cartoon. I can’t imagine life without butter. 

Life without fish would also be a bit bleak. I am a fan, I must say. What I didn’t quite realise, perhaps, is that hake is such a South African staple. We think fish and chips, we go hake. 

But it sounds like if you go overseas (now that I think about it, on overseas travels I haven’t really ordered a fish and chips), you don’t get hake, do you? On average, you probably get something else.

Felix Ratheb: It’s a good question. Let me unpack that a little bit. Southern Europe is very different. Southern Europe, particularly Spain and Portugal, would catch hake in their waters. It’s very abundant. 

They grew up eating hake, and when it dried up in Spain in particular, the Spanish fleet went looking for hake in other parts of the world. Namibia, South Africa and Argentina are the other three where it’s very similar to their hake in abundance. 

They were very used to hake, and that’s why that is the predominant market. Even today, where we sell the bulk of the hake, it’s still Spain, Portugal and Italy, your Southern Mediterranean countries. 

But if you go up north, your point is very well made in terms of fish and chips. 

The fish and chips culture really comes from the UK, and everywhere there is an English community (whether it be in Australia, the US or Canada), you have a very strong fish and chips culture. 

That is predominantly cod. That was mainly caught in Norway, Iceland, and even the UK, and that is very prevalent in Northern Europe. So, you have Northern Europe – they love their cod. Southern Europe – they love their hake.

What we are seeing lately, however, is that you don’t get much cod, and their go-to species has become hake, from that perspective. So, you are finding that most of our growth in the last 10 years has actually come from the north of Europe. 

We’re seeing great strides in Holland – your lekkerbekje that everybody knows if they go and they’ve lived in Holland for a while, that is hake today. You go to Germany, they’ve moved to hake from cod; Poland has been a very good growth market for us, particularly in the last two to three years; Sweden. 

So, hake is sold all over Europe (and the United States and Australia). We simply don’t have enough product for everyone. 

Number one, it’s wild. Number two, it’s healthy. It’s full of omega-3s. It’s quite bland in terms of not being very fishy, so consumers love it. 

It’s the go-to fish in South Africa for moms for their kids – we’ve all been brought up eating fish fingers in South Africa; that’s probably the first interaction you have with fish. So, it is a staple in my view in South Africa, but very important in terms of a very healthy protein globally. 

And Europeans, to give you an example, the Spanish eat 60kg per capita of fish per year. That’s almost four-and-a-half times a week compared to, let’s say, 8kg in South Africa.

Our view is that South Africa has got a lot of growth still. As people move up the LSMs, they want to eat more seafood. People want to live healthier. Obesity is an issue, and demand for fish just keeps growing. 

It’s got a low carbon footprint, which is another positive in terms of fish, and we can unpack that later. But yes, it is a go-to protein for a healthy lifestyle.

The Finance Ghost: Yeah. I mean, South Africa, we think that chicken is a vegetable at the braai. It is a different market here compared to Southern Europe, for sure. And the fish fingers and tomato sauce, absolutely. As someone who has young kids, these are just the realities of life. 

Lots of interesting stuff here. Lots of supply and demand dynamics, which I really do enjoy. I’m looking forward to getting into some of the numbers with Muhammad just now – who is still on this podcast, I promise! We’re just thoroughly enjoying learning about fish at the moment. 

Felix, I do have one more for you, before we move across to talk through some more of the details on the income statement and that kind of thing with Muhammad. That is around the latest performance, bluntly, which is just so good.

It’s been described in your own results announcement as “the strongest performance in your history”. That’s a lovely thing to be able to write. I’m curious to run through, very high-level, without going into much detail (people will go read the results), just what is really driving that. 

And then one specific question from my side. I keep reading about beef inflation. Obviously, with everything going on in South Africa, I would imagine that’s good news for fish, right? Which is a protein source. 

Presumably, if the steak is so much more expensive than it used to be, then suddenly I can put a fish on the braai and it just got a whole lot more affordable, right?

Felix Ratheb: I believe so. I think that if you look at meat inflation, with foot-and-mouth, it’s going to get even worse. That’s tailwinds for us in the seafood industry, but I’m a fish snob. I keep saying that if you look at what we go through to bring that beautiful piece of fish to one’s plate… we’ve got these big ships, lots of people working on them. They go out to sea for 55 days. We produce on the ship, bringing back the last hunted protein on the planet. I mean, there’s nothing that you eat that you hunt, other than fish. It’s naturally organic.

So, seafood inflation has been high, more in the overseas market than locally. But I believe whitefish will start catching up, particularly if you look at inflation with salmon. Salmon is unbelievable, with what it’s done in terms of inflation. 

I think it’s a positive, both locally and internationally. It’s the last hunted protein that everybody will want. And we haven’t even started selling this type of product to China. 

When the Chinese consumer turns to a more Western diet, this is the healthiest way of eating. That has opportunity, too. As I say, the issue on our side is more the supply side. 

Regarding the performance, yes, there are many variables. When you start with a fishing business, and you look at its good performance, you first have to start with the health of the resource. We call it ‘biomass’ in our terminology. How healthy are fish stocks? That’s the first one.

Our biomass in hake (and on the pelagics side, but let’s rather stick to hake) has been very, very healthy. It’s been certified by the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) – that’s the gold standard for sustainability globally, not only in South Africa, and is well managed by government. 

That’s something that is very, very important for us. It’s managed based on science. The crowd at UCT actually do a lot of the modelling, and it’s a model that’s been around for a very long time. 

So, if the biomass is healthy and you’re not taking too much fish out of the water, it’ll be there to sustain future generations.

What we’ve seen this year is a very healthy biomass. Our catch rates (that’s the amount of fish that we catch per day that we go fishing) are up 40%. That’s a very big metric in our lives. 

You can imagine that if I go fishing and I’m catching 10 tonnes of fish a day, I’ve paid for the fuel, I’ve paid for the people, I’ve paid for everything. If I’m catching 14 tonnes a day, effectively my costs are 40% lower, so that has been very positive. We’ve seen fantastic catch rates in the business.

So, you’ve got volume and you’ve got efficiency in terms of catch. Then you look at the top line, and you’ve got more volume now, but secondly, you’ve also got (which I find has happened in the last five years) inflation in hake being high. 

When I started in this business, if we could get CPI (Consumer Price Index) plus 3% or 4% in the markets in which we operate (because obviously we sell to Europe, which had a different CPI to South Africa), it was a good result. 

Now, we are seeing CPI plus 7% or 8% in the last three years. Very good inflation, so selling prices have been significantly higher, and that has helped our result.

You then need some tailwinds, and we’ve had them. Last year, we had a favourable exchange rate. The rand was relatively weak. 

We’re probably one of the few industries that want a weak exchange rate because it benefits us – 64% of what we catch, we export. It’s a big number, and we’ve had a relatively weak rand, mainly to the euro (because we sell to Europe), so that was positive.

At the same time, fuel was favourable – we hit a high of $80 to $90 a barrel, and it’s come back nicely down to around $60 a barrel last year (forget what happened last weekend, I’m just looking at a full period) – and we came off three difficult years. 

You’ll appreciate that when you come off three difficult years, you focus on costs. We got a leaner business. All the right variables, going in our favour. 

We had invested in capacity. We bought four ships, two last year, so that when the good times come, we have the capacity and we have the throughput in our factories to take advantage of it. 

Call it sometimes being lucky – all the stars aligned and we were ready. The management team was, let’s say, in place to be able to win the game against the All Blacks on the weekend. That’s what I put it down to. It’s really having some tailwinds and being able to take advantage of the opportunity. 

And you’re right. I’ve been here for 23 years, and this is by far the best year. The last time I saw this was in 2002/2003, when we had these types of margins. 

At the same time, it’s not only hake. I focused on hake because out of the R1.3 billion that we made in operating profit, R1 billion came from hake. So I focused most of my time on that. 

But the pelagics also had a decent year. Even though the prices came off (because they were off a high in the last two years), we made over R200 million in EBIT in that business, so that had a good year.

Australia had a record year. We had better volumes of prawns and better pricing on the prawns.

Our dairy business also had a record year, which was also positive because you never want to be selling a business coming off a poor year. So it was really, really positive.

Really, the only part of our business that struggled was abalone. Now, abalone is reliant on China. What we are seeing is that the Chinese consumer, specifically in terms of discretionary spend, is not spending. They are saving.

They see that the tough times are coming, and we’re seeing that more than 30% of what they earn, they save. That has built up. It’s even higher than post-Covid. We have a situation right now where we need them to spend.

The product that we offer is a white tablecloth offering. It’s the type of product you’d eat at a high-class restaurant like a Shangri-La or the Hyatt. It’s the Wagyu of seafood, and it’s one of the five treasures that the Chinese appreciate – they absolutely love abalone.

But you need the right consumer confidence and the right macro environment for consumers to spend, so that’s been quite tough. We made a loss in that business. Quite a significant loss – close to R60 million operating loss. 

Fortunately, it’s a very small part of our business. It only makes up 4% of our revenue, so the only blip that we had was in our abalone business. Otherwise, every other business fired at the right time.

The Finance Ghost: Felix, thanks. Lots of great additional details there. I quite enjoy the ‘raising of a child’ and how that’s coming through in this, right? It’s fish fingers, it’s tomato sauce. Then one day, you get your heart broken and your mom gives you the ‘many fish in the sea’ talk. We all had that! 

And that’s the biomass, right? There have literally been many fish in the sea, and that’s been a huge boost to your numbers in this period, which is obviously very helpful.

Muhammad, I’m excited to bring you in here because we’re going to talk about operating leverage. Felix gave a little example there – 10 tonnes, 14 tonnes. I’m not sure if that was the example per ship or just good maths – or easy maths, rather – but it is interesting. 

I’ve always wondered about this – the ship goes out, operating leverage is the name of the game in your business. That’s why we are seeing this incredible result when times are good. As a CFO, can you just walk us through the shape of the income statement? 

And let me also say I’m slightly jealous that you get to be in a business that has so much operating leverage. That must be, I would think, quite a fun thing actually. Maybe a bit stressful too, but it’s interesting. It’s definitely interesting.

Muhammad Brey: Thanks, Ghost. Indeed, it is. It’s interesting, and it’s exciting when it’s going the right way. When the tide goes out, it can also be the other way, so it’s a tale of two sides of the coin. 

There are plenty of fixed costs in the business. Let’s just start with the asset base, which Felix touched on earlier. Ultimately, we are a manufacturing concern of note. There’s a total of somewhere in the order of R10 billion of total assets in the group. We have 56 vessels, 12 factories and 7 aquaculture operations. 

And of course, what’s complementing that is our intangible rights. The 15-year rights in South Africa and the intangible rights in Australia. 

Ironically, these are also the moats around our business; the barriers to entry. Those, as well as our 5,200 employees and the 30 markets in which we sell. 

But typically, like any manufacturing concern, these are big beasts, and you need to feed them with volume, and volume drives these efficiencies. So, we try to sweat these assets through maximum capacity utilisation.

If I then look at the profit and loss (P&L) – how we look at it and the shape of the P&L, the first thing, of course, that drives it is the top line.

Felix tries to drive inflation plus 4% to 5%. The markets allow this with demand, of course, outstripping supply. We then also generally benefit from the weakening rand. It generally weakens on a year-to-year basis.

Of course now, with the sale of Ladismith, that exposure improves from 52% to 64% of revenue. So that’s a nice flip, firstly, for us and something that we try to secure by insurance on an annual basis.

If you then look at the cost of sales line, a large portion of our cost of sales is fixed. Just to give you a sense, a small vessel going out will cost in the order of R200,000 per day to run. A medium-sized vessel, R300,000. The large freezers, which go out for between 45 and 55 days, cost in the order of R450,000 per day to run. 

Now, whether you’re out catching one tonne a day or 10 tonnes a day, a large portion of those costs are fixed. So, you can imagine what volume does to it. 

Just to digress, the biggest portion of those costs would be staff (in the order of 30% to 35%) and fuel (in the order of 15% to 20%). So, you can see how very much fixed these costs are. 

Ultimately, you want to feed these beasts. So when you look at a year like 2025, where the stars sort of aligned, number one, we had much better catch rates, which drove efficiencies. But secondly, we also had catch volumes up in the order of 17%. 

So now, suddenly, you have 17% more volume to spread over the same cost base. You can imagine what that does to your cost per kg. If you put that into numbers, revenue was up 20%. Cost of sales was only up 2%, even though we had revenue up 20%.

Gross profit up 60%, and ultimately operating profit up 200% to almost R1 billion. That just shows you the operating leverage in the business.

We have a very similar situation for our pelagics business, and also even in our Ladismith Cheese business, where we saw that we grew in milk by 8%, but that ultimately translated into a 36% increase in operating profit.

The Finance Ghost: Yeah, very nice. I’m going to look at those ships slightly differently now. My little boy, in particular, thinks they are the coolest thing in the world when he sees them in the ocean. 

Now I can tell him how much they cost. A number that will mean absolutely nothing to him at the age of five, but he’ll still think they’re pretty cool. And I think they’re pretty cool. 

It’s just one of those industries where it’s very real. You can see and touch it, and it brings your food. It’s the real economy, it really is.

And you’ve got a lot of stuff you need to think about in running those boats. You’ve mentioned fuel, for example. Felix, earlier you talked about how the rand influences your selling prices out to Europe, but it obviously also influences fuel costs here.

So, we’ve seen what’s happened in Iran in the last few days. Who knows what happens from here? What happens with the oil price? Is it all just going to blow over? 

There is no way of knowing. And this is why it’s a risk, right? This is financial risk. That’s how it works. 

I guess, the oil price, other than that big $100 blip in 2022 (and I only know this offhand because I looked at an oil price chart this weekend), has been stuck in a bit of a window, right? 

You’ve got a great situation where the cartels kind of want to keep it in a place where they can make their money. And that’s great news, actually, for you guys, because it doesn’t actually flap around that much anymore, other than when there’s some kind of big global distortion. 

And this is a question for you again, Muhammad – as the person who has to run the numbers in this thing, how do you look at, “Okay, which risks can we hedge?” 

And then obviously, you’ve got risks where you just have to accept them as part of business. That’s why it’s called equity risk. There are certain things that are just a risk you have to carry.

How do you guys manage that?

Muhammad Brey: From a risk mitigation perspective or an insurance perspective, our strategy is to hedge 50% of our rand or euro exposure. A big portion of our sales goes into Europe, so what we’ll do on an annual basis is we will hedge 50% of our book for the following year, and this buys us insurance. 

So we’ve locked in the rate. Not only do we lock in the current rate, but we also lock in the forward points or the interest rate differential in that. So we get another R1.20-odd on top of the rate that we have today. 

For example, if the rand is trading at, let’s call it, R18 to the euro today, if I take out a hedge one year forward, I’ll get about another R1.20 on that. That allows me then to lock in R19.20 going forward. 

So our strategy is to lock in at least one year forward, and we buy insurance on 50% of our book. The rest of it is then exposed to the spot market. 

Last year, we traded at around R20. It’s going down now to R19. So, the balance of the book is then exposed, but we ride the ups and the downs.

On the fuel side, you’re right – it has traded in a very narrow window in the last year or so. We’ve tended to sort of lock in when it’s a bit lower. At around the $60 level, we tend to lock in.

Of course, if it goes higher than that, we’d rather ride it out because it would typically tip back to the $60, so we don’t really have a firm strategy on fuel. It would be more opportunistic, and when it’s low, we will take out the exposure. 

The third thing, of course, with the leverage balance sheet is that in the past, you would ask yourself, “Do we hedge the interest rates?” The interest rate was coming down, so it didn’t make sense to hedge at that time. 

At the moment, we’re still looking at one or two more cuts in interest rates coming through, so it wouldn’t make sense to hedge. 

Not only that, but we’re also looking to repay a portion of our debt through the sale of Ladismith cheese, so it doesn’t make sense to lock in anything on that side. 

Again, on the interest rate side, we are much more opportunistic. We’ll see how the curve ultimately bottoms out towards the end of the year, and we’ll look at the bank balance sheet to see what the strategy would be over the next couple of years.

The Finance Ghost: Very interesting, thank you. That’s a lot of additional insight into how you manage the business, which I do appreciate.

I’m going to take it back to Felix now. So, Felix, I was going to ask you about the Ladismith cheese disposal, but to be honest, I think you gave such a great intro to the group earlier that you’ve kind of answered the question – around why you are stepping away from that and how, other than the pairing with wine, it’s not necessarily a good fit with the seafood business. 

So I’m going to ask you something that’s a slight variance of that, which is to say, as you look at the portfolio that you have today, do you feel like you’re a long-term holder of everything that’s in there now? 

Obviously, I’ve done this for long enough to know that everything is for sale at the right price, really (except probably your hake operations). But, as you sit, do you feel like where the group is right now as a portfolio, you’re comfortable? 

Or do you think that there might still be a little bit more M&A activity to come in the near term?

Felix Ratheb: I think where we are right now and the way we’ve articulated it to our investors was that we had such a phenomenal growth period since listing that it’s time to consolidate and take stock.

So that’s what we are doing. Let’s shore up the balance sheet, let’s just get to a consistent dividend policy and yield. I think that is very, very important before we look at doing more.

However, the reality is that no business is going to grow by sitting still. If I look at the portfolio, I think we’re too big in hake now, and even if we did want to buy other hake businesses, it would be tough from a CompCom perspective.

I think there’s still opportunity in pelagics. I don’t believe we’re the biggest player, and there are other related fisheries in South Africa that we’re not exposed to. I would prefer South Africa for seafood because it’s closer to manage. 

So, we would stick to fishing, and you never know what opportunities will come along. To give you an example, we spoke about the Viking acquisition. I was working on that transaction for five years. 

Ladismith cheese – we didn’t just enter the cheese business. We spent five to six years talking to the owners. In fact, when we had made the offer, the factory burnt down, and we came back two years later to buy the business. 

Take a very long time in terms of understanding the sector, the business and, more importantly, the state of the assets and management. 

So we will always be on the lookout, however, we are entering a consolidation-play phase, and for the next two to three years, we’re looking at really optimising our balance sheet. 

In terms of what assets we could or could not keep. It’s really the assets that I’ve classed as having potential, but will they actually survive? 

Let’s look at abalone. We’ve spent R1 billion in abalone. Our view is that our investment thesis is correct. Once consumers start spending again in Hong Kong and in China, I believe we’re going to get to the prices where we were, and then it will be a great business. 

But what if it doesn’t happen? So, you’ve got to be running those scenarios, too, when you look at it strategically. 

So, we’ve got a plan. If it goes the way we want, we would want to grow in that part of the business. But if it goes the other way as well, what’s our exit strategy? I would put it in the question mark corner.

The second one is Australia. We entered Australia, wanted to consolidate that sector and grow. It’s still not big enough, in terms of where we believe it should be. $100 million business, which is the size of the business as it is right now, it probably needs to be $250 million. 

The problem in Australia is that you don’t have a Sea Harvest or an I&J or an Oceana or anybody bigger that you can go and buy. It’s all these small family businesses. So, for you to build a vertically integrated seafood business, you’ve got to buy all these businesses. 

You can appreciate the amount of time and effort it takes to integrate those businesses, which we’ve had to do.

The question mark now is, are we going to deploy more capital to grow Australia?

If not, we’ve got to relook at that asset in terms of – do we want to be there? Because it takes a lot of management time sometimes. Everybody looks at all the ratios in terms of return on capital employed (ROCE) or return on investment (ROI), etcetera, etcetera. 

From a management point of view, I look at it from a return on effort perspective. Sometimes there’s a lot of effort, especially when it’s that far away. 

If it’s not going to become sizable and we’re not going to give it more support, then we’ve got to look at that portfolio, because again, it can be deployed better elsewhere. 

That’s where I am, in my mind. I’ve got assets where they’re question-marked “should I be there?”, but they’ve got the potential if certain things change. 

I’ve also got other sectors within the South African seafood industry that I think we don’t play in. If they were to be available, I’d need to strengthen my balance sheet first to look at whether we would look at something. 

So as you’ve said, if there’s good value, whether you’re selling or buying, you’d always look at it.

The Finance Ghost: Ya. This is a note of appreciation from my side, Felix. I think that’s a great answer, and thank you for addressing abalone. I wanted to ask about it specifically, but I thought that might be slightly unfair, so I’m glad you commented on it. 

Interesting about Australia. Look, anywhere that has a place called Shark Bay – I think everything in Australia is dangerous, so when a place is named after a dangerous animal, then it must be pretty serious. I can well believe it. 

And you could definitely teach the retail sector a thing or two about selling a business on a high like Ladismith Cheese. We’ve seen some pretty hideous exits of businesses by JSE-listed companies in recent times, so yeah, well done. I think that sounds pretty solid. 

Muhammad, back to you then. It sounds like you might be getting some money in the bank from these disposals. That’s exciting, as the CFO. Jokes aside, capital allocation – how should investors be thinking about this in your context? How are you guys looking at this?

Muhammad Brey: Firstly, I think what the sale does is show off the balance sheet. If we just look at this in absolute numbers, debt goes down to circa R1.3 billion, of which 50% is in Australia, which has a very long-term repayment profile, and the balance of 50% in South Africa. 

But the core leverage ratios go down from 1.3x to 0.9x. It’s sub-1x EBITDA. And if you just think about that in the light of where we were at the end of 2024, 2.5x, that does give you quite a bit of pressure and stress. 

The balance sheet will then obviously be in a much better position. That allows a lot more flexibility as a management team. However, I think the strategy in the immediate future is to continue to consolidate. 

Of course, the first thing is to prioritise maintaining our asset base, be it the vessels or the factories; make sure that they’re running efficiently. 

Then secondly, we try to squeeze out whatever else we can in terms of organic growth opportunities and efficiency projects. The way we look at that is typically, we want to earn a very decent margin above the weighted average cost of capital. So that’s the second avenue that we will pursue. 

Thirdly, I think we’d want to still reduce debt further. We do want to keep a level of debt on the balance sheet. In my mind, that’s circa 1x EBIT. From an efficiency perspective, it doesn’t have to be completely ungeared. 

And then ultimately, if we don’t have any further use for cash, that would be returned to shareholders – be it dividends, interim dividends, share buybacks. Ultimately, rewarding shareholders for their patience and ultimately driving value.

The Finance Ghost: Yep, I like it. That sounds solid.

Felix, I’m going to bring it back to you. This might be the hardest question of the day, actually, around ESG and all the attention that seafood gets. As we move on a little bit now from the performance over the past year.

I think it’s quite an important question and it also speaks to consumer trends a bit. I’ve seen a lot of content online – documentaries, the ocean, etcetera, etcetera. You said it earlier, right? This is really the last food we eat at scale that is hunted. So, there’s actually a pretty big responsibility towards the environment and the sea floor and everything else.

You’ve got this long-term fishing license, you’ve got that kind of visibility in terms of your operations. But your end of the bargain obviously has to be sustainable fishing practices. I’m sure we could talk about that for an hour that we don’t have. 

But I think just a few minutes around your sustainability in how you fish, perhaps specifically for those who do feel like eating fish is maybe supporting practices that are not necessarily sustainable. 

What do you guys do to address those concerns, in our waters especially?

Felix Ratheb: I think that’s a very good question, and probably the most important question, because the reality is that, as I’ve said before, we’re fortunate from a seafood-production point of view. We don’t have mad cow disease, we don’t have foot-and-mouth, we don’t have avian flu, we don’t have any of that. It’s a clean protein.

When you enter a new market, what are the questions that you get asked by consumers? And that is the sustainability practices.

But just to pause there. Firstly, we produce food, let’s be clear. It’s a critical source of protein. If you had to do that on land, you’d need twice the carbon footprint, and you’d have to tear down half the other forests. 

The best place to actually extract your food is from the ocean. However, we need to do it sustainably.

Now you will appreciate there is no way I’m going to go and spend R400 million on a new trawler if I’m damaging everything that I’m catching and it’s not going to be there in a couple of years. The paybacks are just too long.

So, we’re the first, from an industry perspective, that supports sustainable fishing practices. That drives our business. In fact, I call it our ‘licence to operate’. Without that, we don’t have a business.

So, what do we do about it? I think the first thing is that we’ve worked and supported, as I mentioned, the Marine Stewardship Council, which is the gold standard for sustainability. 

What does that do? The first part of that is to make sure that you’re not extracting more than what you need out of the oceans, because it’s not going to be there for future generations. That’s the first thing, but it doesn’t stop there. 

The second thing is that when you’re fishing, you’re interacting with other species. You’re interacting with bycatch, you’re interacting with what we call endangered and threatened species. And how do you now interact with those? 

Again, we have a standard, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) in terms of what we do there to make sure that we don’t have issues regarding our interactions with other species.

That, to us, is critical. Otherwise, we wouldn’t get our certification and we’d be all over the news.

The next one is obviously the point that you’ve made in terms of the habitat. The bottom, or the Benthic, as we call it – what are we doing to the ocean floor, etcetera, etcetera.

And that’s where there’s been a lot of misinformation from the perspective that we do not trawl corals. If you’re trawling corals with your gill, you’ll lose it. We don’t trawl fish in rocky areas. It’s dangerous. 

Generally, like most trawling companies, we’re fishing on sandy bottoms. That’s the first thing. The other thing that we’ve done in South Africa. So, the standard also doesn’t allow us to fish in sensitive habitats, so we avoid sensitive habitats.

We’re also one of the proponents – we’re not against marine protected areas. What people wouldn’t know is that we’ve got an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which belongs to South Africa, and we have only trawled or fished 4% of that. That’s it. We’ve only touched 4% of the ocean floor in the South African EEZ. It’s not a big area. 

When we’re talking about putting marine protected areas (MPAs) in places, from our perspective it’s not a big impact. Especially what we’ve agreed as an industry (which was completely voluntary) was to ring-fence those fishing grounds. 

So what we’ve done is we’ve said, “Okay, well, we’re going to ring-fence wherever we fish, and we’re not going to go outside those areas.” So, that 4% or 5% that we fish, we’re not going outside those areas. 

If there are sensitive habitats anywhere else and we happen to have done damage 2,000 years ago, whatever it might be, we’re not going out of that. We take sustainability and fishing practices very, very seriously.

And I guess that’s how we are a responsible fishing company looking forward. And that’s whatever we give our consumer, they must know that we have done it sustainably. I think that is important. 

But it doesn’t stop there. In South Africa, most of our facilities are in rural towns. To give you an example, 30% of the Saldanha Bay town works for us.

We talk about directly working for us, but if you think about the multiplier effect – that is, people who provide food, paint the boats, do this, do that – you’ll find that it’s a much higher number.

So we are critical. And I’m just using Saldanha Bay. You go to St Helena Bay, it’s the same thing. You go to Gansbaai, it’s the same thing, etcetera.

So, we are critical to the town, which means we don’t only provide employment because people’s problems outside my factory gates become my problem. If there are social issues at home, drug abuse, alcohol abuse, we have to do something about it. 

We’re very involved in our communities. Whether it be social centres that we’ve set up, whether it be schools, whatever, we don’t tick boxes for a scorecard. The reality is that the people who work for us – it’s basically the town, and we have to do more than just provide employment. I think that is important.

The other thing that we’ve also experienced in South Africa – in the beginning, it was out of need, in fairness, but then it made a lot of business sense – is energy security and water security.

In the beginning, we had load shedding, so everybody ran to put up solar plants and wind plants. Well, quite frankly, I can tell you probably two of my best investments in terms of payback have been a wind farm that I put up in our abalone farm, which has reduced my electricity cost by 35%, and my solar plant that I put up, both in the abalone facilities as well as the dairy facilities, that has reduced my electricity cost by 25%. 

So, even without load shedding, it made a lot of sense, especially if you’re a big consumer.

Water is a big problem, particularly here in the Western Cape and particularly in the Klein Karoo and the West Coast. We’ve had to put up desalination plants. It was about five years ago that we almost ran out of water in the Western Cape, and again, we put up a desalination plant. In the beginning, it was a grudge investment, only to find later that it’s been one of the better investments. 

All these things in terms of an ESG focus, let’s call it, were initially out of need, but afterwards, make a lot of business sense. 

We’re trying to become sustainable in everything that we do. There’s a culture in our company that everything we do, whatever we touch – whether it be the sea bottom, whether it be fish, whether it be waste – the amount of work that we’ve put in to reduce waste in our business and to make sure that even if we produce waste, it’s recyclable. 

So, our commitment to our consumer: to whoever eats our piece of fish or abalone or whatever, it will come from pristine, beautiful waters, it’s healthy, it’s sustainable, and probably a little bit expensive.

The Finance Ghost: Yeah, that’s a very practical answer, which I have a lot of respect for, because that is just a reality. Like you said in that answer, you do make food, and people need to eat. 

If you’re at the top of the food chain, you’re going to have some kind of footprint on the ecosystem around you, whether you are a human being, a lion or a shark. Take your pick. 

And obviously, all we can really do is try to do the best we can sustainably. So that is a nice practical view.

I’ve seen the sort of typical documentaries, and you’re right, it’s trawling through the coral, right? That’s the classic doccie approach, and it’s all very sad – I have no doubt that happens elsewhere in the world and that some companies do do this, but I’m very glad to hear that there’s a strong commitment from you that that is not happening at Sea Harvest.

So, thank you. You can eat Sea Harvest fish and feel good about it. 

Amazing that water is one of the challenges when basically you spend your lives sending ships out on the water. It’s quite incredible, right? Taking the salt out of it being the operative point.

Let’s move on from some of the ESG stuff and start to bring this to a close, then. 

Just in terms of outlook, Muhammad, I’m going to come back to you now. The Ladismith disposal is happening, and there are obviously a lot of other trends in the group.

Financial outlook for the next financial year – you’ve just come off an incredible year. This is a cyclical business, so I guess some of this might be for people just to manage their expectations a bit, right?

Muhammad Brey: I think that’s right. We’ve set ourselves a target to at least deliver R1.50 through the cycle. Outstanding year in 2025 being R2.19. And of course we want to try and get above that R1.50. 

I think from our perspective, the year ahead would be a more balanced year. There are certainly some headwinds, but also some tailwinds, and I’ll just touch on a few of those.

From a headwind perspective, we’ve had a reduction in the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) by 5%. The rand is a little bit stronger against the currencies in which we trade. We’ve seen the impact of the marine heat waves in Australia, and the Chinese markets continue to be relatively soft. Those are some headwinds that we face. 

However, I think, from a positive or tailwind perspective, we have plenty of capacity to catch our hake. We’ve got some additional capacity now to catch some more horse mackerel. So, those are some additional capacities that we have in the group to take advantage of more volume.

Hake markets are certainly firm, both locally and internationally, as we can see. We’ll certainly be targeting inflation plus plus, in terms of driving value.

In our pelagic business, we are seeing an uptick in global fish meal and fish oil prices, so that’s also a nice tailwind. And then finally, also in the pelagics business, we have some additional capacity that we’ve put on there.

So, in my view, it could be more of a balanced year going forward. I hope that answers the question.

The Finance Ghost: Marine heat wave in Australia. I didn’t even know about that. Every time I learn something new about Australia, it involves nature trying to kill you! It’s incredible, honestly. The most frightening place in the world.

Felix, as we bring this to a close – your elevator pitch to an investor considering an investment in Sea Harvest, listening to this podcast and going, “Okay, this is a business that I might want to get involved in.” 

What would you say that elevator pitch is, in terms of your investment case?

Felix Ratheb: I think we touched on a lot of it in the interview. The first one is that it’s a very defensive industry. At the end of the day, we’re producing food, and everybody’s got to eat. I think that is critical.

Secondly, we’re in an industry where supply is not going to keep up with demand. As people eat more healthily, as populations are growing, as people want more brain food, omega-3s, etcetera, move more to proteins, we’re going to see that that’s going to increase more. 

The only thing that can bring that equilibrium is price, so I do believe that we’re in an industry where we will see good price growth in basically all the sectors that we are in. 

The other thing is that we’re not just a hake business anymore. We are diversified now across many species.

My dream or vision was always to operate at every level of the ocean. So, we’ve got hake right at the bottom. We’ve got pelagics, which are further towards the top. Horse mackerel, and prawns, which are more shallow water. So, we cover the ocean in terms of the various species. 

It’s an industry with very high barriers to entry. You can’t just get quota. It’s an absolute fortune to build ships and factories.

And at the same time, what about the know-how? When somebody’s taking a R250 million asset and is having to catch 20 tonnes of fish a day, there’s a lot of IP there in institutional memory.

So I think that – and empowerment in our industry. You also have that barrier to entry that you have to be very well empowered, which we are.

We’re a rand hedge, as Mo said. Post this transaction, 64% will come from offshore across 30 geographies in hard currency. It’s the euro leading it, then the Aussie dollar and then the US dollar. Those are the currencies that we are exposed to. 

At the same time, we don’t have a single customer that’s more than 2% to 3% of our business, so we don’t have the exposure that others fear to Coles, Woolworths or Shoprite or wherever it might be. 

We’re not price takers. I think that’s critical. I’ve driven my team to be like that in every country we operate. Even if we operate in Italy, we don’t only sell to one retailer; we sell to five retailers, probably ten food service distributors. 

We’ve spread our product so that we’re not reliant on any particular customer, which sometimes can expose you to risk. We’ve seen it in Australia. 

We’ve got brands. The Sea Harvest brand is a recognised, iconic brand in South Africa. The Saldanha brand is very strong in Australia. The Shark Bay prawn brand, people would know, in terms of provenance. 

Fishing companies generate a lot of cash, so they’re good dividend payers, provided you don’t have a lot of debt. That’s why I’ve had a consistent effort to reduce debt, because we generate a lot of cash, and we’re a fantastic share to have for an investor that’s looking at a decent dividend yield. 

Finally, we’ve got a very good management team. Sometimes I look around the table, and the team that I have is probably the Springboks, in terms of – if you look at them compared to my global peers around the world, because we operate globally. 

I chair many of the international associations, and I look at the people around the table and the tenure that they’ve had in the business is quite phenomenal.

You add that all together, and I think it’s a great business, a great company to invest in. I strongly believe that most of the time, it’s undervalued because it’s not appreciated or understood by investors. 

Let’s see where we go forward. As Mo says, I don’t think we’ll see one of these record years in the next couple of years, but the point of the matter is that we need to come very close. We have some tailwinds and some headwinds, but we as management have a plan to try to protect those operating margins.

The Finance Ghost: Well, thank you both for your time. This really has been interesting. It’s a fascinating business. Tough business, but lots of cool stuff going on there. All the best to you for the period ahead. Coming off a very, very impressive base, which of course means a tough base for comparison. 

I look forward to seeing the next set of numbers coming out. Muhammad’s smiling there. He knows. I know already – I’m going to read that in an announcement, reminding people about the tough base. 

Felix, Muhammad, thank you so much. All the best, and I really appreciate your time on this.

Felix Ratheb: Thank you.

Ghost Bites (ADvTECH | FirstRand | Greencoat Renewables | Impala Platinum | Sanlam | STADIO)

More solid earnings growth at ADvTECH (JSE: ADH)

Student enrolment sounds positive as well

ADvTECH continues to just get on with it really, with a trading statement for the year ended December 2025 reflecting expected growth in HEPS of between 14% and 19%. That’s roughly 5x inflation!

This works out to around 235 cents at the midpoint of guidance, suggesting a trailing Price/Earnings (P/E) multiple of 17.6x. South Africa is still a market where you can buy high-quality companies on a PEG ratio of roughly 1.

How do you calculate that? You compare the P/E multiple to the growth rate. For example, buying a company trading on 10x, with a 10% earnings growth rate, is a PEG of 1. If the growth rate was higher, the PEG would be lower than 1.

This is just one of many valuation metrics out there, but anything at or below a PEG of 1 is worth a further look. Check out Peter Lynch’s writing on this topic if you want to learn more. I enjoy the way it bridges concepts that you’ll find in growth and value investing.

It’s also worth noting a comment by management that enrolments are in line with their expectations. That’s good news.


FirstRand’s ROE has moved even higher (JSE: FSR)

This is why the group attracts a premium valuation

FirstRand has released results for the six months to December 2025. The group is known for having a rock-solid business that generates excellent Return on Equity (ROE). Aside from some hiccups in the UK market, that reputation remains intact.

In a period in which HEPS increased by 11%, the financial services group managed to also increase ROE from 20.8% to 21.1%. This is miles ahead of the laggards in the local banking sector. To make it even more impressive, the Common Equity Tier 1 (CET 1) ratio, which essentially measures the amount of equity on the balance sheet, increased from 13.6% to 14.4%. Not only is the group in the territory of having a fortress balance sheet, but they’ve also improved their return on that balance sheet.

Earnings growth was driven by an 8% increase in net interest income (NII) and a 12% increase in non-interest revenue (NIR). In a superhuman effort in the treasury strategy, the net interest margin (NIM) somehow increased by 8 basis points despite the reduction in interest rates in the market. That is truly exceptional.

The credit loss ratio increased slightly, with the blame being laid at the door of the economy in Botswana. As people have been warning for a while now, the obliteration of profits in the diamond industry is going to have an effect there.

Including R333 million in legal costs related to the UK motor commission matter, operating expenses were up 9%. This means the cost-to-income ratio improved from 48.9% to 48.7% – another strong metric for the group.

And in case you’ve been wondering whether people have been vibe coding their corporate transactions, RMB saw growth of 16% in knowledge-based fee income.

So that’s a no, then.

I’ll leave you with one other interesting point: Wesbank is doing really well, powered by the growth in new car purchases in South Africa. Core advances at Wesbank grew by 13%, while FNB advances were up just 5%! Thanks to the lack of safe public transport in South Africa, we are a nation of car buyers – and on credit.


Greencoat Renewables is reducing debt and introducing share buybacks (JSE: GCT)

It’s all about capital management

Greencoat Renewables, as the name suggests, has a renewable energy portfolio. They have 36 assets spread across five European countries. It makes for a feel-good story, but that doesn’t mean that it also makes money.

Relying on the wind to blow is tricky. The sun is a lot more dependable, although not necessarily in Europe. And when you add in the macroeconomic shifts in the world and the effect of the yield curve, that pretty wind farm can dish up returns that are more volatile than the South-Easter in Cape Town.

In the year ended December 2025, Greencoat Renewables generated cash of €114.6 million, well down from €140.8 million in the prior period. The net asset value per share has decreased from 110.5 cents to 99.0 cents.

There’s been a modest reduction in debt from €1.26 billion to €1.21 billion. This works out to 52% of gross asset value, so these projects carry more leverage than a property fund.

The target dividend for 2026 is 6.81 cents per share, unchanged from 2025.

How do you create value in this situation?

One of the ways is to sell assets at good prices to reduce debt (they are targeting €350 million in asset disposals over the next 18 months). They hope to reduce the gearing to 45% in 2027, a far more palatable level.

Another way is through share buybacks, with a programme of €100 million kicking off and expected to run for 12 months. This represents 13% of current issued share capital. The first tranche of the programme is €25 million, running between March 2026 and September 2026. This leaves them with a long way to go towards the end of the programme, with the risk being that the share price rises into that significant buyback. I guess a rising share price is a problem they would love to have!

It would also help them tremendously if the wind blew a bit more in Europe.

A further positive update is that the company has established a new green digital infrastructure platform and its first investment. The underlying opportunity here? Data centres. Big, power-hungry data centres that need to run on renewable energy to avoid a social outcry.

The platform is a 50:50 joint venture with Schroders Greencoat. The first asset in the platform, the Drogheda Energy Park, is a brownfield project north of Dublin.

With Ireland as familiar territory for the hyperscalers, this actually sounds like a great opportunity.


Impala Platinum can thank the PGM prices for its recent performance (JSE: IMP)

That’s because other key metrics weren’t great

In the classic environment of a rising tide that lifts all boats, it’s still important to check which boats might be rusty. In mining, the best way to do this is to look at production and unit cost metrics (the “controllables”), as the price of the commodity sits outside of management’s control.

In the six months to December 2025, Impala Platinum’s Group 6E production only increased by 1%, while refined and saleable production was slightly down (even though the group uses the word “stable” to make it sound better). Unit costs increased by 11%, so they are very lucky that rand revenue per 6E ounce increased by 40%.

Capital expenditure decreased by 23%, so that gave a useful boost to free cash flow. The group achieved headline earnings of R9.3 billion and free cash flow of R7 billion.

This is a five-fold increase in earnings vs. the prior year, but we all know how well things went in this sector during periods when the mines relied on PGM price increases to cover inflationary cost pressures. It’s obviously difficult to get more of the stuff out of the ground (otherwise prices wouldn’t go up anyway due to supply deficits), but this is exactly why many have lost their shirts in this sector.

And also their shoes. Possibly their pants as well, depending who you ask.


Sanlam’s earnings have been heavily impacted by corporate activity (JSE: SLM)

The market never enjoys a period where “normalised” earnings are needed

When it comes to the financial services giants, Sanlam can never be accused of being boring. The company is always busy with some kind of corporate transaction – and usually more than one at a time.

This means that the earnings can be skewed by the specifics of the deals, especially as accounting rules are complex. Fin Acc IV lecturers get excited when they see this stuff, but everyone else starts to feel their eyes glazing over.

We therefore need to deal with the important context to these numbers that explains why the year-on-year moves are so sharp.

In the comparable period, the cessation of the Capitec partnership led to a once-off reinsurance recapture fee in the base period. There’s also the partial disposal of Shriram Finance in 2024, as well as the Namibian integration into the SanlamAllianz joint venture. And in 2025, the stake in that joint venture was reduced from 59.59% to 51%.

Now for the metrics that actually drive the numbers. For the year ended 31 December 2025, new business volumes for the group increased by 18% as reported and 22% on a normalised basis. This is a record performance for the group. Net client cash flows more than doubled, which is excellent.

Value of New Business (VNB) unfortunately went the other way, dropping by 21% as reported or 11% on a normalised basis. This was driven by product mix in South Africa, along with the various distortions detailed below.

The Net Result From Financial Services (NRFFS) moved by between -5% and 5% as reported, or increased by 15% to 25% on a normalised basis.

To add to the complexity, they are replacing NRFFS with a metric that the market is more familiar with: net operational earnings and adjusted headline earnings.

Using net operational earnings, the move was -15% to -5% as reported, or 0% to 10% normalised.

And finally, we have HEPS, which fell by between -25% and -15%. Much of this is due to the distortions, but there was also a difficult investment variance in 2025 vs. 2024 that hurt the numbers.

The market didn’t like it. And probably didn’t really understand it, either. The share price fell 5% on the day vs. a decline in the JSE All-Share of less than 1%.


STADIO manages even higher growth than its arch-rival ADvTECH (JSE: SDO)

The midpoint of core HEPS growth is north of 20%

In case you thought the abovementioned growth at ADvTECH was just a fluke in the sector, I now bring you STADIO – and the story here is even better.

For the year ended December 2025, STADIO’s trading statement reflects growth in core HEPS of between 17.1% and 27.3%. HEPS will be between 17.5% and 27.7% higher. Either way, that’s a midpoint of over 22%.

With core HEPS of between 36.9 cents and 40.1 cents, the midpoint is around 38.5 cents and hence the P/E multiple is just over 30x.

Using the PEG ratio example that I introduced you to earlier, STADIO is on a PEG of nearly 1.4x. This is a quick way to see that the market is putting a significant premium on STADIO vs. ADvTECH.

In today’s poll, I’m keen to find out which one you prefer:


Nibbles:

  • Director dealings:
    • The Wiese family has reshuffled some chairs at the dining room table, with father and son doing some trades across their various entities. Titan Premier Investment has sold shares in Invicta (JSE: IVT) to Thibault Square Financial Services. The value? A casual R482 million. There’s some feel-good context for the next time you’re having a family budget conversation in the living room. Sigh.
    • Tharisa (JSE: THA) announced that the CFO sold R7.3 million worth of shares. The company secretary also got involved here, selling R980k worth of shares.
    • An executive director of KAL Group (JSE: KAL) bought shares worth R990k.
  • ArcelorMittal (JSE: ACL) has renewed the cautionary announcement related to negotiations with the IDC regarding a sustainable solution to the company’s problems. It’s clearly a very difficult situation, with the IDC needing to determine the extent to which taxpayer-subsidised funding will be dressed up as a commercial agreement. There’s a spectrum here from pure commercial terms through to a government bailout. I’m sure some kind of solution will be found, but I can’t wait to see exactly where they land on that spectrum.
  • In case you’re keeping score for Schroder European Real Estate Investment Trust (JSE: SCD), the company announced some updates in terms of leases. There’s a new lease for a property in Germany that contributes 5% of portfolio income. The 10-year lease has been signed at an 18% increase to the previous passing rent (that’s good news). A further 5% of portfolio income is at heads of terms stage on a 7-year lease (no information is given on the pricing). But before you get too excited, a property in the Netherlands (also 5% of portfolio income!) has a tenant in financial difficulties, which means Schroder is now suing for the rent. This fund has been very disappointing, with the share price down more than 20% over 3 years. Including dividends, the total return over 3 years is essentially nil.
  • enX (JSE: ENX) has released the circular for the disposal of the remaining 75% in West African International to Trichem South Africa. This actually relates to a previously negotiated deal, as Trichem is simply exercising their option here. The independent expert has determined that the minimum price under the option is towards the low end of the fair value range, but that still means that the transaction is fair. enX shareholders will need to approve this via a special resolution, as the shares represent the greater part of enX’s assets or undertaking (a Companies Act definition for a s112 resolution).
  • ASP Isotopes (JSE: ISO) is still keeping SENS busy. The latest announcement from subsidiary Quantum Leap Energy is that they’ve appointed Nate Selpeter as Chief Technology Officer. Like many of the people who work there, he’s a PH.D. and a leader in his particular field. The average IQ at ASP Isotopes is a metric that they should consider adding to their reporting!
  • Mantengu (JSE: MTU) has refinanced around R130 million in short-term debt that was payable at the end of February 2026. At Langpan and Sublime, working capital facilities have been converted into 4-year and 3-year loans respectively. That’s important breathing room for the balance sheet, with the share price closing nearly 13% higher in appreciation.

Who’s doing what this week in the South African M&A space?

Sanlam Life (Sanlam) is set to acquire a 25% economic interest in the diversified investments portfolio of the ARC Fund. The transaction entails Sanlam subscribing for a separate class of shares in African Rainbow Capital Investments for a cash consideration of R3,2 billion. The Investment Portfolio excludes the ARC Fund’s investment in African Rainbow Capital Financial Services. Through the transaction Sanlam Life will gain access to a diversified portfolio of non-financial investments which expands Sanlam Investment’s alternative assets exposure and offering.

In a significant transaction for its Spanish subsidiary, Vukile Property Fund has acquired Islazul Shopping Centre from Nutwood Invest, ultimately owned by international private equity and real estate managers. Vukile will pay €202,15 million for the large-scale retail centre which is located in Madrid. The property is being acquired at a net initial yield of c.6.5% and is expected to deliver a cash-on-cash yield in excess of 8%.

Labat Africa has agreed to acquire a 20% equity interest in Mondau, an AI and technology company. Mondau specialises in Industrial AI applications, leveraging machine learning to optimise manufacturing processes as well as environmental and data-driven solutions supporting agriculture and sustainability initiatives. The company has a net asset value of R150 million and Labat will pay R30 million for its stake in the Mozambican asset.

The newly launched new green digital infrastructure platform – a joint venture between Greencoat Renewables and SCSL Global energy Infrastructure – has made its first investment in Drogheda Energy Park, 40kms north of Dublin, Ireland.

In November 2025, Kore Potash advised that it had received approaches from two parties, each of which were evaluating the possible acquisition of the entire issued share capital of the company. One of the parties has now advised that it has decided to suspend its interest and is unable to procced for internal reasons. The other party remains engaged in the formal sale process.

Libstar, which has been trading under cautionary since September 2025 following several non-binding expressions of interest regarding the potential acquisition of all Libstar securities, has decided not to progress engagements with any potential investors. The non-binding expressions of interest received were not reflective of the fair value of the company – based on the company’s historical performance as well as its medium- to longer-term outlook.

Following the ruling by the Competition Commission and the subsequent deliberation by Transpaco’s Board, the company has decided not to appeal the prohibition of its R128 million acquisition of the Premier Plastics Group, announced in November 2025.

Inspired Evolution has successfully exited its controlling stake in Commercial Energy SA, a South African clean energy platform specialising in the ownership and operation of commercial and industrial solar photovoltaic and battery energy storage system assets. Evolution has exited to SolarAfrica Energy, a company providing a suite of capex-free green energy solutions to the commercial and industrial sectors in Southern Africa. Financial details were not disclosed.

Open Access Data Centres, a subsidiary of WIOCC Group, has acquired a portfolio of South African data centre assets from NTT DATA. The transaction comprises seven data centre facilities, strategically located in key centres across South Africa, forming an important platform with in the local digital infrastructure ecosystem. Financial details of the transaction were undisclosed.

Weekly corporate finance activity by SA exchange-listed companies

Brait has successfully placed 5,633,802 Premier Group shares on the open market at an issue price of R177.30, raising gross proceeds of R1 billion. The placing shares constitute approximately 4.4% of the total Premier ordinary shares in issue. The net proceeds will be retained for general working capital purposes, potential investment opportunities and the repayment of group debt.

Africa Bitcoin has acquired a further 0.4742 BTC for a cash consideration of R512,466 at an average price of R1,080,695 per BTC. The group now holds 5.0246 BTC with an aggregate value of R7,83 million.

AttBid, a vehicle representing Atterbury Property Fund (APF), I Faan and I Dirk, which made an offer to RMH shareholders earlier this month, has acquired in on-market transactions RMH shares. Following the transactions, AttBid and APF hold 32.77% and 7.13% respectively, resulting in an aggregate of c.39.90% of the RMH shares in issue.

Salungano has advised that it estimates that the company will be able to request the JSE lift its suspended trading from June 2026 onwards. Wesizwe Platinum says it is on track to publish the audited financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2025 by not later than 30 April 2026, following which it will commence the necessary steps to lift the suspension of trading in the company’s shares.

This week the following companies announced the repurchase of shares:

GreenCoat Renewables has implemented a share buyback programme totalling €100 million over 12 months with a first tranche amounting to €25 million beginning on 5 March 2026 – representing 13% of the issued share capital.

Quilter has announced it will commence a share buyback programme to repurchase shares with a value of up to £100 million in order to reduce the share capital of the company and return capital to shareholders.

In a bid to optimise its capital structure and deliver enhanced value to shareholders, iOCO continued with the repurchase of shares in the open market. During the period 30 January to 27 February 2026, a further 2,899,689 shares were repurchased at an average price per share of R4.26 for an aggregate R12,35 million. Repurchased shares are currently held as treasury shares.

Anheuser-Busch InBev’s US$2 billion share buy-back programme continues. The shares acquired will be kept as treasury shares to fulfil future share delivery commitments under the group’s stock ownership plans. During the period 23 to 27 February 2026, the group repurchased 392,609 shares for €31,25 million.

In December 2025, British American Tobacco extended its share buyback programme by a further £1.3 billion for 2026. The shares will be cancelled. This week the company repurchased a further 469,383 shares at an average price of £45.92 per share for an aggregate £21,55 million.

During the period 23 to 27 February 2026, Prosus repurchased a further 2,058,996 Prosus shares for an aggregate €90,7 million and Naspers, a further 794,130 Naspers shares for a total consideration of R717,07 million.

Four companys issued a profit warning this week: Merafe Resources, Thungela Resources, South Ocean and Sanlam.

Six companies issued or withdrew a cautionary notice: Remgro, Libstar, Tongaat Hulett, Raubex, RMH and ArcelorMittal South Africa.

Who’s doing what in the African M&A and debt financing space?

British International Investment (BII) has committed US$25 million in financing to Rawbank, a commercial bank in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The facility will strengthen Rawbank’s ability to increase access to finance for non-mining corporates and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) across the country.

Kenya Pipeline Company Plc announced the results of its Initial Public Offering (IPO) that closed in February. The IPO was oversubscribed at 105.7%. 11,812,644,350 ordinary shares at an offer price of KES9.00 per share were issued, raising KES106 billion (US$820 million). Trading in the shares on the NSE is expected to commence on 10 March 2026.

Phatisa has sold its majority stake in Copperbelt Agri Holdings, the holding company of Zambian table-egg producer, Goldenlay, to Vanden Avenne, a Belgian integrated feed and protein manufacturer. AgDevCo, a long-term debt provider to Goldenlay, has also exited as part of the transaction. Management will reinvest alongside Vanden Avenne, ensuring continuity and alignment as the company enters its next phase of growth. Financial terms were undisclosed.

Platinum Credit Uganda, a subsidiary of The Platcorp Group, has secured a US$4 million loan from Swiss asset manager. The investment, provided over a term of 24 months, was disbursed for deployment on December 22, 2025. The funding will be used to expand their financing for low-income households and micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) across Uganda.

Moroccan mobility startup, Weego, has raised US$1,1 million in a new funding round led by Azur Innovation Fund. Weego operates a mobility-as-a-service (MaaS) application that integrates multiple transportation options into a single platform. The investment will support the expansion of the company’s MaaS platform and accelerate its growth across African markets.

Globeleq has acquired a 51% equity stake in Lunsemfwa Hydro Power Company (LHPC) from Norfund. The remaining 49% of LHPC is owned by Wanda Gorge Investments, a Zambian-based infrastructure investment company. LHPC, based in Kabwe, Zambia’s Central Province, operates two hydroelectric power plants with a combined capacity of 56 MW and is constructing a 27 MWp solar PV project. Its growth pipeline includes a 200 MWp solar portfolio and various hydropower expansions. The financial terms were not disclosed.

Oyass Capital has invested in Senegal’s Eyone Medical through a financing of XOF1 billion (US$1,8 million), supplemented by non-financial support via dedicated technical assistance. The funding will be used in the deployment of the Single Patient Record, a strategic project led by the State of Senegal aimed at modernizing the health system and improving patient care.

The risks of shadow AI in M&A transactions

In technology-focused M&A transactions, value related to material data increasingly resides in AI models, rather than traditional source code. This shift creates new challenges for buyers conducting due diligence investigations. “Shadow-AI” tools and models developed and implemented outside of formal governance pose particular risks that can affect valuation, legal compliance and post-closing integrations. For buyers, identifying and managing these hidden risks is essential to protecting value and avoiding unforeseen liabilities.

“Shadow AI” refers to AI models, scripts or datasets created by employees outside formal approval and governance processes and procedures. These tools are often undocumented and poorly controlled. While the use of Shadow AI may start as experiments or for simple tasks, it creates hidden technical and regulatory risks that can affect valuation, risk allocation, and addressing post-closing obligations.

Shadow AI typically arises when teams, or individual employees, bypass internal checks and procurement processes which relate to AI tools. Privacy reviews, data right assessments and security controls are often overlooked. Common risks include training models on personal data without a lawful basis, scraping data in breach of website terms, using open-source components with restrictive licences, or exposing confidential information to third-party AI tools. Once these tools feed into live systems or client deliverables, they can contaminate outputs and create uncertainty around intellectual property (IP) ownership.

A policy checklist and forensic checks are not sufficient to assess Shadow AI risks. There are further measures which buyers should consider when evaluating technology companies, such as:

  • scanning code repositories for unapproved models, notebooks and pipelines;
  • running licence and dependency checks to identify restrictive or non-compliant components;
  • reconstructing data lineage using system logs, cloud usage records, storage inventories and model registries to understand what data was used for training, and whether the data ownership rights are sound;
  • testing prompts and outputs for signs of copied content, bias or safety issues;
  • interviewing engineers and applied scientists, not just management; and
  • reviewing access controls, API keys and use of third party AI tools to identify unapproved services.

Where Shadow AI is detected, buyers typically require focused clean-up plans and should negotiate specific legal protections. Buyers should insist on targeted indemnities covering IP infringements related to AI use, privacy breaches, and violation of AI platform terms. Buyers should also tighten warranties around data provenance, model governance and the use of third-party AI tools. This gives the buyer a walk-away right if undisclosed issues surface later in the M&A process.

Warranty and indemnity insurance is not a cure-all. AI-related risks are frequently excluded and, where cover is available, premiums tend to reflect how mature and credible the target’s data and AI governance really is.

A transaction is usually affected by the use of Shadow AI in the following ways:

  • the price is reduced to reflect retraining costs and data contamination risks. A portion of the consideration is deferred, linked to completing data re-licensing, fixing edge-case model performance, and closing privacy gaps;
  • specific indemnities are included to cover IP claims linked to legacy scraping and code issues, backed by escrow; and
  • closing conditions include obtaining outstanding data consents, completing privacy impact assessments, and decommissioning the Shadow AI notebooks, with retraining done in a controlled environment.

Sellers should not wait for due diligence investigations to address Shadow AI. Conducting internal audits, documenting data provenance, and implementing clear AI governance policies before going to market can reduce price reductions, limit indemnity exposure, and accelerate deal timelines. Proactive remediation signals credibility and strengthens the seller’s negotiating position.

Consider a multinational company with thousands of employees across various departments. What happens if 10% of these employees begin using an AI tool that integrates into everyday systems to improve spelling and grammar in emails, documents, slideshows and messaging?

This scenario gives rise to several issues which directly reflect the Shadow AI risks discussed above:

  1. Lack of visibility: Management does not know this tool is being used, or by whom it is being used, creating governance gaps that arise when employees bypass internal checks.
  2. Data exposure: There is no oversight of what information is being input into the tool, risking the exposure of confidential or personal data to third-party AI services.
  3. Unclear licensing terms: The AI tool’s terms and conditions may grant a broad license, allowing the provider to use, modify and disseminate any data input, including using that data to train the provider’s own AI models.
  4. Delayed detection: These risks are unlikely to surface until something goes wrong – for example, when a competitor gains access to strategic information or a claim is brought because confidential customer data has been inadvertently used.

For buyers in an M&A transaction, identifying and pricing such risks becomes critical. The due diligence measures outlined above – reviewing access controls, API keys and third-party AI usage – are designed to uncover precisely these scenarios before they affect deal value or create post-closing liabilities.

In conclusion, there is an increased value in the data which a business owns. Shadow AI is a growing commercial, technical and regulatory concern which needs to be accounted for in M&A transactions. There are measures which can be implemented in the due diligence process to identify Shadow AI risks, and to mitigate the damage which may be caused by the use of Shadow AI. This allows for the business value to be accurately assessed and for Shadow AI risks to be accounted for in any M&A transaction.

Tayyibah Suliman is a Director and Head: Technology and Communications and Sadia Rizvi and Izabella Balkovic Associates | Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr

This article first appeared in DealMakers, SA’s quarterly M&A publication.

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