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Who’s doing what in the African M&A and debt financing space?

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Mediterrania Capital Partners and European Development Finance Institutions, FMO, British International Investment, BIO from Belgium, and Impact Fund Denmark, announced a €100 million co-investment in Coris Holding, the second largest banking group in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Operating under the Coris Bank International brand, the group is present in 10 countries through subsidiaries in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Togo, Benin, Mali, Guinea and Chad, as well as two branches in Niger and Guinea-Bissau.

Absa Bank Uganda has signed an agreement to acquire Standard Chartered Bank Uganda’s Wealth and Retail Banking (WRB) business portfolio, subject to regulatory approvals. Financial terms were not disclosed. Under the agreement, all Standard Chartered WRB clients and staff will transfer to Absa.

Pan-African investment platform, AfricInvest, has announced an undisclosed investment in The British University in Egypt. The investment, which is one of the largest foreign direct investments in Egypt’s education sector to date, was made through a capital increase with the Khamis family remaining the majority shareholders of the University after the investment. The capital increase will enable the University to further strengthen its position in the higher education sector in Egypt and regionally by expanding the capacity of existing faculties, establishing new ones, diversifying its curriculum, broadening its educational offerings, and implementing enhanced governance tools.

Stanbic Bank Kenya and Stanbic Bank Uganda have closed a US$45 million long-term funding package to support the expansion of two PepsiCo bottlers in East Africa. Crown Beverages in Uganda has secured US$30 million and SBC Kenya has secured US$15 million.

10Altics Business has acquired Nigeria’s Nebiant Analytics for an undisclosed sum as part of its strategic objective of expanding operations within Nigeria and throughout Africa.

FNB Zambia announced that it will acquire the wealth and retail banking business of Standard Chartered Bank Zambia for an undisclosed sum.

Aradel Holdings Plc announced that its wholly-owned subsidiary, Aradel Energy has entered into a definitive agreement to acquire a 40% equity interest, in ND Western (NDW) from Petrolin Trading. Aradel Energy currently owns a 41.67% stake in NDW, which holds a 45% participating interest in OML 34, a producing Oil Mining Lease located in the Western Niger Delta.

Independence reimagined in the age of King V

The evolution of the King IV Code to the draft King V Code signifies an ongoing evolution in the South African corporate landscape, meticulously refining governance frameworks to align with leading international standards and emerging global trends, thereby elevating the sophistication and integrity of corporate governance practices.

While King IV laid a solid foundation by emphasising structural separation and independence of mind, King V builds on that legacy with a sharpened focus on independence as an active governance function. Independence must now be visible, defensible, and deeply embedded in boardroom culture. The timing is critical. Recent corporate scandals, both domestically and internationally, have starkly illuminated the perils inherent in boards that, while ostensibly robust on paper, fail to exercise substantive and effective oversight. In many such instances, the mere presence of independent directors proved insufficient, as genuine independence – so critical to sound governance – was conspicuously absent.

While King V retains all the definitional hallmarks of independence, as articulated in King IV, it goes further by instituting more rigorous and discerning criteria to substantively assess independence at board level, representing a marked advancement over the prior framework and reflecting a more sophisticated approach to governance.

Section 5 of King V codifies a new standard for independence,1 replacing vague thresholds with clearer, more prescriptive rules. These reforms not only align South Africa with global best practice, but seek to rebuild market trust in the wake of recent governance failures. Four areas are particularly notable: tenure, cooling-off periods, related party scrutiny, and remuneration.

1.Tenure: The end of discretion
King V introduces a hard cap on director tenure: beyond nine years, independence status is automatically lost (Principle 5, Practice 25(h)). This represents a decisive departure from King IV’s flexible approach, which permitted boards to override the threshold with annual evaluations. King V removes this discretion, aligning South Africa with standards such as Provision 10 of the UK Corporate Governance Code. The rationale is clear: independence must not only exist, but must also be manifestly perceived to exist, as the prolonged tenure of directors risks entrenching them within the company’s affairs, and gradually diminishing the objectivity and incisiveness that underpin true independent judgment.

That said, the fixed cap may oversimplify a complex issue. South Africa’s concentrated ownership structures, transformation imperatives and limited pool of experienced, demographically representative directors present a unique context. While the nine-year limit promotes global alignment and reduces ambiguity, it also closes the door on a more nuanced calibration that might better reflect domestic realities.

2.Cooling-off periods: Codifying distance
King V replaces board discretion with fixed cooling-off periods to reduce the risk of informal influence. Former executives must now observe a dual regime: three years out of management, plus two additional years without any significant involvement in the company (Practices 25(c) and (d)). A three-year cooling-off period also applies to former audit partners, material service providers and advisers (Practices 25(e) and (f)).

These boundaries reflect international best practice and behavioural insight. They are long enough to allow detachment, yet short enough to preserve access to talent.

3.Related party influence: Expanding the risk perimeter
The current definition of “independence” includes, as a key consideration, the potential for “relationships” to influence or compromise objective judgement and decision-making. King V proposes an amendment to Principle 25, introducing the concept of a “related party” in relation to non-executive directors, with “related party” defined in accordance with section 2(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. This refinement provides welcome clarity, offering a more precise delineation in terms of which relationships are encompassed within the ambit of “relationships”, thereby enhancing the rigour and transparency of the independence assessment.

4.Remuneration: Incentivised, not captured
In a commercially pragmatic shift, King V clarifies that share-based or performance-linked remuneration does not automatically disqualify a director from being classified as independent, unless the remuneration is also material to their personal wealth (Practice 25(d)). This reflects modern compensation practices, particularly in equity-heavy sectors. It enables companies to recruit investment-savvy directors without losing their independence classification. Still, boards must assess both structure and scale with rigour – alignment with shareholder value is permissible; dependency on it is not.

5.Transactional risk and strategic implications
The implications for dealmakers and governance professionals are immediate. Independence is no longer a static designation; it is a moving part of the deal process. Directors crossing the tenure threshold mid-transaction or becoming conflicted through related-party developments could compromise quorum, regulatory clearance or shareholder approval. This elevates independence to a transactional risk factor.

Hard caps and broader exclusions also constrain board composition. In niche, technical or transformation-sensitive sectors, the pool of eligible independent directors narrows. Boards must therefore approach succession planning with strategic intent, making use of advisory panels, board observers, and staggered rotations to preserve governance continuity.

Legal risk is also heightened. Where independence underpins audit committee functioning or board approval, challenges to a director’s status can become grounds for litigation or regulatory scrutiny. Boards should adopt well-documented, defensible assessment protocols, and engage proactively with investors to build confidence in governance practices.

6.A call to action: Embedding independence by design
To remain ahead of the governance curve, boards should institutionalise independence oversight as a strategic function. This means auditing independence against transaction calendars, maintaining real-time dashboards that track tenure and related-party ties, and embedding reviews into board evaluations. These should be supported by robust documentation capable of withstanding legal and regulatory challenge. Above all, independence must become part of a board’s operating culture, not just a compliance checklist.

As the finalisation of King V nears, boards face a defining moment. Independence has become a proxy for governance maturity, deal credibility and investor trust. King V is not merely a tightening of rules. It is an invitation to governance leadership. For CEOs, CFOs, general counsel and board chairs, the imperative is not to do the minimum, but to hardwire independence into the DNA of board oversight.

Boards that rise to this challenge will not only align with regulatory expectations. They will also earn the confidence of the market and the freedom to lead with speed, clarity and integrity. In governance, as in dealmaking, credibility is the ultimate currency. And in the age of King V, independence is how it is earned.

  1. King Code IV at Part 1.

Isaac Fenyane is an Executive, Amrisha Raniga a Senior Associate and Sibulela Mdingi a Candidate Legal Practitioner | ENS

This article first appeared in DealMakers, SA’s quarterly M&A publication.

Ghost Bites (Astral Foods | Glencore | KAP | MTN Ghana)

Astral Foods pulled off a stunning turnaround in the second half of the year (JSE: ARL)

The annual growth is no indication of the volatility in H1 vs. H2

Astral Foods released a voluntary trading statement that reflects growth in HEPS for the year ended September 2025 of between 5% and 15%. That sounds so… normal? And nothing like we are used to seeing in the poultry industry, where the profit charts could give a theme park rollercoaster a run for its money.

Sure enough, if you compare the performance in the first half (H1) vs. the second half (H2), you see the craziness that we are accustomed to. For the six months to March, HEPS was down by 54% at R4.09 per share. The midpoint of the guided range for the full year is R21.12, so they generated roughly R17 in HEPS in H2!

This works out to approximately a 65% year-on-year improvement in HEPS in H2, which is exactly how they managed to offset the disastrous first half. If you’re looking for a low-stress life, stick to eating chickens rather than investing in them.

There are a lot of reasons why things got better, with higher production numbers leading to better cost recoveries. When you combine this with improved selling prices, the tight economics in the poultry sector move sharply in the right direction. We saw a similar story recently at sector peer Quantum Foods (JSE: QFH).

You may recall that some wild things happened on the Quantum Foods register in 2024, which is why the 5-year chart looks like this when we plot Astral against Quantum:


Glencore gives tighter guidance (JSE: GLN)

Copper is still down year-to-date, but has accelerated

Glencore released a production update for the third quarter. The main highlight is that copper production was up 36% sequentially (i.e. Q3 vs. Q2), helping to mitigate some of the year-on-year irritation that has been caused by lower head grades and recoveries. On a nine-month basis, copper production is down 17%.

Steelmaking coal reflects a jump of a whopping 123% year-to-date, but you have to keep in mind that the acquisition of EVR in mid-2024 is breaking these numbers. Australian steelmaking coal production is roughly flat year-on-year. Energy coal is up 1%.

Touching on other commodities, cobalt and zinc are up 8% and 10% year-to-date respectively. Lead is down 3%, nickel is down 16% and gold is down 17%, while silver is up 6%. Ferrochrome is down by a nasty 51%, a nightmare we already know about thanks to disclosure by Merafe (JSE: MRF) as the joint venture partner.

With the benefit of an additional quarter under their belt, Glencore has tightened the full-year guidance. In copper, they dropped the upper end of guidance (from 890kt to 875kt), while maintaining the lower end at 850kt. There’s no change to steelmaking coal. Energy goal is slightly higher, as is zinc, while nickel has come down.


KAP announces a forestry merger in PG Bison (JSE: KAP)

This is an effort to improve the economics in the Southern and Eastern Cape

Forestry is a tough gig. KAP owns many businesses, one of which is PG Bison, so the group has exposure to this sector that has risks ranging from global prices through to Mother Nature herself. Speaking of natural risks, fires in recent years have done nasty things to the forestry and sawmilling sector in the Southern and Eastern Cape. Bluntly, you can’t cut down and process trees that burnt before you could get to them.

This is why KAP has announced that PG Bison will merge its forestry, sawmilling and pole operations in the region with MTO Forestry, a company that also operates in this part of the world. It’s a sizeable transaction, with PG Bison’s relevant assets being valued at R713 million.

Here’s the problem: the valuation in PG Bison’s financials and the value for this deal are world’s apart, with the disposal price being set at just R251 million. Ouch. To be fair, the loss after tax attributable to PG Bison for the year to June was R18 million, so it sounds like they were struggling to actually unlock the underlying net asset value. This is a story as old as time in the forestry sector.

With some planned B-BBEE benefits in the final holding structure, the end result is that PG Bison will hold 49% of the merged entity.

This is a category 2 transaction, which means that shareholders won’t be asked to vote on it.


Another strong quarter at MTN Ghana (JSE: MTN)

There’s a deceleration, but the overall numbers are still excellent

The African growth story continues for MTN, with the next round of quarterly updates being kicked off by MTN Ghana. The business is running at a delicious EBITDA margin of 58.4% and grew revenue by 29.9% in the latest quarter. The improvement in the EBITDA margin of 220 basis points drove EBITDA higher by 34.7%. Best of all, ex-lease capex was only up by 7.8%, so capex intensity has come down and that’s great news for free cash flow.

Notably, the year-to-date growth rates for the nine months to September are actually higher than for just Q3, with revenue up 36.2% and EBITDA up 41.6%. In other words, the third quarter actually represents a deceleration from what we saw in the first half of the year.

Nonetheless, the business looks very well positioned for a strong finish to the year. Decelerating off such a high base is fine if the resultant numbers are still very good.


Nibbles:

  • Director dealings:
    • The CEO of Vunani (JSE: VUN) bought shares worth R32k to add to his recent tally.
  • Primary Health Properties (JSE: PHP) announced that it has received clearance from the UK Competition and Markets Authority for the combination with Assura. The process is different to what we are used to seeing in South Africa, as this approval would be a condition precedent in South Africa rather than something that isn’t finalised before the deal is done. Either way, Primary Health Properties can now focus on integrating the two businesses and achieving the synergies. Until now, they had to keep them strictly separate. Remember, the target is run-rate cost synergies of at least £9 million, so there’s much work to be done.
  • If you’re interested in the Southern Palladium (JSE: SDL) share purchase plan, then the booklet is apparently available on the website. I say “apparently” because I spent a few minutes looking and then gave up. Perhaps the upload was delayed.
  • Northam Platinum (JSE: NPH) announced that GCR has revised the outlook on the long-term issuer credit rating from stable to positive. That really is a sign of the times in PGMs and how much things have improved, with Northam’s relatively low-cost position referenced a few times in the announcement.
  • Libstar (JSE: LBR) has renewed the cautionary announcement regarding negotiations around a potential acquisition of all the shares in the company. The share price is up around 50% since the lows in early August and has gained around 20% since the first cautionary announcement in mid-September.
  • Sable Exploration and Mining (JSE: SXM)’s subsidiary Lapon Plant has entered into an agreement with Daemaneng Minerals that will see the latter take responsibility to operate and manage the partially constructed beneficiation plant and magnetic separation plant that produces magnetite. The key point here is that Daemaneng will fund all the capex and operational expenditure, thereby de-risking it for Sable and significantly improving the chances of some near-term positive cash flows. A circular will need to be issued to shareholders to get approval for this deal.
  • Wesizwe Platinum (JSE: WEZ) has released an update on production ramp-up progress. It’s a short and technical update that won’t mean much to anyone who isn’t in mining. The TL;DR is that they are making progress on the infrastructure required for the underground mining ramp-up.
  • For whatever reason, there are two non-executive directors at Putprop (JSE: PPR) who have decided to not make themselves available for reappointment. Those resolutions have thus been withdrawn from the AGM. The new CEO starts in the role from 1 November.

Ghost Stories #79: Fintech meets frontier markets – now on the JSE

Optasia is listing on the JSE, which means that South African investors will have the opportunity to invest in this exciting fintech business. With a proprietary platform and extensive relationships across numerous emerging and frontier markets, Optasia builds bridges between financial institutions and underbanked consumers seeking airtime credit and microfinance solutions.

To explain how the business works, Salvador Anglada (CEO, Optasia) joined me for this detailed discussion. We covered the core underlying model, the DNA of the business and the journey to scale, along with the importance of the relationships that have been built in this ecosystem. We also covered off the risks and opportunities for the group.

As always, remember to do your own research and to treat this podcast as being for informational purposes only. For more information on Optasia, visit the website here.

Listen to the podcast here:

Transcript:

The Finance Ghost: Welcome to this episode of the Ghost Stories podcast. I come to you at a very exciting time because we are talking about a new listing on the JSE – drumroll please! How great is that? We are so used to hearing about delistings – it is lovely to be talking about a genuine IPO, a business coming to the JSE, raising money, giving South Africans a chance to participate – and also just what a cool growth story. I’ve really enjoyed actually engaging with the pre-listing docs that have gone out, everything that has been put out there.

I’m personally really looking forward to this conversation. We are having it with exactly the right person, that is Salvador Anglada. He is the CEO of Optasia, a really exciting business that is coming to the JSE. Salvador, thank you so much for squeezing this into your busy diary of roadshows and speaking to institutional investors. I know that Optasia values the retail investor audience. That’s where this is ultimately going. Thank you so much for that, for your time. I’m just looking forward to getting to know more about the business.

Salvador Anglada: Good afternoon, everybody. Good afternoon, Ghost, and thank you for having me here today. It’s a big pleasure to share with you this time this afternoon.

The Finance Ghost: It’s going to be great. I’m excited. Let’s jump straight into it. When I look on the Optasia website I see words like financial empowerment, inclusivity, unlocking access, really powerful stuff. These are the words that feature prominently in the way that Optasia describes the business. It sounds like the right strategy when you think about emerging markets and frontier markets, particularly when you’re trying to scale and reach a size where the economics look really good. I think let’s begin with the simplest question of all because the market is not familiar at this stage with the Optasia business: what does the company actually do? Can you describe for us as simply as possible what the business model is?

Salvador Anglada: What we do really is to solve a problem that exists in a lot of countries, what we call underbanked countries. There are a lot of people that they don’t have access to financial services, so what we do is to solve that problem using technology, we are able to provide credit, loans and financial services to all these people. And we are doing that, creating an alternative way of scoring the risk of the people without structured data, without credit bureaus, without anything that the developed world uses.

We use our technology, we collect data, we create a credit scoring for every single person. We’re able to decide on the amount and the affordability of any person using data, as I said, and connecting with their mobile wallets or any single device that the person has in order to receive the money. This is what we do. We do it at scale – operating in more than 38 countries, we have been able to scale to 120 million* active customers that receive our loans per month. A machine that is being created, when I say a machine – an engine more than a machine, connecting the dots and allowing us today to take more than 30 million credit decisions as we speak every single day. Also to disburse more than $13 million of credit also every single day. This is what it is, a platform that allows us to provide credit at scale big business.

The Finance Ghost: It’s an impressive story. And I think you’ve raised such an interesting point there, which is that without the data, what tends to happen is people assume that the risk of providing financial services to unbanked people is much higher than it actually is. So that’s what the technology is doing, right? It’s closing that gap. It’s saying to financial services providers, actually we know something about these people, we’ve built out these models, we understand this market a lot better. That allows you to price for the risk and it allows people to get access to financial services that they might not be able to get any other way. That’s what I’m understanding from you.

Salvador Anglada: Yeah, I would say this is exactly what it is. We are building up a model that allowed us to include all these people in the possibility to have access to financial services. And the only way using technology, as you said, I mean the way that a traditional bank provide credit is first of all, you need to have a bank account. Second, they ask you for your salary certificate and then normally they calculate a percentage of that and they give it that as a credit. We are talking with people that don’t have bank account, a lot of them don’t have a salary certificate. The beauty is to collect all this structured and unstructured data, hundreds of thousands of different data. We take more than 5,000 data points and we create features, more than 100,000 features per person. What we do is to try to simulate the behaviour of the people when they are going to get a credit and more than that, the affordability. We try to understand this using the characteristics of the different people, taking into account the data that we collect that are as diverse as your phone or the transaction that you do in your mobile wallet. We are able to predict what is your potential opportunity to take credit and to be able to pay back. Because we do not ask for any collateral, any warranty, nothing. We just give the credit.

We connect the platform with the wallets that customers are using their mobile phones. We are able to disburse that amount of money at the time that the customer is asking for. It’s a process that takes not more than 30 seconds. You ask for a credit of $20 and we decide if yes or no, in 30 seconds you will – if the answer is positive – you will get the money in your wallet and you can do whatever you want with that money. You can pay bills or you can cash out if it is what you want to do.

The Finance Ghost: And all of this is made possible, as you say, by technology. The big deal here, it’s stuff like smartphones for distribution. It’s a tried and tested strategy in markets like Africa. It’s machine learning to understand more about this – and you talked about an engine – it’s that algorithm in the back-end, whatever name you want to put to it. At the end of the day, it’s a lot of clever tech that has actually been built over time to do this.

The Africa story itself is so interesting. I have a very fond memory of a client I worked with in my advisory days where I travelled to Kenya. Part of their business was built on the fact that they could deliver to people in Kenya who don’t have a traditional street address, it’s more GPS locations than anything else. People who haven’t done any work in Africa, they don’t understand these limitations. They don’t understand what it’s actually like on the ground. As you say, someone who doesn’t necessarily have a traditional salary, doesn’t necessarily even have a bank account, but still has an income of some kind, still has financial needs. That’s a very interesting opportunity, and I think it creates a really cool business, Genuinely, I do.

I think it creates a business that is actually quite difficult to copy. That’s a big part of the value of Optasia, right, is this machine you’ve built ultimately, and just how big it actually is. And that brings me to the point I wanted to raise around the scale of the business. If I look at your intention to float announcement, there’s a statistic in there that no single country or currency is more than 19% of group revenue. That’s pretty impressive diversification. There are not a lot of businesses that can say that, actually. If you think about all the American tech players, they can’t say that because the US is almost always more than 20% of their revenue. And you’ve done it across many, many, many countries.

Why is building something of that scale so tough, and then creates value in the process? Why is it so difficult to get to where Optasia is today and the value that has been created today? What are the challenges to get there?

Salvador Anglada: First of all, what happened is that even if we have a very modern platform, one that is able to manage, as you said, collect the data, run all the data and build up the algorithms and then disburse and collect the money integrated with the different players. The point is that it’s a cloud platform, built with microservices, but needs to be deployed in the ecosystem. With our partners we have a B2B2X model which means that we work through distribution partners like mobile network operators or digital banks or eCommerce players. Anyone that has three things for us that allowed us to run our business. They need to have customers, of course, because I mean this is the distribution channel. They need to have data that we are able to handle in order to calculate the behaviour of the people and simulate, as you said, the potential income and the possibility for them to afford potential loans. And also they need to have a way to interact with the customers normally, as I said, an application, a mobile app or a mobile wallet. The reality is that all this is available, but all this data cannot be moved out of the place that it is seated. If we talk about a mobile operator, we will not move this data out of the data centre as you can imagine. But important to be very strict with the data privacy and also with the customer protection rights.

So at the end of the day, it’s a very modern platform, but needs to be deployed locally. We have 38 different deployments that need to be done in the different places. Normally what you have is a bunch of potential distribution partners in every single country. If you really want access to all the people in a different country, you need to find one of these partners, the one that we are talking about, and do the deployment locally. And it is tough. This is tough because you need to start with one country and then go to the second one and the third and go up to the one that we have today. We’ve been building up in the last 12, 13 years. You need to integrate with a local partner and also you need to find out in that specific country also a bank or a financial institution which allowed us to get the amount of money that we’re going to then provide as a credit.

The system allowed us to underwrite all what we do, so the risk is on Optasia. But we use of course the balance sheet of a bank to provide a loan because they are the ones that have the licence. All these ecosystems need to be built. We need to choose our country to be able to provide the service to all the people in that specific country and then we need to move to the next one. Because in the world we have more than 1.7 billion of people that they don’t have access to financial services. Of course they are not in one single country – as you can imagine, all of them are in underbanked countries, in countries that are still in a process to develop their own economies. Yes, I think it is a specific capability to run and to develop those models and those deployments on the different countries is quite complex from one side, but then also create a big competitive advantage. Because imagine today to try to build up the same local integration and create these ecosystems across 38 countries. It will take a lot of time for a lot of people.

The diversification comes because we want to provide service across – and also I have to tell you that at the end it’s also another competitive advantage because these countries we are talking about could be Ghana, or Kenya, or I can name all of them – or Indonesia or Philippines. What it gives us also is a very interesting – at the end in this painful process, it’s a big diversification of the income and the revenues. It’s important because you know very well that operating in some of these countries could be tough related to the fluctuation of the currency. And if you are able to diversify as much as possible, that means that you have less exposure to that fluctuation. And it’s a natural hedge, natural protection for the company.

The Finance Ghost: It’s incredibly interesting and hot off the press this week is the news that FirstRand is participating in the IPO. They’re taking a stake of just over 20%. That was really interesting because Optasia is a platform business. You have a lot of partnerships with financial institutions and then with distributors on the other side. In some respects it sounds a bit like a two-sided marketplace. There’s also wording like “take rate” that comes through in terms of how the business actually works. Obviously it’s such a valuable route to market that a player like FirstRand has actually looked at this and said, okay, we want a minority stake here. We would like to make sure we are part of the action. Just a very interesting additional boost I guess to the entire IPO story really.

I think let’s maybe dig a little bit into this two-sided marketplace. The way you work with the different financial institutions and how they provide you with the balance sheet to do what you do and maybe just how Optasia actually makes its money – what is the economic model for Optasia? You take a lot of financial services, you can distribute it through to end users, that’s fine. What does that mean when you talk about things like take rates and having all these different banks? What is the basic explanation?

Salvador Anglada: The service, how it works – you are right, I mean we cannot do this alone. We have the technology, we have the platform and we integrate with different actors in the market. From one side we integrate with these distribution partners. As I said, the one that they have customers and they have data and they have also allowed us to access to the customers. What we do is we get the data from them. The data is unstructured. We collect from more than 5,000 data points. We clean up all the data, we organise and then we create what we call features. We have more than 100,000 features per person and that is a way of how we describe any single individual. We don’t know who is any person, because all the data anonymised. But we are able to understand in an anonymous way, we are able to describe every single person, how they will perform against credit, how much they are able to afford, what is the amount that we are able to give it to them based on what we believe. The way that we simulate what could be his or her income, we will be able to provide a specific credit. These features are the ones that have been feeding our algorithms. Algorithms that are calculating two things at the end: what is your credit scoring and what is your credit limit?

And all this is being calculated in real time. Every single time you ask, I will be able to provide this amount to you. All these algorithms are different per deployment, per country, quite complex and always we are training them in a continuous way in order to improve and enhance the output that we are getting. Of course, I mean as I said, this is one part of the piece. We have the customers and the data we are able to access.

But on the other side, we need to have a financial institution that is able to provide credit. Because we are not a bank, we don’t have a licence, so we are not able to physically be the lender on record. The loans are not in our balance sheet. We find also on the other side of this ecosystem – and you very well describe – banks, financial institutions that are ready to work with us. Of course, if we go to a financial institution, we say we want to provide credit to people, small amounts, maybe $5, $10, $20 for 30 days, and please allow me to get some funds in order to run the business, because it’s important to do it locally also and to run the operation locally. I mean, the natural answer would be no, of course, because we don’t know you and we don’t understand this type of business. So what we do is we tell them, don’t worry, we will underwrite the risks. If any person do not pay – some people do not, as you can imagine – we will take the risk out of that. And to do that, I will warranty. And there are some instruments to warranty these amounts. We provide the bank warranties. We provide cash margin.

The percentage of the amount is being covered properly by this cash margin and these warranties. The reality is that, I mean, our model runs a very lower default rates than any other. We are well covered. But in any case, we provide these warranties but just so everybody is comfortable.

Then the magic happens. Person would ask for the loan in the wallet of the distribution partner. We are integrated with them. We have a very good experience. You ask for $20, for instance, and we tell you, yes, we can give it to you this $20, but I mean, after 30 days you need to pay me $20.50 or $21, which is the cost of the service that I’m going to give it to you. The money, it’s coming from this financial institution that I was mentioning before. And everything is well arranged in a way that we are able to disburse the money. If the customer is accepting the terms and conditions and everything is absolutely clear, they will get the money in 30 seconds. The money will be in the wallet, as I said before, and they can do whatever they want with that. These ecosystems – us in the middle with our technology, our platform, the distribution partner, which is a wallet and a financial institution, is the magic that allowed us to extend the service. And just because we always choose distribution partners with millions of customers, as I said, a digital bank or a mobile operator, it’s allowing us to expand the service quite rapidly because it’s a service that is very much demanded in all those places where if this is not the case, they don’t have any other way to access that. Or maybe just in an informal way asking to a friend or a family. But we are structuring that. We are creating a market that was not existing before. And I think the potential –  and we can talk about later, about how big is this market. It’s massive.

The Finance Ghost: Yes, that all makes sense. I can believe that market is absolutely huge. Actually, let’s jump straight into that – just how big is this market? I actually I’m keen to hear it in your own words. What is the size of the opportunity here that you are chasing?

Salvador Anglada: Well, that’s difficult to know to be honest, because I think we are just scratching the surface. But when we do some calculations, what we see is that, well, first of all, in the world there are 1.7 billion people that don’t have access to bank accounts or their own bank. This is the potential market. When we try to deep dive more, understand what is the addressable market or the size of the addressable market. Some people in South Saharan Africa, they talk about $350 to $400 billion. The reality is that there is what we call tailwinds around these type of services. Because if you think about what are the drivers, the drivers are always – you have population that in these countries continues growing. You need mobile phone or mobile service, and the penetration of the mobile services that could be future phones or smartphones doesn’t matter. It’s rising in all the countries and I start to be close to in a lot of countries, 80% to 90%.

Also we’ve seen wallets are important and just because there are no banks in those countries, I mean the wallet has been expanded exponentially. Only in Africa you have 400 million active wallets. And active wallets means that are being used per day. All in all, what happened is that, I mean, every single year the market grow. The number of people that are accessing for the first time financial services in these markets is growing more than 50%. There is a growth of new people that they decide to take loans using this type of service. It’s a huge market. It’s been expanded gradually. In any single country that we go, we see the demand, think that’s why the company is growing so healthy and so fast.

The Finance Ghost: It’s a very interesting story. So what I’m hearing is lots of short-term lending, unsecured lending. These are small loans to people that need to be paid back quite quickly. And you can imagine the reasons why people would need these loans. It would range from micro-businesses through to someone’s source of income. The asset they use has broken, they need to fix it, otherwise they can’t actually earn an income.

That sort of micro-business type stuff, typical of frontier markets where people need access to funding, they need it quickly, they need it now, and they’re not working on oh, what is the percentage cost of this funding? As you say it’s $20 and I need to pay back $21 quite quickly. But without that $20, they are in serious trouble. So the cost of debt, the $1 is “affordable” to them because the cost of not having the debt is worse. Whereas in percentage terms for your business, if you can earn $1 on $20 in 30 days, life is good. There’s then space in the economics for you to build out the platform to reward the banks, and I guess you’ve got to obviously pay your distribution partners.

So, can you give us examples? I think everyone listening to this obviously understands what a bank is. You can understand how the financial institutions get involved. But in terms of your distribution partners, what sort of businesses are these – telco type companies, how do you distribute? Who are these partners?

Salvador Anglada: Well, it depends on the places. In sub-Saharan Africa, most of the partners are mobile network operators because they are the one that has developed the mobile wallets. Customers like MoMo, which is MTN or VodaPay with Vodacom or M-Pesa which is Safaricom, those are the ones that has developed those wallets. They are the ones that we use as distribution partners in other countries.

In Asia for instance, it’s more the wallets being called super apps in some cases where they provide you with a lot of services, including financial services or in some cases even digital banks that has been created because the traditional bank has not been deployed properly. So as I said, it’s a variety.

But talking about the economics, as you said, I mean, yeah, you need to understand that all these need to be orchestrated with this amount on top, this service fee, this dollar on top of the $20 that you were mentioning, we need to pay absolutely everything. First of all, we need to deploy the technology. The platform need to be deployed locally as we said, because it cannot work like a cloud platform that can get access to millions of customers and get these economies of network very fast. I mean the, all the players today in internet, we cannot do that – we could, but you need the regulation, every single service that we provide, any cash loan that we provide, are approved by the central banks of the different countries through our financial partners. It’s very important to understand that the cost of deploying the technology, also to run the algorithms.

And then of course, as I said, we underwrite the whole risk. And I will talk about that in a minute. Because it’s important that we really rely on the technology and our algorithms. And that means if a customer take a loan of $20 and then they need to pay that in 30 days, and they do not pay that because for whatever reason they can’t, we are able to extend that loan maybe for the same period, one time, only one time, we will extend another 30 days, we will charge similar amount than before. And we expect the customer to come and pay. And if they do not pay, we don’t do anything. There is no collateral, we do not charge compound interest. We do not blacklist the customer in any single place. We just write off or wait until the customer pay back. Because some of them, they pay back in 30 days after or 60 or 90, sometimes six months when they have money. What I’m trying to say is that we really rely on the algorithm. We really rely on what we believe is the amount that someone can afford in order to be able to get the money and pay back.

Also, we rely on the responsibility of the customers because for them keeping a good credit history, it’s important and they know it’s important. And we educate them a lot. They understand that because they know that if they do not pay, of course we will not give them another credit. What I’m trying to say is that we deploy, then we absorb the whole default which need to be covered by this take rate or that service fee. Also, of course, we pay our partners and we pay our distribution partners because they are giving us access and they are allowing us to create all these services, either because they allowed us to access to go to the customer base and also because we use their data. And last but not least, we need to pay to the financial institution that is giving us the amount of credit that allowed us to run that service. All in all, it’s a tight business, but we are able to handle in an optimal way after 13 years of experience.

And we are able to absorb all these costs and create profit out of it that is allowing us to continue expanding to other countries.

The Finance Ghost: Salvador, thanks, that’s really interesting. That’s a lot of additional insight then into the distribution, but also just the way you think about the customers. It’s fascinating that when someone doesn’t pay back, they don’t necessarily get blacklisted. It’s almost like your model is allowing for, okay, the size of exposure – let’s learn something about this person, let’s apply all of the previous data we have. And at the end of the day, when it comes to credit, I mean, I’m not a credit expert at all, but I know that one of the important things is just behaviour and someone’s honesty. And most people are good people, they actually want to pay back. They want to do the right thing. It sounds like your model works off that assumption, right? It treats people as people. It says, well, someone is on average going to want to pay this thing back. So let’s give them a chance, let’s give them access to credit. That’s what I’m hearing.

Salvador Anglada: You’re right. We believe that people, they want to pay. Some of these people, they use the credit, 30%, 35% they use the credit from their own small businesses to handle their working capital. Some of the people are using for the university or the school fees. Some of the people they are just using because they need to end the month and they don’t have – for whatever unexpected end, they are not able to do it. So yes, you’re right.

Most of the people, this is what they’re doing and they take care of their history and in terms of credit because they know that if they are good payers, the amount that we can provide as a loan will increase. In some of the deployments that are older, we’ve seen that the average amount of credit that a person has multiplied by more or less seven times after five years. So for instance, we start as an average of $3. After five years, that amount is $21. And this is only because people are good payers, they try to take care and we also get more confidence on those specific people. And this is the way that the system works also. The system is intelligent.

The other thing that happened is that we are able to detect fraud. We detect strange habits. If someone tried to create a way to improve so fast the amount that they can get from the system, so we start to get credits and pay very quickly in order to enhance and increase the scoring and the credit amount that he is able to afford, we detect it and we do not follow that increase to those customers. Also with detecting customers who are moving money from wallet to wallet in order to pay back the credit. So those are elements that also just, I mean, the beauty of the data is that all this information that is totalled in the structure allowed us to understand better and better this type of behaviours which are the minimum, don’t get me wrong, but are also important yet to try to avoid in order not to contaminate the whole system.

The Finance Ghost: Yeah, that makes sense. You’re talking there about the power of the models that you use, et. Let’s move onto that. Optasia does talk about being an AI-powered business. I think I saw in your documents over 200 models working on this data set in the business and I think over 120 patents in the group which is really interesting. It’s clear why, I think it’s come through in the conversation why this is so important and valuable. I’m almost more interested in the patents actually, more than 120 of them. What are some of the things that would relate to? Does that mean that your scoring models, the actual tech sitting behind all of this, you have protection on how those algos work, or what is that referring to?

Salvador Anglada: We have two things. We have models and we have the platform. The platform includes everything that allows us to disburse and collect, it includes the models that allow us to calculate the algorithms and to calculate the scoring, it includes also the loan management system. It has also a marketing module that allows us to run campaigns for educate people to do notifications and also to do marketing itself. We have a module that allows us to build up new products and also a module to help us with the collection. It’s a quite comprehensive and complete platform on top of that. But as you said, the models are the ones that allow us to decide the credit scoring and the credit limits.

Different things are under patent. Definitely the output of the models is something that is proprietary. We do not share with anybody. There are part of the process that also part of the patents that we have and if I can put an example for people to understand what does it mean, we have the history of 13 years of providing credit – airtime credit and microfinance credit – to the people. What it has helped us – and it’s under our own IP and under patent – is the velocity on how we can provide these loans or how we can increase the amount that we can give it to you as a loan without putting you in the risk of default. It’s not the same to move you from 5 to 15 than to move you from 5 to 7 to 10 and to 15. And this speed is critical and it’s been developed and it’s as I said proprietary, and we use in all our models to try to control properly the amount and then the default, which again is critical. If we do not control properly the default and we double the amount, it will make the model unsustainable and anti-economic.

So these type of elements in the process are quite unique. Also, for instance, the way that we calculate and create features per person, as I was mentioning before, we accumulate up to 100,000 features per person that describe this person, this mechanism. It’s also under patent that are examples of the 120 patents that we have accumulated over the years.

The Finance Ghost: Fascinating. It really is interesting. Let’s dig into some of the numbers now. I think we reached that point in the podcast where we should chat about that famous thing for startups that is so important in tech platforms, and that is the J-curve, which basically just means for listeners who maybe aren’t familiar, if you can imagine a capital J, there’s that bottom curve – that’s where a platform business is building out its operations. It’s typically burning cash, it’s loss-making, but it’s building the business of the future. And then that J kind of shoots up to the moon – that’s typically what happens then to profitability at successful platforms.

Once they get to scale, then the contribution margin of new customers is really high and they make a lot of money. And it seems that that’s where you are now in the journey, Salvador. Your adjusted EBITDA for Optasia up 91.3% year on year. It’s a big number. That’s why I’m laughing as I say – that’s a really big number! So well done.

What is driving this acceleration in your earnings? What should investors think about in terms of your growth rates going forward? Obviously to the extent you can talk about it, need to be careful here that you don’t give forecasts to the market or say something that’s not in other docs, but just at a high-level. Your views on the flywheels for growth and what you believe can be achieved in this business?

Salvador Anglada: Well, first of all, the speed of the growth right now, it’s also based on the transition of the business to microfinance. The platform started providing micro-loans, but based on airtime. We were providing people at the very beginning, if you were running out of credit in your mobile phone, we were able to provide you a credit in order to continue talking until you top up next time or just because of convenience, they were not a place close to. That was the very beginning of the company and then that has gradually migrated and pivoted to micro-finance solutions, loans, as I said, or buy-now, pay-later type of services or overdraft services. And this shift has created this enormous growth momentum that you were referring. In the first half of the year, we are growing at 90%. This is one element that is important to understand.

The second one you were talking about, the J-curve, is absolutely true, exactly what you said. You invest in the platform, you invest in customer acquisition cost and at one point of time you have the critical mass and you are able to create profit out of that. That’s not exactly our case. And yes, it’s the case of a platform, but we create a model, we build up the ecosystems in-between our partners in a way that the cost of acquisition of a customer is being paid as we go, because we share the revenue that we get from the customer at the time that we acquired the customer.

Very important, because it’s an intelligent way to move on that is allowing us to have profitability from the very beginning. We do not pay if we don’t do business. And we pay at the time that we do business. That is helping us to scale in a profitable way and is helping us also to create a cash flow that then we use to invest in the next deployment.

So it’s exactly what you said, but we change a bit the traditional model of the platform, we get the economics of network of the platform, but we change the economics. That means of course that the profitability will not go up at this stage. So we are, I would say, in an optimal level at this stage and even if we will continue growing and we expect to duplicate our size every two to three years, the margins or the percentage of the margin should stay more or less. I mean, could change, of course there are economies of scale, but it will not have a dramatic change.

The other thing I want to tell to everybody is to understand our EBITDA margins are before interest, cost of capital that we use in order to finance the loans. And this is very normal on the banking system. So a lot of people compare us when we go to the market and when they look for multiples of our business with digital banks and they love to calculate, I mean the multiples over the net profit rather than EBITDA in that case. Our business is absolutely profitable, but run in a level of around 20% net profit margin.

The Finance Ghost: Thank you. That’s a really important distinction. I actually did plan to ask you how people should think about EBITDA, understanding now that your business does take on some of the credit risk, you are ultimately borrowing money from banks. You’re not exactly acting as a bank in the middle because obviously that’s a very regulated thing, but there are elements of that.

I would definitely suggest to the listeners, as much as it’s a tech company, you do need to be a little bit careful using EBITDA. But still, the growth is clear.

If you’re growing your EBITDA at that sort of rate at steady margins, then as long as you can manage your financial institution relationships, etc, that suggests that the business is well positioned for growth. So that seems pretty solid.

I wanted to ask you about the capital being raised through the listing process. My understanding is that you are looking to raise R1.3 billion in fresh capital. Naturally this leads to a question around what the capital will be deployed into, what it’ll be used for. It’s quite a capital-light model in theory, although net working capital does jump around a lot, it depends on the amount you are lending out, etc.

So, you see this fresh capital coming in. How should investors feel about that number? Where is it going and why are you raising it now?

Salvador Anglada: The amount that we’re going to float and will be made public, it’s around 30% of the company. And out of that there is a piece of which will be, as you say, new money – primary – that we will use for expansion and also to finance our growth. And I will come back in a minute to that. The rest that we are floating is just to allow also to create the right liquidity, the vehicle for some of the old investors that has helped us during all these years to have also the possibility to exit and offer the possibility to participate in the company to new investors. So there are these two tranches, we call it primary and secondary. 20% of the total is primary, 80% will be secondary.

The primary, which is the one that you are referring, will be used mainly for two things. One is what you said is about continue supporting our growth. Our growth is important. It means the deployments of new countries and new partnerships, new ecosystems, the possibility to expand and accelerate in Asia, and also the launch of new products and services that will complement the one that we have today. And all this, even if we have already financed ourselves, we want to be sure that there is no limitations for the company to do so. And that’s why this primary, on top of that, the potential opportunity to do an acquisition that allowed us to accelerate further our growth is also on the table. Of course, there is not at this stage any candidate, it’s only the idea to find data definitely out of Africa.

And that’s a second element that we have taken into consideration when we decided to rise primary. It will give us a lot of flexibility, it will support our growth if needed, it will support when M&A or inorganic growth is needed and definitely will support the potential that we have and we will use properly at the time that it’s going to be needed.

The Finance Ghost: Makes sense. Thank you very much for clarifying that. I think as we start to bring the podcast to a close, I always like to understand what some of the key risks are that keep you up at night. There’s obviously a very exciting story here. There’s a lot of great things that have been built that you are busy doing. It’s all very interesting in terms of risks. Obviously the business is carrying credit risk. You’ve confirmed that for us, so thank you. What else keeps you up at night? What do you try and get your top execs to focus on in terms of where things can go wrong, the things you need to make sure don’t happen? What are those primary risks for investors to consider as they decide whether to invest in Optasia?

Salvador Anglada: I think we have a solid company. You’re right that we have a risk of default, but just thanks to technology, I think it’s something that is quite under control, or we believe so. The way that we run the business, the way that we ramp up a new deployment, a new country, we babysit, we fine tune before we really run, so we know how to walk before run. So this is something that of course it’s important, but I would say it’s quite under control.

For me, what is critical is to continue diversifying the business. This is very, very important. And there are two factors that everybody will understand. I think you mentioned before, that there is no single country – well, there is one that it is 18% of our revenues, but all the rest are more close to 10%, 10% to 13% just to be precise. We are quite diversified, but I want to continue doing that.

And there are two reasons, as I said. The first one is the FX exposure is not very big because we operate in local currency. So when we partner with a bank, a local bank, we provide the loan in local currency. But of course, I mean whatever profit we do, it’s exposed to the valuation of the currency. And this is something that is normal in the country that we operate. We need to accept that and we need to live with that. So one of the things that we want is to diversify because that will allow us, if there is a problem with one of the currencies, it will not affect much. To be also clear, in the past there was more concentration and that hit us at one point of time we were facing a big devaluation in countries where we have too much exposure. And we learned the lesson and that’s why we really, really pushed for this diversification.

The other thing that it’s important is that we are also quite protected towards any single problem that it may happen in one of the countries. And it’s not easy to find out a problem, but it could happen because if it happens and you are diversified, first of all, just because the length of the credit is low, we’re talking about weeks or a month, it’s not so difficult to reduce the exposure in the market. But even if you are not able to do it, the impact in the whole company is again quite limited. And let me tell you that it’s not easy to find one of these events. An example is when COVID happened six years ago, we were already providing of course loans and one of the big markets at that point of time was Pakistan. And you can imagine we were a little bit scared of what was going to happen. Should we reduce the level of exposure in the market, what should be our reaction? We started monitoring things 24/7 to understand what was the level of exposure and the level of collection. And it was a surprise that we see that even with COVID, people were continuing paying at the right time, even more, they were paying faster. And that was a big surprise. Then you realise how important is the service for the people, how important is the credit history, but also how linked is the service versus the macro element conditions. So inflation, forex risks, COVID or pandemics were not affecting at least the small economies of the people that are using these loans to move on. Well, that is giving us also the calm and the trust that even if we are operating with risk, we are providing credits even if they is unsecure. We really believe that we have a model that is robust and quite resilient.

The Finance Ghost: Any business that has been through COVID has learned some big stuff around macro level events and black swan events. It’s quite good that you’ve actually been through that kind of stuff and built it into your thinking.

Salvador, last question before I let you go off and build this exciting business – could you just confirm the extent to which your management, you included, everyone involved there is invested in the business? I think specifically when there’s an IPO, investors always want to know that they are investing alongside a committed management team who are also invested in the business. If you could maybe just confirm that position for us?

Salvador Anglada: Well, yeah, this is very normal in all the companies that are growing, tech companies. Be sure that the people are engaged and there is a skin on the game and the people are going to also get the benefit of the growth and exactly this is the case. The management team have been participating in an incentive plan based on options during all these years that now some of them are going to crystallize because I mean there is a public event and the company is going to be listed at the same time. As part of this process, we are reshaping the program for the future, being sure that all the people that are helping me, and including me, of course, run the business and to move the business to the next step will take exposure on that. That means that part of our remuneration is based on the success of the company in the future and the success of the shares and the value that the company will take if we are able to execute properly. So yes, I can confirm to you that. And hopefully that will happen.

The Finance Ghost: Absolutely. Salvador, thank you so much for your time today. I think we’re going to have to leave it there. I would encourage any listeners, if you’re interested in this, include a link in the show notes to all of the IPO docs. Obviously, go do your own research. All the normal disclaimers certainly do apply here. IPOs are fun things, very interesting, very exciting to have new companies on the market. But always make sure you do your research. Think about how this would fit into your broader portfolio strategy.

I think what is really cool about it is that we don’t have anything else like this on the JSE. And as I say, that news hot off the press of FirstRand taking over a 20% stake in the business at the upper end of the IPO range is certainly something that I’ve taken into account in my decision in whether or not to participate in this IPO, certainly my interest in it.

So, Salvador, thank you so much for your time. All the very best with this. Welcome to the JSE. I look forward to tracking the progress and writing about it. And perhaps I’ll be able to do a podcast again with you sometime about results down the line. So thank you so much and good luck.

Salvador Anglada: Thank you very much. Ghost, thank you for having me here. Today. Thank you, everybody.

*note: this was amended from “up to 130 million” in the original recording.

Ghost Bites (Anglo American | Ascendis | Balwin | Kumba Iron Ore | Old Mutual | Santova | Valterra Platinum | WeBuyCars)

A mixed bag at Anglo American (JSE: AGL)

This year looks fine, but there’s a caution around copper in 2026

Anglo American released a production report for the third quarter ended September 2025. They are on track for 2025 guidance in copper and iron ore, although the copper business in Chile has some question marks around production in 2026.

On the steelmaking coal front, the business is in recovery mode and Anglo will look to start finding a new buyer for the business in coming months after the previously planned disposal fell through. They are also in the process of regulatory approvals for the nickel transaction, as well as a structured sales process for De Beers.

From a growth perspective, all eyes are of course on the Teck Resources merger. I mean, merger of equals. Except they aren’t very equal at all, despite the press releases beating everyone with the we-are-actually-the-same-size stick at every opportunity.

Looking at selected numbers, copper production is down 9% on a nine-month basis, while iron ore is down 2% and manganese ore has jumped by 34% due to severe weather disruptions in the base period. In case you’re wondering, diamond production is down 5% year-to-date and up 38% for the quarter, with production from Q4 having been brought forward into Q3 (and thus artificially boosting the quarter).

Copper prices are up around 6%, while iron ore increased 2% (mainly thanks to Minas-Rio). Diamond prices are down 3% year-to-date in terms of average realised price, although the price index for diamonds is down 14%. Yikes.

The area of concern in the update is copper production for 2026, where lower-grade materials from stockpiles are affecting Collahuasi in Chile. They are talking about flat production in 2026 and a potential rebound in 2027. They will update 2026 guidance for copper during the first quarter of next year.


Ascendis Health has another tilt at going private (JSE: ASC)

Hopefully with far less drama this time

When Ascendis tried to go private last time, things got pretty ugly out there on the socials and surely behind closed doors as well. That deal was eventually canned. There’s now another attempt to go private, this time at an offer price of R0.97 per share. The previous attempt in late 2023 was for R0.80 per share. This price is 21.25% higher than before and comes nearly two years later, so it isn’t really very different to the 2023 offer when you consider the cost of capital.

The structure of this deal is an offer made by the company to shareholders, accompanied by a delisting. The price is an 18.2% premium to the 30-day VWAP. Holders of 72.07% of shares have indicated that they will not accept the offer. Holders of 57.03% of the voting class (i.e. the non-concert parties) have given their support to it. If shareholders would like to follow the company into the unlisted environment, then they are able to do so.

Interestingly, there’s a maximum acceptance condition of 20% of total shares in issue. 72.07% have already said no to the offer, so this leaves a question mark around what the remaining 27.93% will do. For this deal to go through, at least a portion of them need to be willing to move into the unlisted environment.

Forvis Mazars in South Africa has acted as independent expert and has opined that the deal is fair to Ascendis shareholders.

The Ascendis website is a great opportunity for this screenshot that tells a story of what life has been like for many JSE-listed mid-caps over the past decade:

The circular for this deal is available here.


Balwin is looking much better these days (JSE: BWN)

Importantly, gross margin from apartment sales is holding steady

Balwin Properties released results for the six months to August. The company has had a tough time over the years, with the share price still trading in line with mid-2020 levels. The company trades at a stubbornly low valuation, reflecting the patchy historical performance and general apathy for JSE mid-caps.

If they can make a habit of reporting numbers like the ones for the six months to August 2025, the market will pay a lot more attention. Revenue climbed 44% and HEPS was up 29%, with the group taking advantage of better conditions in the residential property market. This result was driven by a 45% rise in apartment handovers.

Balwin Annuity (gotta love a segment that does exactly what it says on the tin) increased its revenue by 55% and now contributes 8.3% of group revenue. This is a helpful underpin.

Although gross margin was down from 32% to 29%, this was because of the lack of land sales in this period. What really counts is apartment gross margin, which was steady at 23%.

The cash position improved from R254.8 million as at February 2025 to R303.4 million as at August 2025. There’s still no interim dividend, with the group continuing to focus on debt reduction (the loan-to-value ratio is a meaty 39.3%). When they feel ready for dividends, I hope that they do share buybacks instead. That should do wonders for the share price.


Kumba Iron Ore on track for annual guidance (JSE: KIO)

The market liked it, with the share price up 4.8% on the day

Kumba Iron Ore released a production and sales report for the third quarter of 2025. It tells a positive overall story, with sales up 7% despite production dipping by 2% due to maintenance at Sishen. This disconnect is thanks to improved rail performance, as Kumba sits on an stockpile that Transnet appears to be unable to ever catch up on. At least they made a small dent in the stockpile in this period, with ore railed to port increasing by 12%. Yay!

The Kolomela mine continues to do the heavy lifting, with production up 8% year-on-year for the quarter and 11% year-to-date. At Sishen, production is down 6% for both the quarter and year-to-date. From a cost perspective, Sishen is expected to be within guidance for the year, while Kolomela’s strong production performance could take it below the full year guidance for costs (i.e. more efficient than expected).

In terms of global selling prices, an improvement in demand for steel has given a boost to prices. They are now running at a consistent average realised FOB export price for the nine months year-to-date vs. the comparable period.

Kumba’s success is always at the mercy of Transnet. This is why the market feels good when Transnet seems to be making progress.


Old Mutual targets 6% – 9% dividend per share growth over the medium-term (JSE: OMU)

The capital markets day presentations are packed with insights

Capital markets days are lovely things. I wish that all companies would do them. These days are an opportunity for management (usually divisional execs as well) to present the business targets and strategies for the next few years.

Old Mutual is the latest such example, with all the presentations available here.

In terms of financial targets, the number that is easiest to focus on and remember is the planned growth in dividend per share. They want to achieve 6% to 9% growth over the medium-term. From FY22 to FY24, the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) was 6.4%, so they are targeting an acceleration (as one would hope). This comes with a change to the dividend policy that will be based on underlying cash generation rather than headline earnings.

They will achieve this through a mix of organic and inorganic growth. One of the acquisitions that the market will focus on is 10X, a way for Old Mutual to chase passive net inflows. Old Mutual is acquiring an 85% stake in 10X based on an enterprise value of R2.2 billion, with the deal expected to be completed in the first half of 2026.

I remain skeptical about Old Mutual Bank and why it should even exist, but perhaps time will prove me wrong. This slide around the scale plan for the bank and the break-even target is certainly interesting:

Take note that they are targeting monthly break-even during FY28. These things take time.


Santova’s margins have dropped sharply due to lower global shipping rates (JSE: SNV)

But the company is confident – and on the hunt for deals

Santova has released interim results for the six months to August 2025 that have a very odd shape. You see, revenue and net interesting income increased by 56.3%, yet HEPS fell by 23.1%. Talk about a divergence!

This is because operating margin tanked from 26.3% to 14.0%, with Santova having to navigate a global trade environment that has seen a spectacular drop in freight rates. Shipping rates are expected to remain at pre-pandemic lows for the foreseeable future, with the double-whammy of oversupply and weak demand. It’s important to remember that operating margin will be structurally lower in future due to the acquisition of Seabourne, a business focused on fulfilment centres and express courier. This is less risky than being exposed to global shopping, but also carries lower margins.

The nastiest drop in profits in this period was Asia Pacific, where net profit after tax fell by 72.9%. It’s thankfully much smaller than the South African, European and UK businesses. The North American business is looking dicey, with restructuring to that business and an increase in loss from R3.7 million to R4.6 million.

Santova has an asset-light model relative to many other ways to play in the freight game, so this makes them more resilient. In fact, they are seeing this as an opportunity to consider acquisitions at a time when prices will be depressed. Kudos to them: this is the kind of thinking that is sorely needed in cyclical industries.

It’s worth noting that Seabourne’s net profit contribution was negligible in this period, with R8 million of profits (for three months) being offset by R6.3 million in acquisition costs and R1.7 million in interest on the acquisition debt. This situation will change going forwards, as the acquisition costs were non-recurring.


Valterra Platinum’s production has dipped (JSE: VAL)

The good news is that Amandelbult is back to steady state

Valterra Platinum released a production report for the third quarter ended September 2025. Despite the company being separated from Anglo American (JSE: AGL), they still released the update on the same day as the Anglo companies.

The good news is that Amandelbult has been ramped up to steady state production ahead of schedule, so that’s pretty good going since the flooding in February 2025. The bad news is that refined PGM production fell 5% this quarter and sales volumes were down 9%, some of which is due to volumes rolling into October.

Still, the group says that it remains on track for 2025 metal-in-concentrate production.

On a year-to-date basis, if you adjust for the change in model at Kroondal, PGM production is down 7% and sales volumes are down 16%. It’s just as well that PGM prices are up so strongly.


WeBuyCars punished heavily by the market as growth faltered (JSE: WBC)

There just aren’t enough details available at this stage to make a call

As regular readers will be aware, I’m long WeBuyCars and I’m a fan of the business model. This has worked out very well for me, even after the share price took a bath on Tuesday:

I’m very tempted to use this market panic to buy more, but I’m going to wait for the release of results on 17 November to make sure that there’s nothing fundamentally broken in the business. Core HEPS increased by between 0.8% and 6% for the year ended September 2025, a growth rate that definitely doesn’t cut it for a growth darling on the JSE. The midpoint of the guided range is 224.65 cents, which puts it on a P/E of 20.8x after the nasty sell-off. That’s typical of a quality company on the JSE, so it’s now at more reasonable levels, but not “cheap” in a way that will encourage people to jump back in.

With new car sales doing well recently (and kudos to CMH (JSE: CMH) for a particularly solid adaptation to what has happened in the market), I suspect that the influx of affordable Chinese and Indian vehicles has affected demand for used cars from legacy manufacturers. If that’s true, the depreciation curve on that shiny German car in your garage is going to be even worse than you feared. From a WeBuyCars perspective, I take comfort in the knowledge that whilst they might have a crummy period now and then due to a market dislocation, they’ve still managed to grow earnings during a year of immense disruption to the sector.

This is why I remain happily long, and why my tendency is to want to add to my position, not cut it. Roll on 17 November!


Nibbles:

  • Director dealings:
    • Jan Potgieter has sold more shares in Italtile (JSE: ITE) as part of detaching himself from the group, this time to the value of R190k.
    • The CEO of Vunani (JSE: VUN) bought shares worth R4k.
  • Merafe (JSE: MRF) released production numbers for the nine months to September. As we know, the ferrochrome smelter market is in crisis at the moment. Production from the joint venture with Glencore (JSE: GLN) suffered a 51% drop in production for the nine months as production was suspended based on adverse market conditions. Attributable chrome ore production was down 3% and attributable PGMs concentrate production increased 1% (in both cases on a nine-month basis as well).
  • There’s an interesting play afoot at RMB Holdings (JSE: RMH), which has been trying to achieve a value unlock since forever. The major underlying asset is the stake in Atterbury, where there have been major disagreements between that company’s board and RMH’s board on the way forward. Things are getting even more interesting now, as Atterbury has acquired a stake of 28.35% in RMH and Coronation has sold out entirely. There are some clever people involved on both sides of the table here, so keep an eye on this.
  • I don’t think Renergen’s (JSE: REN) current earnings are the most important element of that story, so I’m just mentioning the updated trading statement down here. For the six months to August 2025, the headline loss per share is expected to be between -R0.866 and -R0.957, an increase in the loss of between 89% and 109%. Aside from transaction costs related to the ASP Isotopes (JSE: ISO) transaction, there were higher depreciation and other costs based on the commissioning of the full Phase 1 plant. You know things haven’t exactly gone to plan when switching on your operations leads to higher losses.
  • Africa Bitcoin Corporation (JSE: BAC) announced the results of their capital raise. I’m afraid that the excitement they tried to generate around the change in strategy hasn’t amounted to much, with only R4.05 million raised in the holding company towards buying bitcoin. They also raised just R62k for the Altvest Credit Opportunities Fund (JSE: BACC). I will say it for the millionth time: walking before you run is the right way to build trust in the market and to get people interested. I personally think that full focus should be on demonstrating that ACOF can be viable before they do anything else.
  • I was wondering how long it would take to see changes to the top execs at MAS (JSE: MSP). Sure enough, CFO Bogdan Oslobeanu has now resigned. A successor hasn’t yet been named.
  • Here’s an interesting capital raise for you: British American Tobacco (JSE: BTI) released a prospectus for the issuance of a mezzanine instrument that is subordinate to senior creditors. They are making allowances for up to €1.2 billion to be issued.
  • Piet Viljoen has resigned from the board of Goldrush (JSE: GRSP). He also recently resigned from the board of Astoria (JSE: ARA) as part of refocusing his time.
  • Delta Property Fund (JSE: DLT) announced the appointment of Mpho Makwana as an independent non-executive director and the chairman of the board, replacing Phumzile Langeni in that role. With prior experience at Eskom and ArcelorMittal, he clearly enjoys a challenge.
  • Trustco (JSE: TTO) needed to find a new sponsor after the corporate finance team at Vunani (JSE: VUN) resigned as the company’s sponsor. Trustco has appointed Dea-Ru to act in that capacity.
  • Murray & Roberts (JSE: MUR) announced that the High Court granted a final liquidation order for the liquidation of Murray & Roberts Holdings. Remember, the downstream subsidiary is in business rescue, so this only relates to the listed holding company.
  • Deutsche Konsum’s (JSE: DKR) efforts to restructure the balance sheet will culminate in an extraordinary general meeting scheduled for 4 December.

Ghost Bites (Astoria | FirstRand | iOCO | Pick n Pay)

Astoria adds its name to the list of companies that want to leave the market (JSE: ARA)

The stubborn discounts to NAV on the JSE have claimed another victim

Investment holding companies are slowly becoming a rare sight on the JSE. The market tends to value them at a significant discount to NAV, regardless of whether they deserve it or not. This creates a dislocation in the performance between NAV per share growth and the share price itself (which is what the market cares about). Even share buybacks seem to struggle to close this gap for many of these structures.

Of course, what doesn’t help the situation is when the NAV goes in the wrong direction in a tough year, as has been the case at Astoria. The company released its quarterly results for the three months and nine months ended September 2025. The unlisted investments are only subject to a detailed valuation at the half-year and full-year points, unless there are obvious changes that need to be considered (e.g. the repurchase of shares by Outdoor Investment Holdings). The NAV per share is R10.99, down 6.1% vs. December 2024 and 21.6% vs. September 2024.

With the NAV trending lower and with all the difficulties of trying to reduce the discount to NAV, Astoria has taken the decision to use its cash pile to facilitate a transaction that will allow the company to build in private rather than in public. The price on the table is R8.15, which at first blush looks like a 26% discount to the NAV. There’s a nuance here: my understanding is that the company plans first unbundle Goldrush (JSE: GRSP) shares to its shareholders, in a ratio of 12 Goldrush shares for every 100 Astoria shares. Goldrush closed at R6 per share yesterday, implying a value of 72 cents per Astoria share. This is a moving target as the Goldrush price changes, but it takes the price to R8.87 based on latest numbers. That’s a discount to NAV of 19.3%.

The cash portion is a 26.5% premium to the 30-day VWAP, so they’ve basically split the difference vs. the NAV discount before you take into account the Goldrush unbundling. That doesn’t seem out of line with the other delistings in this space.

Shareholders who don’t want to sell at this price have the option of keeping their shares in an unlisted environment. It’s always worth remembering that there is no guarantee of liquidity in that environment, with the only buyers for shares usually being other existing shareholders, or the company itself. Holders of 57.81% of the shares have committed to not accepting the offer. Notably, holders of 59.33% of shares other than those held by concert parties have agreed to vote in favour of the delisting.

Full details will be available when the circular is distributed by the end of November.


FirstRand takes a 20.1% stake in Optasia (JSE: FSR | JSE: OPA | JSE: EPE)

And they’ve done it at the top end of the guided range for the IPO price

When a new company is coming to market, it’s absolutely critical that a successful IPO is achieved. Generally speaking, this is judged by the market response to the capital raising activities and the way that the share price behaves when it opens for trade. The pricing of the IPO is usually done in such a way as to leave something on the table for the market to fight over.

Optasia’s pricing guidance for the IPO is R15.50 to R19.00 per share. It certainly sends a strong signal about this price range that FirstRand has happily taken a 20.1% stake in Optasia at R19 per share, right at the top of the guided range. As bullish signals go, that’s about as good as it gets for Optasia, and for Ethos Capital as one of the existing shareholders in Optasia.

Optasia is an exciting emerging and frontier markets platform focused on fintech. It provides an attractive distribution channel for financial products, including those of banking groups. FirstRand has clearly recognised the strategic importance and wants to hold a significant minority position, giving it a better chance of unlocking benefits for its retail and business banks through the platform.


iOCO’s share price has more than tripled since the 2023 rights offer (JSE: IOC)

The latest results show how far things have come

iOCO (previously EOH) is proof that when it comes to speculative stocks, it really is about timing the market rather than time in the market. This is a company that raised capital in 2023 at R1.30 per share, yet now is trading at R4.25:

Those who bought the extreme 2024 share price pressure have absolutely cleaned up, as the share price has quadrupled since then!

Why has this happened? Well, with the company having walked over the hottest of hot coals to shake off the EOH era, it now finds itself in a situation where HEPS for the year ended July 2025 swung from a loss of 0.21 cents to profit of 40 cents. Free cash flow per share was 51 cents vs. negative 21 cents in the comparable period. As turnarounds go, this one is working out very well indeed.

The group has been shifting things around in a big way, leading to a 1.2% drop in full year revenue due to disposals. Importantly, the second half of the year reflects growth of 4%, so their exit velocity in revenue is positive. Not exciting, but positive.

The good news is that gross margin improved by 140 basis points to 28.7%, so that modest move in revenue has levered up into a much better performance in profits. Adjusted EBITDA improved by 68% and operating profit was up by a rather daft 275%.

Another very important strategic move has been the push for recurring revenue, up from 37% of revenue to 48%. Guidance for FY26 is for this to be above 60%, so that will lend support to the valuation.

But here’s the best guidance of all, and something that you very rarely (if ever) see in South Africa: free cash flow per share guidance! They reckon it will be at least 60 cents per share. With the share price currently on R4.25, that’s an implied forward free cash flow yield of 14%.

If they can hit these targets and increase the recurring income in the group, then I wouldn’t be surprised to see further upside in the P/E multiple (currently 10.6x based on the latest numbers).


Pick n Pay is still heavily loss-making (JSE: PIK)

Sales momentum is great and all, but they need profits

Retail turnarounds are hard. Grocery turnarounds are even harder. Pick n Pay is giving us a local example of this, with the group struggling to stem the bleeding in the core Pick n Pay business. If it wasn’t for Boxer (JSE: BOX) to give the group some underlying value, I’m starting to wonder if there would be any Pick n Pays left out there!

The problem is that shrinking into prosperity as a grocery retailer means losing out on the benefits of scale. In a market with largely homogeneous products and extremely price sensitive customers, scale is key to success. Pick n Pay closed 65 loss-making stores in this period and although that is a necessary step, it has knock-on problems for the rest of the business. For example, if volumes are down, volume rebates from suppliers are lower and thus gross margins suffer. To compound the issue, giving up loss-making stores means vacating space that creates an opportunity for a competitor to enter your turf and put your next-closest store under pressure. With a juggernaut like Shoprite as their biggest competitor, Pick n Pay needs more than just a Springboks sponsorship to survive.

If you look at the group numbers, you’ll see a 4.9% increase in turnover and a jump in trading margin from 0.1% to 0.5% for the 26 weeks to 31 August 2025. This won’t make sense in the context of what I just told you. The reason is that the group numbers include Pick n Pay’s stake in Boxer, whereas the internal cancer that is crushing the entire group is the Pick n Pay Supermarkets business itself. In other words, we need to dig deeper to explain what is going on. Before we do that, I want to point out that the group reported a headline loss per share of 59.77 cents, or a R439 headline loss. The loss is 45.3% better than the R803 million last year.

The silver lining is that there is some momentum in the underlying Pick n Pay business. Like-for-like sales in Pick n Pay Supermarkets increased to 4.8% for company-owned supermarkets and 1.7% for franchise supermarkets. Direction of travel aside, both of those numbers remain unexciting. Gross profit margin improved by 0.4% as mix improved, but only came in at 16.9%. Yes, the underlying mix of businesses may be different, but I need to highlight that Shoprite (JSE: SHP) is running at a gross margin above 24%. There is no world in which adjusting for the underlying mix would explain that gap. There’s only one explanation: lack of scale and efficiencies is severely hurting Pick n Pay’s profitability at the tills.

Pick n Pay Clothing remains a positive story, although growth in this period was achieved vs. an extremely soft base. 7.5% like-for-like growth seems unlikely to continue in the second half, with the company noting that growth moderated towards the end of the interim period.

The profit story only gets worse further down the income statement. Trading expenses were up 6.2% on a like-for-like basis, which means expenses grew faster than like-for-like sales. Pick n Pay attributes this to the building of “operational and customer facing capacity” and higher advertising spend. A guaranteed way to upset the market during a turnaround is to shrink your sources of revenue while increasing your capacity. Capacity for what, exactly?

The number that counts is trading profit after lease interest, mainly because of ridiculous accounting rules that push the lease expenses into the net finance costs. Pick n Pay made a loss of R1.16 billion on that basis, slightly better than R1.27 billion in the comparable period. Boxer was good for a profit of R702 million, showing strong growth vs. R613 million in the comparable period. The group loss improved from R660 million to R462 million – still a significant loss.

It’s also very important to remember that there is a 34.4% non-controlling interest in Boxer. The best underlying business in the group needs to be shared with all the investors who now own Boxer alongside Pick n Pay. This puts even more pressure on the story in terms of attributable earnings to Pick n Pay shareholders.

Thanks to all the capital raised in the market, group net funding swung from a net expense of R392 million to net income of R145 million. Pick n Pay is sitting on R3.9 billion in net cash, a number that will keep dropping unless the losses can be stopped.

The most disappointing point of all in this announcement is that the trading loss in FY26 is expected to be broadly in line with FY25 in the Pick n Pay segment. Pick n Pay’s share price fell 6.3% on the day and is now flat year-to-date. My money remains far away from this turnaround story.


Nibbles:

  • Director dealings:
    • The CEO of Vunani (JSE: VUN) has added another R4k worth of shares to his recent purchases.
  • On 20th October, Southern Palladium (JSE: SDL) announced a planned placement of shares at A$1.10 per share to raise A$20 million. They also left themselves room to raise A$1 million through a share purchase plan open to retail shareholders. The first tranche of shares has been issued, raising A$7.26 million in the process.
  • Curro (JSE: COH) is making progress on the conditions precedent for the take-private by the Jannie Mouton Stigting, a deal that is loved by everyone with any degree of common sense in the market. The Competition Commission is one of the outstanding conditions, so don’t count any chickens before that is out the way. Based on the recent pricing of Capitec (JSE: CPI) and PSG Financial Services (JSE: KST) shares earmarked for the deal, the scheme consideration is a 74% premium to the closing price of Curro on 25 August 2025.
  • If you’re interested in Caxton and CTP Publishers and Printers (JSE: CAT), then keep an eye out for investor presentations that will be available on the website from Tuesday, 28th October.
  • The collective holding-of-breath at Shuka Minerals (JSE: SKA) continues, with Gathoni Muchai Investments promising the company that the flow of funds under the loan agreement will be happening this week. The money is needed for the acquisition of Leopard Exploration and Mining Limited, a company that appears to have patient sellers based on all the delays to the flow of funds.
  • Harmony Gold (JSE: HAR) gave the market a reminder that mining is a dangerous industry. There was a tragic loss-of-life incident at the Mponeng mine, near Carletonville. There’s no indication in the announcement that the operations at the mine have been suspended, so I assume that they haven’t.
  • Prosus (JSE: PRX) has significant (and growing) business interests in South America. They’ve launched something you won’t see every day: a Brazilian Depository Receipts programme. This is backed up by the American Depository Receipts (ADR) programme in the US that is a far more common site. It essentially gives Brazilian investors easier access to invest in the group.
  • Way back in December 2024, enX (JSE: ENX) announced the acquisition of the property situated at 30 – 48 Jacoba Street, Alberton. ENX occupies the property and they were keen to lock in what is obviously a strategic site. The purchase price was set at R95 million. Why am I raising this again? Well, it’s taken this long for the deal to become unconditional and for it to close! It’s incredible how long these things sometimes take to be finalised.

UNLOCK THE STOCK: Redefine Properties

Unlock the Stock is a platform designed to let retail investors experience life as a sell-side analyst. Corporate management teams give a presentation and then we open the floor to an interactive Q&A session, facilitated by the hosts.

We are grateful to the South African team from Lumi Global, who look after the webinar technology for us, as well as EasyEquities who have partnered with us to take these insights to a wider base of shareholders.

In the 62nd edition of Unlock the Stock, Redefine Properties joined us to talk about the recent numbers and the strategic outlook for the business. As usual, I co-hosted this event with Mark Tobin of Coffee Microcaps and the team from Keyter Rech Investor Solutions.

Watch the recording here:

The Ascent of Alternative Lending: Navigating the Private Credit Market in South Africa

In our prior examinations of the South African fixed income universe, we detailed the structure and participant dynamics of the listed debt market. We established that this market is characterised by persistent illiquidity, driven by the dominance of institutional investors, such as life insurers and asset managers, who often adhere to conservative, “buy-to-hold” strategies. This environment, while offering predictable income streams and stable portfolio performance for some, restricts the ability of market participants to rapidly reallocate assets or respond effectively to evolving market conditions. The scarcity of buyers and sellers of the same instrument at the same time perpetuates this cycle.

However, the discourse on corporate debt must now pivot to address a far larger, yet less visible, segment of the market: Private Credit.

The global financial ecosystem is undergoing a profound transformation, marked by a significant migration of corporate debt from public, listed or syndicated markets toward bespoke, privately negotiated solutions. This evolving landscape, often termed private credit or direct lending, has swelled exponentially, with global assets under management (AUM) exceeding $2.5 trillion and projected to reach $3 trillion by 2028. South Africa, with its developed financial sector and large institutional investor base, is emerging as a critical participant in this sophisticated asset class not only for local investors, but on the global stage.

For financial market participants, grasping the drivers and dynamics of this shift, and its specific manifestation in the South African context, is paramount.

The Global Macro Shift: The Retreat from Public Credit

This global retreat from traditional public credit markets can be attributed to a convergence of factors on both the supply and demand sides of the equation. Traditional supply is impacted by regulatory hurdles and associated costs. Simultaneously, investors are now more sophisticated in their processes than ever before, and are less focused on whether an instrument is listed, something that was once a firm requirement.

Following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), stringent regulatory requirements fundamentally altered the risk appetite and operational capacity of traditional commercial banks. Facing increased capital adequacy and liquidity constraints, banks began scaling back on lending, particularly to medium-sized or complex clients perceived as “risky”. This regulatory creep has created a substantial funding gap. Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) and specialist debt funds have stepped in to fill this gap, operating largely outside the rigorous capital perimeter of banking regulation. For instance, banks now struggle to provide term funding lasting longer than three years at competitive pricing, leaving room for fund managers to adopt a longer-term lending perspective. Basel III regulations, the most recent iteration of the core regulatory framework governing the capital reserves of these banks, is equally reinforcing these constraints.

Concurrently, institutional investors globally, including pension funds and asset managers, have driven immense demand for private credit. They are actively searching for asset classes that offer attractive risk-adjusted returns, diversification benefits, and enhanced yields compared to traditional debt instruments. Historically, private credit has demonstrated the potential to deliver superior returns, compensating investors for the asset class’s inherent illiquidity and perceived risk.

From the borrower’s perspective, private credit offers a superior user experience characterised by speed, flexibility, and confidentiality. Unlike standardised public debt instruments, private debt instruments can be customised with bespoke structures, flexible repayment schedules, and tailored covenant arrangements that align precisely with a borrower’s unique operational and financial requirements. In addition, transactions can often be executed faster, providing funding certainty more quickly than going through traditional bank credit committees or syndicated loan processes.

The True Scope of Private Credit in South Africa

In the South African financial context, the definition of private credit requires a nuanced understanding, extending beyond the common perception of merely funding high-risk, mid-market enterprises or providing smaller, high-yield investment opportunities.

Private credit, fundamentally, encompasses any instrument that is not publicly listed. This broad scope means it covers all forms of debt funding provided by non-bank lenders outside of the listed bond market.

It is important to remember that this asset class includes the debt raised by large, listed companies through private channels. The pool of entities requiring debt funding in the private market vastly surpasses the handful of major corporate issuers (around 25 entities annually, excluding government and SOEs) active in the local listed debt market. Given that there are nearly 300 listed companies in South Africa, most of which require some form of debt funding, the opportunity in the private credit space is significantly broader than in the listed space.

The South African Landscape

South Africa’s private credit market is influenced by the unique dynamics of its capital markets. The listed debt market is infamously characterised by illiquidity due to the dominance of institutional investors who typically hold assets until maturity. The resulting lack of a robust secondary market makes establishing reliable mark-to-market prices problematic.

Furthermore, the attractive yield and high liquidity offered by South African Government Bonds (SAGBs) often make corporate credit comparatively unattractive for conservative asset managers, discouraging diversification away from sovereign risk.

In this context, private credit provides essential capital to areas traditionally underserved, overlooked or deemed too complex by traditional banks. This includes addressing South Africa’s estimated R509 billion SME credit gap, supporting job creation across 19 distinct economic sectors. It also channels funding into development priorities like affordable housing, student accommodation, and infrastructure, offering both financial returns and measurable social impact. Major institutional investors, such as the Public Investment Corporation (PIC), are increasingly turning to private debt for its clear structure and reliable income, favouring it over illiquid equities and complex private equity deals across the continent.

Bridging the Transparency Gap: The Digital Ecosystem

A key structural limitation of global private credit markets, particularly relative to public markets, is their opacity, lack of price discovery, and illiquidity. As we have discussed previously with the Ghost Mail community, over reliance on mark-to-market pricing in illiquid markets can be deeply misleading as a single distressed trade can skew valuations far from a bond’s intrinsic worth (or fair value).

To address these challenges and enhance market efficiency, integrity, and transparency in South Africa’s fixed-income ecosystem, Intengo is employing technology to bridge the mechanics of private and listed credit.

A critical component of this emerging infrastructure is the ability to manage private and bespoke instruments seamlessly alongside more traditional public assets. Achieving operational and liquidity interoperability between these two segments would mark a major step forward, creating a more efficient, integrated, and resilient financial ecosystem.

Workflow Automation: The use of advanced workflow tools enables automation of crucial processes such as new fundraise creation for issuers, electronic fund allocation for selected investors; and integrated settlement orchestration. Automation reduces operational errors in both public and private debt issuance. However, continued reliance on manual processes, such as managing private transactions outside of the platform, increases the likelihood of errors. This further reinforces the value of a unified, automated workflow solution.

Multi-Asset Liquidity: Addressing the limited secondary trading volume requires a system that extends well beyond traditional listed bonds. Future advancements in the industry must establish a centralised venue for multilateral negotiation and trading of a range of assets, merging traditional listed instruments with dematerialised loans or notes, REPOs, and other structured products. This shift supports the goal of improving liquidity and execution capabilities for the entire market.

Intengo Market provides a digital ecosystem designed for debt issuers, investors, and intermediaries that is addressing these exact market challenges.

Crucially, Intengo enhances pricing transparency and discovery by integrating market intelligence and leveraging its unique data advantage. The platform collects anonymised auction bid-level data and secondary market trading data to build independent fair value curves. Unlike models based solely on listed data, Intengo’s approach incorporates the collective intelligence of the local institutional investor base to model credit spread curves that reflect true market consensus. This separates fundamental value from short-term market volatility, delivering rigorous, transparent analytics that bring private credit pricing closer to the efficiency of public markets.

Conclusion

The expansion of private credit is not a cyclical phenomenon, but a structural shift driven by an evolving and more sophisticated investor universe couple with a cost sensitive issuer base. While the inherent challenges of illiquidity, complexity, and valuation opacity remain central to the asset class, the South African market presents compelling opportunities for institutional investors who possess the local expertise to navigate its complexities. By leveraging technological platforms to enhance origination capabilities, data transparency and streamline transaction execution, the South African private credit market is poised to mature further, providing critical bespoke financing for growth while delivering potentially attractive risk-adjusted returns for sophisticated institutional investors.

Ghost Bites (Harmony Gold | Metrofile | Orion Minerals | Quantum Foods | Safari Investments)

Harmony Gold has completed the MAC Copper acquisition (JSE: HAR)

The R18.4 billion transaction is just one example of large mining houses chasing copper

Harmony Gold announced the MAC Copper acquisition back in May 2025. It always takes several months to get deals of this size across the line. The good news is that the wait is over, with Harmony implementing the deal with effect from 24 October. The total equity value was R18.4 billion ($1.01 billion), funding using cash reserves and a bridge facility (debt).

Harmony will focus on integrating MAC Copper into their group over the next three months. They will give a detailed update on operational performance and key development milestones when interim results are released in February/March 2026.


Metrofile has released the circular for the Mango Holding take-private (JSE: MFL)

The shareholder meeting will take place in November

After many years of deals waiting in the wings and not materialising, Metrofile shareholders finally have a take-private to consider in the form of a scheme of arrangement. A special purpose vehicle put together by Mango Holding acts as the offeror, with the plan being for the offeror to obtain a platform across Africa and the Middle East. If you work your way up the chain, you eventually land at WndrCo LLC as the largest individual shareholder, a technology investment firm focused on consumerisation of software. That makes sense. There are some other entrepreneurs and high net worth individuals involved who have experience in software as well.

For Metrofile shareholders, it’s much simpler than that: the scheme is a way to sell their shares at a premium of 95% to the 30-day VWAP up to 25 March, the day prior to the release of the cautionary. Before you get too excited about that premium, you need to see a multi-year chart of the share price:

As you can see, the price was extremely depressed when the offeror swooped earlier this year. The price of R3.25 per share is in line with where the shares traded in July 2023, except the offeror would be getting control of the company for this price!

A deal isn’t a deal until the conditions have been met, with the most important one at this stage being the shareholder approval. Irrevocable undertakings have been received from holders of 52.81% of shares in issue. That’s a very good start, but it doesn’t guarantee a successful outcome. They need 75% approval for the scheme.

The general meeting for the vote by shareholders is scheduled for 24 November.


Orion Minerals looks back on a watershed quarter (JSE: ORN)

The share price really tells the story

Junior mining companies are required to release quarterly activity reports to keep the market updated about the progress being made. Even if you know nothing about Orion Minerals, this chart will give you an idea of how important the latest quarter has been:

The biggest driver of this change in sentiment was the signing of a non-binding term sheet with a subsidiary of Glencore (JSE: GLN) for a financing package of $200 – $250 million. They’ve also made a key appointment of a project director and focused on further work at the underlying projects.

If you follow the company, you’ll also know that Orion has been busy with post-quarter capital raising activities. The planned raise was upsized a couple of times to the current level of roughly R99 million. Cash on hand at the end of the quarter was only around R6 million, so these capital raises are very necessary.


Quantum Foods is enjoying much better operating conditions (JSE: QFH)

HEPS shot up in FY25

Quantum Foods released a trading statement for the year ended September 2025. We knew that it was going to be a strong year, as interim HEPS was up by a rather spectacular 244%. Yes, this means that interim HEPS more than tripled!

The full-year move wasn’t nearly as impressive, but nobody is going to complain about a HEPS move of between 58% and 78%. It’s actually worth isolating the second half of the year to get a sense of the maintainable growth rate. In 2H’24, HEPS was 58.7 cents (you calculate this by substracting the comparable interim HEPS from the comparable full-year HEPS). In 2H’25, HEPS was between 52.6 cents and 68.6 cents. You can therefore see that the move in the second half of the year was very tame in comparison to the first half. At the midpoint of guidance (60.6 cents for 2H’25), it reflects growth of 3.2% for the second half.

Why is this the case? Well, it all makes sense when you look at how severely the previous period was hit by HPAI outbreaks (bird flu) and load shedding, particularly in the first half of FY24. This effect was less significant in the year-on-year growth for the second half of the year. Another reason why 2H’25 was softer is because egg prices in FY25 were 17% lower than in FY24. Despite a 79% jump in egg supply, the egg operations actually suffered a drop in profitability year-on-year because of the prices.

Thankfully, the weighted average cost of broiler feed was down 2% and layer feed was unchanged, thanks to a drop in price of soya meal that helped them offset the impact of expensive yellow maize. This is one of the reasons why the farming business was the star of the show on a year-on-year basis, with much higher layer flock numbers driving efficiencies and better cost recoveries. They talk about “much improved earnings” despite a small HPAI outbreak and other irritations like an administrative penalty related to a farm in the Eastern Cape. On the broiler side of the farming business, volumes were up and cost recoveries benefitted as a result.

In the feed business, total volumes were up 9% as volumes supplied to the external market and internally were boosted by the recovery in flocks across the country.

In the other African operations, Zambia and particularly Mozambique were difficult, with the latter impacted by civil unrest and outright theft of 16% of the birds in an incident in December 2024. Uganda thankfully has a far more positive story to tell, with earnings heading in the right direction.

Full results will be available on 28 November. The share price closed 13.6% higher on the day of results, but this was on very thin volumes and you can safely ignore that move. Interestingly, the share price is down 12.7% year-to-date and down 23.6% over 12 months.


Safari Investments isn’t wasting any time with its plan to go private (JSE: SAR)

The circular is out in the wild already

On 17 October, Safari Investments released a firm intention announcement regarding a plan to repurchase all the shares not held by Heriot REIT (JSE: HET) and its subsidiaries. In other words, this is Heriot taking Safari Investments private, but using Safari’s balance sheet. They are in a hurry to get it done, with the circular already released and the delisting date penciled in for 23 December.

Safari’s stock is highly illiquid and Heriot already owns 59.2% of the fund, so a delisting makes sense here. Another reason for the delisting is that Safari plans to undertake developments going forwards, so that makes things difficult for a REIT in terms of consistent dividends.

Irrevocable undertakings have been received from holders of 34.03% of the shares eligible to vote. This is an important point to understand. Heriot and its concert parties have 61.28% of the shares in issue, so only 38.72% of total shares in issue are eligible to vote. From that voting pool, 75% approval is required and they’ve locked in irrevocables from 34.03% (i.e. 34.03% of the 38.72%, not 34.03% of all shares in issue).

Incredibly, the fair value range of the shares is between R7.67 and R8.54, despite the net asset value (NAV) per share being R11.77 as at June 2025. In determining this fair value range, Moore acted as independent expert and used discounted cash flow and capitalisation of earnings. They took note of the much higher NAV per share and applied a market-related discount of 35.16% (based on observable JSE discounts) to arrive at the fair value.

In summary: the NAV of JSE-listed property funds is about as useful as those stapled condoms that once made headlines in South Africa. We know this already, but here it is in black and white. REITs are valued on yield and yield alone. It’s time that impairments to balance sheets were recognised to take this into account.


Nibbles:

  • Director dealings:
    • To give you an idea of what truly impressive balance sheets look like, Capitec (JSE: CPI) announced a couple of transactions by the founders. Michiel le Roux executed an option transaction with a put strike price of around R2,754 and a call strike of around R5,251 (the current spot price is R4,030). The expiry date is 1.29 years on average. The options relate to 350,000 shares, or a casual R1.4 billion in shares based on the call price! Separately, an associate of Piet Mouton pledged shares worth R2.3 billion for a loan facility. What do the kids say again? Aah yes, “there are levels to this game”.
    • A director of OUTsurance (JSE: OUT) bought shares worth over R3.25 million.
    • A non-executive director of Hammerson (JSE: HMN), bought shares in the company worth nearly R180k through the reinvestment of dividends.
    • The CEO of Spear REIT (JSE: SEA) bought shares in his family investment vehicles worth R98k.
    • The CEO of Vunani (JSE: VUN) bought shares worth R4k, adding to his recent purchases.
  • Canal+ has begun the squeeze-out process to acquire the remaining shares in MultiChoice (JSE: MCG). The MultiChoice listing is suspended from trading with effect from 27 October and will be terminated on 10 December (subject to final regulatory steps). For this reason, MultiChoice will not be releasing its interim results on 12 November 2025 as would otherwise have been the case.
  • With shareholders having given their support to the Natco Pharma offer, Adcock Ingram (JSE: AIP) has confirmed that the listing will be terminated with effect from 11 November. The scheme consideration of R75 per share will be paid to shareholders on 10 November.
  • Pan African Resources (JSE: PAN) has officially transitioned from the AIM to the London Stock Exchange Main Market. The company hasn’t issued any new shares in this regard. They’ve simple transferred the listing from the development board to the main board in a move that should help them attract larger institutional shareholders.
  • Barloworld (JSE: BAW) announced that Nopasika Lila is retiring as group finance director. According to the announcement, she leaves from 31 November 2025 – a date that doesn’t exist on the calendar! Ghostly dates aside, new finance director Relebohile Sehoole will be in that role with effect from 1 December 2025. At least that’s a date that you can find in your Outlook calendar. This is an internal promotion, which is always good to see.
  • Africa Bitcoin Corporation (JSE: BAC) announced that BDO has resigned as external auditor. This is because Forvis Mazars in South Africa has been appointed as auditor of the subsidiary Africa Bitcoin Strategies, which is en route to becoming a significant component of the group. BDO is looking to avoid a situation where they need to rely on an audit conducted by another firm on a large component of the group. The company hasn’t announced a new external auditor yet.

Outwit, outplay, outproduce: the day TV got real

How a tropical island experiment, a writers’ strike, and a collapsing TV economy gave birth to modern day reality television.

The year was 2000. Pants were worn low, bean bags were everywhere, and you had to hit the number 6 three times on your Motorola Razr to type a letter “o”. Most people were just happy to have survived the Y2K bug. Little did we all know that our lives were about to be permanently altered – because this was the summer that Survivor premiered. 

Before this moment, prime-time television was either rehearsed laughter in sitcoms, carefully plotted twists in dramas, or polished faces on talk shows. Then CBS sent sixteen strangers into an island wilderness and waited for a different kind of storytelling to unfold. Instead of a script, the world tuned in to the slow, combustible chemistry of humans under pressure.

It is tempting to tell the story of Survivor as a show that arrived fully formed and changed everything overnight. The truth is messier and more interesting. Reality television had been inching its way into American homes for years. Fox’s Cops and America’s Most Wanted had already blurred the line between reportage and entertainment while MTV’s The Real World (born of the early 1990s) had proved that unvarnished young lives could sustain narrative arcs across a season. But Survivor altered the gravitational pull of the medium. It turned unscripted spectacle into an engine that could fill schedules, attract advertisers, and redefine what networks thought viewers wanted. In short: it launched reality TV. 

The market that found its formula

When the finale of the first season of Survivor aired, 51 million viewers tuned in. For context, that number belonged to an era when network television still measured cultural gravity in tens of millions of viewers per event; that year, it was a rating only eclipsed by the Super Bowl. The ratings translated into advertising gold, with CBS reportedly charging $600,000 per 30 second ad slot during the finale. The rest of the industry quickly sat up and took notice.

But Survivor didn’t just succeed because it was entertaining; it worked because it arrived at the exact moment the old model of television was collapsing under its own weight. By the late 1990s, scripted programming had become prohibitively expensive. Networks were paying millions per episode to retain stars, and writers’ guild negotiations had grown increasingly fraught. The 1988 Writers Guild strike (one of the longest in Hollywood history at the time) had already exposed how vulnerable networks were to production shutdowns. Executives began quietly searching for formats that could bypass unions altogether – shows without scripts, without actors, and without the constant threat of collective bargaining.

When Survivor arrived, it offered the perfect economic solution. It required no name-brand talent, no residuals, and no writers’ rooms full of salaried professionals. The drama was human and unscripted, the labour non-union, the costs minimal. Reality television was a new genre, sure, but it was also a business model born out of financial necessity. It allowed networks to fill airtime year-round without the overhead of scripted production, and audiences, exhausted by formulaic sitcoms, devoured the novelty.

No surprise, then, that the following years felt like a chain reaction. CBS doubled down on the success of Survivor by launching Big Brother and The Amazing Race, while Fox answered with American Idol. By the mid-2000s, every major network had a version of reality that suited its brand – ABC had The Bachelor and Extreme Makeover: Home Edition, NBC ran The Apprentice and The Biggest Loser; while MTV pivoted from music videos to household sagas with The Osbournes and Newlyweds. The medium matured not into a single shape but into many: competition, voyeurism, makeover, talent. In 2003 the Emmys created categories to acknowledge the impact. Reality TV had shifted from a curiosity into an industry.

How real is “real”?

From the start, the producers behind Survivor wanted to manufacture chaos. Their original plan for the show’s opening was to literally sink the ship that the contestants were on and have them swim to the island. When that proved logistically impossible (and more than a little dangerous), they settled for the next best thing: loading sixteen people onto a vessel, announcing that they had ten minutes to grab whatever they could carry, and sending them off in rafts toward an island. Things went wrong practically immediately: the waves were rougher than expected, contestants were vomiting everywhere, and what looked like a short distance required more than two hours of rowing to cover. The cameras kept rolling, capturing it all.

The island itself was more wilderness than set. There were no amenities, no real shelter, and, as it turned out, not even sleeping quarters for the crew. Cameramen, sound operators, and producers found themselves camping on the same beaches as their subjects, with their notebooks dissolving in the humidity and their nights interrupted by rats and snakes crawling over their legs. Both cast and crew lost weight, battled parasites, and suffered heat exhaustion. By the end of the 40-day shoot, many were physically wrecked and emotionally frayed.

This is what made Survivor so strangely compelling: its reality was constructed, but the suffering wasn’t. The conditions forced out real tears, real hunger, real desperation. A confession filmed in the middle of that chaos might have been edited for drama, but the emotion itself was authentic; the product of exhaustion and exposure as much as narrative design.

That’s the sleight of hand that defines reality television as a whole. The illusion of pure spontaneity is built on careful orchestration, but the emotions it captures are not false. The cameras didn’t create the breakdowns, but they did make sure the breakdowns were seen. What audiences respond to isn’t factual accuracy, but emotional truth – the visceral, uncomfortable immediacy of watching people pushed to their limits.

The people left to pick up the pieces

The consequences of manufactured authenticity are both personal and institutional. Contestants returning from seasons of Survivor are often in poor physical and emotional shape. Parasites, weight loss, and psychological strain are not rare. The first season of Survivor had “therapists” on set that contestants could request to talk to – but these therapists were on the CBS payroll, and therefore occupied a conflicted place between care and production priorities. After months of deprivation and public scrutiny, many former players described an unsettling sense of betrayal. They had been invited to participate in an experience that promised adventure and exposure, only to find themselves subject to manipulation in service of entertainment.

That ethical tension followed the shows into the culture at large. Reality television has normalised certain types of voyeurism, and it raised questions about consent in pressured circumstances and the responsibilities producers hold toward participants. Those questions have still not fully been answered, even as 57% of new TV programming today is classified as reality TV. Since 2000, at least 38 reality TV participants have died by suicide. The genre built its empire on access to the most vulnerable parts of human experience, but in doing so, it forced us to confront an uncomfortable truth: the line between storytelling and harm is far thinner than television ever let on.

What it left behind

You could argue that Survivor taught television to trade in intimacy. Audiences learned to care about ordinary people in extraordinary situations, to root for underdogs, to analyse social gameplay with the same intensity critics applied to scripted narratives. The genre diversified, hybridised, and metastasised into shows about talent, transformation, and competition. It reshaped summer programming and rebalanced industry economics in favour of formats that could be produced quickly and cheaply.

Two decades on, Survivor itself endures, its edges refined, its craftsmanship slicker, its players more strategic and media-savvy. The island is less of an accident and more of a calibrated laboratory (rumour has it the crew have actual quarters these days). Yet the fundamental equation remains the same: remove the comforts that prop up civilized behaviour, challenge people to meet one another in a confined social field, and let the human drama do the rest. 

After all these years, the tribe still speaks. We listen – sometimes appalled, often delighted – and we keep coming back for more, not because we believe everything we see, but because, for a few hours a week, television gives us a mirror that is discomfitingly human. There’s just far more reality TV to choose from these days.

About the author: Dominique Olivier

Dominique Olivier is the founder of human.writer, where she uses her love of storytelling and ideation to help brands solve problems.

She is a weekly columnist in Ghost Mail and collaborates with The Finance Ghost on Ghost Mail Weekender, a Sunday publication designed to help you be more interesting. She now also writes a regular column for Daily Maverick.

Dominique can be reached on LinkedIn here.

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